Although New Guinea's Thunderbolt pilots faced several different types of enemy aircraft in capricious tropical conditions, by far their most common adversary was the Nakajima Ki-43-II Hayabusa, codenamed 'Oscar' by the Allies. These two opposing fighters were the products of two radically different design philosophies. The Thunderbolt was heavy, fast and packed a massive punch thanks to its battery of eight 0.50-cal machine guns, while the 'Oscar' was the complete opposite in respect to fighter design philosophy – lightweight, nimble, manoeuvrable and lightly armed. It was, nonetheless, deadly in the hands of an experienced pilot. The Thunderbolt commenced operations in New Guinea with a series of bomber escort missions in mid-1943, and its firepower and superior speed soon saw Fifth Air Force fighter command deploying elite groups of P-47s to Wewak, on the northern coast. Flying from there, they would pick off unwary enemy aircraft during dedicated fighter patrols. The Thunderbolt pilots in New Guinea slowly wore down their Japanese counterparts by continual combat and deadly strafing attacks, but nevertheless, the Ki-43-II remained a worthy opponent deterrent up until Hollandia was abandoned by the IJAAF in April 1944. Fully illustrated throughout with artwork and rare photographs, this fascinating book examines these two vastly different fighters in the New Guinea theatre, and assesses the unique geographic conditions that shaped their deployment and effectiveness.
Nakajima K-43 Hayabusa, code-named Oscar by the Allies, was the Imperial Japanese Army's equivalent of the Zero fighter in service with the Imperial Navy. In combat units the machine replaced the aging Ki-27. Manufactured in large numbers, the fighter remained in frontline service until the end of the war. By the time its final version entered production, the development of its successor - the Ki-84 - had already started. The Ki-43 was a very maneuverable machine, but in many areas it was inferior to its adversaries. Despite its fragile design, poor armament and almost no armored protection, the Ki-43 was well-liked by the Japanese pilots and it became a symbol of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service. Hayabusa was the pinnacle of the Japanese fighter design development until the lessons learned in the Pacific laid the ground for new approaches to the construction of tactical aircraft.
The JAAF Nakajima Ki-49 DONRYU (Helen) is presented in this volume. All variations, markings and units are covered in this, the seventh in a multi-volume series.
The 100th title of Osprey's celebrated Aircraft of the Aces series covers a subject sure to be of interest to historians of World War II. The Ki-44 'Tojo' was a fast-climbing, heavily armed point-defence interceptor that was used successfully in slashing hit-and-run tactics that caught Allied pilots by surprise. In the air defense role 'Tojos' pioneered the deployment of a unique 40 mm cannon, the firing system which had no cartridges but instead had the propelling charge contained in the base of the projectile. The Ki-44 was to be used by the JAAF in larger numbers in China than anywhere else. This exciting title from author Nicholas Millman brings the Ki-44's role in the Pacific theatre to vivid life, accompanied by full color plates and archival photographs.
Dubbed the 'Oscar' by the Allies, the Ki-43 Hayabusa was the most prolific Japanese fighter of World War II. Produced in great numbers, it initially proved superior to most US and British fighter types, due to its excellent maneuverability. The light weight and large wing area gave it a small turning radius and a high rate-of-climb which was ideal for pilots in close combat fighting. However, the Ki-43's swiftness and agility came at a price, with the low-wing design meaning that firepower and safety had to be sacrificed. With only two machine guns, a Ki-43 pilot would have to perform a dangerous balancing act between achieving a high rate of kills and their own survival. Surprisingly, more Japanese pilots achieved Ace status flying the Hayabusa than any other plane and despite being steadily outclassed by new fighters, the Ki-43 remained in frontline JAAF service until the war's end. This book expertly charts the experiences of the pilots and discusses the early stages of the war in South-East Asia, China, Burma and New Guinea. Accompanied by detailed appendices and specially commissioned artwork, this is the first volume in English to focus exclusively on the exploits of the Ki-43.
Although the German Me 163 Komet rocket fighter was created as a remedy for the mass air raids of the Allied air force on Germany, its origins date back to 1938. Alexander Lippisch then began work at the DFS factory on a tailless rocket-propelled aircraft, designated as DFS 194. At the beginnings of 1939, the project was handed over to the Messerschmitt factory and there it developed into the Me 163A. Two prototypes of this aircraft - V4 and V5 - were completed in 1941 and flown as gliders. Then the V4 received a Walter HWK R.II rocket engine with a thrust of 7.5 kN, and on October 2, 1941 H. Dittmar achieved a speed of 1003 km/h on mentioned plane. Thirteen Me 163As were built for training.
Nakajima K-43 Hayabusa, code-named Oscar by the Allies, was the Imperial Japanese Army's equivalent of the Zero fighter in service with the Imperial Navy. In combat units the machine replaced the aging Ki-27. Manufactured in large numbers, the fighter remained in frontline service until the end of the war. By the time its final version entered production, the development of its successor - the Ki-84 - had already started. The Ki-43 was a very maneuverable machine, but in many areas it was inferior to its adversaries. Despite its fragile design, poor armament and almost no armored protection, the Ki-43 was well-liked by the Japanese pilots and it became a symbol of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service. Hayabusa was the pinnacle of the Japanese fighter design development until the lessons learned in the Pacific laid the ground for new approaches to the construction of tactical aircraft.
Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943 —a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the US Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. Letourneau contends that this was not entirely the case. He argues that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a ""wait-and-see"" posture. Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE. The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea -—including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties -—during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE. The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons. The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts."
