The Prussian Army invented the systems of modern war, and Helmuth von Moltke was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate--in the three wars of German unification against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865), and France (1870-71)--the war processes invented during his lifetime. These processes have been used in all modern 20th-century wars because they respond to the size, space, time, and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments as an aspect of Moltke's life as a professional soldier.
Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke’s thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on “Moltke the Elder” that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke’s enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War “Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor’s careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.”—Foreign Affairs Magazine “This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history’s greatest geniuses. [Moltke’s] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended.”—Armed Forces Journal “A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History
"The Moltke Myth is author Terence Zuber's groundbreaking book on Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. Often referred to as Moltke the Elder, he is portrayed today as the nearly-infallible victor of the Prussian wars in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria, and in 1871 against France. Moltke the Elder is known as a brilliant, innovative planner and master of the battlefield. The Moltke Myth shows that this "common knowledge" is based solely on hero-worship and simplistic generalizations." "Zuber, a career infantry officer, subjects Moltke's plans and orders to a militarily professional analysis. He asserts a new premise that Moltke was a normal human being who made grave errors like systematically failing to use cavalry reconnaissance and never knowing the location of his enemy. Zuber presents the true story about how realistic peacetime training and tactical excellence in combat helped the Prussian army win battles. The Moltke Myth offers stimulating new perspectives on tactics and strategy in the Wars of German Unification."--BOOK JACKET.
The Prussian army invented modern war processes, and Helmuth von Moltke (1800 - 1891) was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate the war processes invented during his lifetime. In this book, Bucholz examines Moltke's work and the processes he utilised in each of the three wars of German unification: against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865) and France (1870-71). Moltke's achievements have become a legacy for modern military strategists. The procedures he developed have been used in all of the wars of the twentieth century - the Persian Gulf War of 1991 may be its most interesting example - beacuse they respond to the size, space, time and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments in a unique way, by using organisational, knowledge and learning theory, by looking closely at Moltke's life as a professional soldier and by bringing little-known research in the field to a wider audience.
The Wars of German Unification is the definitive account of the three of the most decisive conflicts in the history of modern Europe. In this new edition, Dennis Showalter offers a thoroughly updated look at the wars and their context that will be invaluable for those interested in the military, social and political history of the period. Showalter explores how the Schleswig-Holstein conflict of 1864; the 'Six Weeks War' of 1866; and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 fundamentally altered the balance of power in 19th-century Europe. They marked the establishment of Prussian hegemony in central Europe, the creation of the Bismarckian Reich in 1871, the reduction of Habsburg influence and the collapse of Napoleon III's Second Empire. The Wars of German Unification offers a balanced and incisive account of the wars, their origins and their consequences, and firmly embeds these conflicts in their political, ideological and military contexts. This volume traces the transition from the 'cabinet wars' of the 19th century and shows how the conflicts that made up the wars of German unification provided the foundation for the birth of modern warfare.
"But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists - Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoening, and their American and European counterparts - were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield."--BOOK JACKET.
On July 19, 1870, Emperor Napoleon III of France declared war against the Prussia of King William I and Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck. This book depicts the world in which that war took place. In this study of the diplomatic history of the Franco-Prussian War, the author draws extensively on private and official records, journalistic accounts, cabinet minutes, and public statements by key players to produce a book that is unmatched in the range and clarity of its analysis, its characterizations, and its vivid language. -- Description from book cover.
A historian analyzes the Franco-Prussian War’s Battle of Sedan, from its causes and effects, to the characters involved. The Franco-Prussian War was a turning point in the history of nineteenth-century Europe, and the Battle of Sedan was the pivotal event in that war. For the Germans, their overwhelming victory symbolized the birth of their nation, forged in steel and tempered in the blood of the common enemy. For the French, it was a defeat more complete and humiliating than Waterloo. Author Douglas Fermer’s fresh study of this traumatic moment in European history reconsiders how the mutual fear and insecurity of two rival nations tempted their governments to seek a solution to domestic tensions by waging war against each other. His compelling narrative shows how war came about, and how the dramatic campaign of summer 1870 culminated in a momentous clash of arms at Sedan. He gives fascinating insights into the personalities and aims of the politicians and generals involved but also spotlights the experiences of ordinary soldiers and civilians. Praise for Sedan 1870 “Fermer is an eminently readable author and his books well worth the investment. Sedan 1870, is an excellent study in hubris and hunger, doctrine and professionalism and the underlying motivation that drives troops, regardless of the quality of their leadership, to astonishing levels of self-sacrifice.” —Chris Buckham, The Military Reviewer
