Author: Iulia Cioroianu

Publisher:

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

This paper presents an agent-based model of political competition over multiple heterogeneous electoral districts. Both the positions of district candidates and those of their national parties are endogenously determined and allowed to differ. Candidates are free to choose their position at the district level, but their success in elections also depends on the position of the national party. The ideological space is two-dimensional, thus advancing the results of previous models of electoral competition over multiple districts, which have only analyzed the case of a single policy dimension. In each district, candidates from two national parties compete in plurality elections. Voters' utility depends on both the distance between their ideal position and the position of the candidates, as well as the distance between their ideal position and the position of the candidates' party in congress. After each election, the policy positions of the national parties are determined as the median of the positions of their successful district candidates. If the candidates' vote share increased in the previous election, they make a small move in the same direction they came from; if their vote share decreased, they move in the opposite direction. The results show that neither national parties nor local candidates converge to the same position in the policy space. In the long run, candidates try to balance district preferences against the position of their party. The extent to which they tend to satisfy their district voters at the expense of the national party is positively related to the weight voters place on candidate positions, as opposed to national party positions. Incumbency turnover is higher where voters value the positions of national parties more, and where the districts are more homogenous.