Military Leadership in the 21st Centuryaims to provide junior commanders or entry-level military officers with an introductory-level appreciation of the key concepts and issues related to military leadership from a social-behavioral science perspective. The book focuses on "direct-level" or "team leadership". It has three main themes: (1) the human dimension of military operations and organization; (2) the main approaches to direct or team-level leadership, including the trait-approach, values or ethical leadership, and leadership styles and behaviors; and (3) the challenges of leadership in 21st century military operations, organizations, and, the 21st century military profession. Besides learning key leadership-related concepts and issues, readers are also introduced to key events, institutions and social-behavioral scientific research programs that have shaped contemporary military leadership doctrines and systems.
This illuminating study critiques the concept of leadership as understood in the last 75 years and looks to the twenty-first century for a reconstructed understanding of leadership in the postindustrial era. More similarities in past decades were found than had been thought; the thread throughout Rost's book is that leadership was conceived of as good management. He develops a new definition and paradigm for leadership in this volume that distinguishes leadership from management in fundamental ways. The ethics of leadership from a postindustrial perspective completes the paradigm. The book concludes with suggestions that can be immediately utilized in helping to transform our understanding of leadership.
Second Place Winner of the MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition for the CGSC Class 2008-01. The United States Army should reassess its leadership philosophy, in much the same way that it reconsidered its view of Army Operations with FM 3-0, in order to account for evolutions in our society as well as an increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment for the Army in the 21st century. While the Army's doctrine has certainly matured regarding the subjects of leadership and leader development, with pertinent regulations and field manuals updated within the last two years, the Army has yet to fully account for modern demands on Army leaders, changes in society, and potential improvements in the Army's leadership climate. Despite efforts by Army leaders like General Shinseki to evaluate our leader development programs and subsequently examine Army culture as it effects leadership and leader development1, our doctrine and practices remain deeply rooted in historical traditions - heavily biased by relatively sophomoric assumptions about what leadership is and how it is best practiced. We lack critical reflection on the subject - an appreciation of other ways to look at leadership and leader development and an understanding of why our doctrine is rather than simply what it is. This paper is an attempt to critically examine several aspects of the Army's view on leadership in the 21st century and posit recommendations for change to better prepare our Army's leaders for current and future circumstances.
As the nature of warfare evolves, the Army must produce leaders who comfortably interact with diverse populations and embrace complexity. This emerging truth dictates a need for change in how Army officers are trained and selected to lead at the highest levels in order to regain the initiative in managing today's fluid operational environment. The concept of strategic leadership, therefore, must be examined closely in Army doctrine. Social, cultural, and complex problem-solving skills are becoming a priority and must be developed in young officers to provide enough knowledge for senior leaders to leverage later in their careers. Rarely does the typical Army career prepare someone to succeed in the strategic arena where the non-military elements of national power carry greater effects than large numbers of troops and equipment. The basic question addressed in this study is “how effective is the U.S. Army at developing strategic thinkers capable of leading decisively in complex and adaptive environments?” To answer this question, three distinct areas are analyzed: (1) the ability of the Officer Education System (OES) to distinguish critical abilities deemed necessary to succeed in the modern security environment, (2) the ability of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) to measure an individual's dedication to self study and lifelong education, and (3) the ability of the same OERS to measure individual skills acquired through operational experience. The Army's current OES pushes the most complex topics to the final stages of an officer's educational career. As a result, few officers get a chance to expand their intellectual boundaries through critical and creative thinking prior to their field grade experience. Doing business this way denies the opportunity for junior level officers to develop the requisite skills needed to excel in the strategic arena. The Army must promote advanced educational opportunities as healthy and necessary to a young officer's career. As the key process for reporting a leader's abilities and potential for advancement, the OERS focuses primarily on current performance and provides little incentive to highlight an officer's dedication to career-long professional development. The over-valuing of short-term success negates the potential benefits of continuous learning, a long-term endeavor. The result of such short-sightedness stifles innovation while entrenching a “business as usual” approach to leadership development ignoring the changing operational environment. The personnel management system continues to emphasize combat deployments, regardless of skills acquired, over an officer's need for professional development. The current version of the OER fails to utilize the leader development aspects it was designed to accomplish. The Army must look into traits and attributes particular to leaders at the senior levels in order to develop context-based evaluation systems. Junior and senior level leaders should not be evaluated on the same scale. A way to accomplish this is to establish qualitative standards for branch qualification based on operational experiences, not just on the number of months assigned. To force a change in the culture and career progression of leaders prepared for 21st century warfare, the officer education and evaluation methodologies must adapt to reflect the complexities of the contemporary operating environment. To accomplish this, the Army must adjust its leader development systems to recognize and promote strategic thinking much earlier than in past generations.
A history of modern military command, from the individualist, heroic generals of the twentieth century to the highly-professionalised command teams of the twenty-first. Profiling prominent contemporary generals and their staffs, King vividly analyses divisional headquarters, giving a unique insight into the transformation of military command.
As the nature of warfare evolves, the Army must produce leaders who comfortably interact with diverse populations and embrace complexity. This emerging truth dictates a need for change in how Army officers are trained and selected to lead at the highest levels in order to regain the initiative in managing today's fluid operational environment. The concept of strategic leadership, therefore, must be examined closely in Army doctrine. Social, cultural, and complex problem-solving skills are becoming a priority and must be developed in young officers to provide enough knowledge for senior leaders to leverage later in their careers. Rarely does the typical Army career prepare someone to succeed in the strategic arena where the non-military elements of national power carry greater effects than large numbers of troops and equipment. The basic question addressed in this study is "how effective is the U.S. Army at developing strategic thinkers capable of leading decisively in complex and adaptive environments?" To answer this question, three distinct areas are analyzed: (1) the ability of the Officer Education System (OES) to distinguish critical abilities deemed necessary to succeed in the modern security environment, (2) the ability of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) to measure an individual's dedication to self study and lifelong education, and (3) the ability of the same OERS to measure individual skills acquired through operational experience.
This report represents the findings and recommendations of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. Congress asked the commission to "conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the armed forces, including minority members who are senior officers." The commission's recommendations support two overriding and related objectives: (1) that the armed forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the public it serves and the forces it leads and (2) that the services pursue a broader approach to diversity that includes the range of backgrounds, skill sets, and personal attributes that are necessary to enhancing military performance. The commission finds several tacit barriers to advancement throughout a service member's career, such as a lack of clarity regarding promotion opportunities, and also one overt barrier: the policy excluding women from combat. The commission proposes changes which would start at the moment of recruiting, and proposes allowing women to serve in combat.
No one man can win a battle by himself, but battles have been won and lost because of the strength or failings of one individual: the leader. What went on in the minds and hearts of a select group of military leaders at critical moments in battle is the theme of this book. In Leaders and Battles, W. J. Wood re-creates ten battles from history, depicting the action in vivid detail—the brilliant formations, charging horses, clanking bayonets. The point of view is always that of the commanding officer. The particular quality of leadership that won—or lost—the encounter is very clear. For Mad Anthony Wayne at Stony Point, it was courage that won the day. For Scipio Africanus at Ilipa, it was imagination. Custer’s judgment at the Little Big Horn was definitely in question. When the French stormed Ratisbon, it was the inspiration of Lannes that broke the impasse. At the battle of Bushy Run, Bouquet could never have outwitted Pontiac had he lacked flexibility. The dynamics of battle as well as the strategy and tactics involved are equally well demonstrated. Though the means of fighting varied as much as the time and the civilizations involved, the lessons learned are just as applicable today. Men no longer fight with drawn swords, make barricades out of mealie bags, or use a swarm of bees as a weapon. But that is part of this book’s fascination. Leaders and Battles is a remarkable retelling of fighting engagements for the armchair strategist, the leader in training, the history buff, and the general reader. It will take time before the major wars and low-intensity skirmishes of this century can be written about with the historical detachment and understanding that the author displays here. In the meantime, we can all profit from these lessons of history.
