This 2nd volume of the series builds on the themes of volume 1. Established concepts and theoretical issues are presented by established scholars in the governance, management and administration fields. These are set alongside highlighted emerging themes, and they're practicality illustrated through specific case examples.
This text studies transaction cost economics, influential in economic thought on how institutions work. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes it in organizational terms, as a governance structure.
This edited volume provides a comprehensive overview of the diverse and multi-faceted research on governance in multilevel systems. The book features a collection of cutting-edge trans-Atlantic contributions, covering topics such as federalism, decentralization as well as various forms and processes of regionalization and Europeanization. While the field of multilevel governance is comparatively young, research in the subject has also come of age as considerable theoretical, conceptual and empirical advances have been achieved since the first influential works were published in the early noughties. The present volume aims to gauge the state-of-the-art in the different research areas as it brings together a selection of original contributions that are united by a variety of configurations, dynamics and mechanisms related to governing in multilevel systems.
Abstract: "Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site.
What factors have played a negative role in the implementation of this IT Governance mechanism? What governance mechanisms will be used for the mobile strategy and day-to-day operations? What IT Governance mechanisms have been implemented as a result of culture-cognitive influences? What IT Governance mechanisms have been implemented as a result of normative influences? What governance mechanisms are in place to ensure implementation? Defining, designing, creating, and implementing a process to solve a challenge or meet an objective is the most valuable role... In EVERY group, company, organization and department. Unless you are talking a one-time, single-use project, there should be a process. Whether that process is managed and implemented by humans, AI, or a combination of the two, it needs to be designed by someone with a complex enough perspective to ask the right questions. Someone capable of asking the right questions and step back and say, 'What are we really trying to accomplish here? And is there a different way to look at it?' This Self-Assessment empowers people to do just that - whether their title is entrepreneur, manager, consultant, (Vice-)President, CxO etc... - they are the people who rule the future. They are the person who asks the right questions to make Governance Mechanism investments work better. This Governance Mechanism All-Inclusive Self-Assessment enables You to be that person. All the tools you need to an in-depth Governance Mechanism Self-Assessment. Featuring 898 new and updated case-based questions, organized into seven core areas of process design, this Self-Assessment will help you identify areas in which Governance Mechanism improvements can be made. In using the questions you will be better able to: - diagnose Governance Mechanism projects, initiatives, organizations, businesses and processes using accepted diagnostic standards and practices - implement evidence-based best practice strategies aligned with overall goals - integrate recent advances in Governance Mechanism and process design strategies into practice according to best practice guidelines Using a Self-Assessment tool known as the Governance Mechanism Scorecard, you will develop a clear picture of which Governance Mechanism areas need attention. Your purchase includes access details to the Governance Mechanism self-assessment dashboard download which gives you your dynamically prioritized projects-ready tool and shows your organization exactly what to do next. You will receive the following contents with New and Updated specific criteria: - The latest quick edition of the book in PDF - The latest complete edition of the book in PDF, which criteria correspond to the criteria in... - The Self-Assessment Excel Dashboard - Example pre-filled Self-Assessment Excel Dashboard to get familiar with results generation - In-depth and specific Governance Mechanism Checklists - Project management checklists and templates to assist with implementation INCLUDES LIFETIME SELF ASSESSMENT UPDATES Every self assessment comes with Lifetime Updates and Lifetime Free Updated Books. Lifetime Updates is an industry-first feature which allows you to receive verified self assessment updates, ensuring you always have the most accurate information at your fingertips.
Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. The authors provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large block-holder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement "tools" can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries.
This paper explores a firm's reliance on internal and external governance mechanisms, recognizing that the choice of one instrument relative to the other is itself part of the governance policy of the firm. Starting from the premise that firms' disclosure policies can foster external scrutiny and takeover activity we show that such external instruments then become substitutes for internal monitoring and restructuring. We also argue that, since technological progress affects the returns to internal and external information acquisition, its incidence on firms' disclosure policy drives the relative effectiveness of the two governance mechanisms. Specifically, we show that improvements in dissemination technology lead to more disclosure and more successful external governance, but less board monitoring and internal restructuring. By contrast, general advances affecting information processing have the opposite effect unless they only enhance internal processing capabilities such as performance measurement and reporting systems, in which case they increase voluntary disclosure. We also find that firms' disclosure policies fall short of the social optimum, thus providing a rationale for regulation that sets and enforces minimal disclosure standards. Our results are robust to the introduction of agency conflicts between shareholders and their boards, although divergent interests reduce the overall effectiveness of technological advances in fostering good governance. Throughout we discuss empirical implications and lessons for the design of corporate-governance arrangements.
This paper explores the dynamic interplay of formal/informal governance mechanisms, in terms of functional and dysfunctional consequences for both sides of the dyad, in long-term inter-organizational relationships. Using two longitudinal cases of UK defence sector procurement (warship commissioning) we move beyond notions of complementarity and substitution in governance towards a more nuanced view where the governance mix of inter-organizational relationships can be convergent or divergent. Our findings, showing that relationships can exhibit functional and dysfunctional behavior simultaneously, lead us to conclude that mismatches in governance mechanisms can be positive as well as negative. In building a context dependent understanding of governance we both summarize the (dys)functions associated with formal and informal governance mechanisms, and explore their impact on relationship exchange performance over time.
Studies in Public and Non-Profit Governance (SPNPG) publishes in a growing area of governance research. SPNPG allows for the establishment of an engaged community of researchers. It contributes to the definition of the theoretical components that assign an innovation role to governance systems in public and non profit organizations.
The concept of the circular economy (CE) has gained increasing attention as a means to achieve environmental sustainability and economic growth at the same time. This study examines the role of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms in promoting CE strategies among non-financial listed companies, which is still a relatively unexplored topic in the CE literature. Our findings indicate that the presence of stakeholder engagement practices, sustainability reporting, and environment management teams have a direct impact on the adoption of CE strategies, while the presence of a CSR committee, adherence to the United Nations' Global Compact, and executives' compensation linked to ESG performance do not have a direct effect but support CE strategies through other mechanisms. Overall, this study provides valuable insights for policymakers and managers as it shows that CG mechanisms can be used to promote the adoption of CE business models, thus contributing to climate risk mitigation objectives.
