A conspicuous feature of the modern economy is the multitude of multiunit systems that operate in several markets - an organizational form that arguably rivals the "M-form" as the 20th century's most successful. Research traditions studying multiunit systems include the multimarket perspective, which has used commitment and mutual forbearance theory, and the multiunit perspective, which has used learning and knowledge transfer theory. These perspectives are interdisciplinary, but to date there has been little direct interaction among them. This text aims to bring these areas together, discussing such things as: examining how variation in firm capabilities affects the co-ordination of branches and thus their forbearance or transfer of routines; bridging theories of market conduct and internal behaviour to explore how knowledge about markets and competitor behaviour is transferred among organizational units; making a theory of contingent multiunit or single-unit competitive advantage that can account for the coexistence of these organizational forms in many markets; and examining the effects of firm contacts in alliances or technological fields on their competitive behaviours.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
It is now almost twenty years since liberalisation and the introduction of competition was proposed for electricity utilities. Some form of restructuring has been widely adopted around the world to suit local objectives. The industry now faces new challenges associated with global warming, rising prices and escalating energy demand from developing countries like China and India. The industry will have to cope with; managing emissions; managing variable energy sources like wind, dev eloping clean coal technology; accommodating distributed generation and new nuclear stations and managing the impact of these developments on the distribution and transmission networks. It is now necessary to consider how the various market structures that were adopted have performed and how they will address some of these new issues and what further changes might be necessary. This volume presents an all-inclusive analysis of the electricity market structures that have been adopted around the world and how they are performing. It provides an up-to-date analysis of the cost of competing technologies, the operation of energy and ancillary service markets and the impact of renewable sources and emission restrictions. It takes a forward look at likely future developments necessary to cope with the new emerging issues. Part One introduces industry infrastructure, analysing state utilities, the motives behind liberalisation and the resulting structures. Part Two considers generation costs, including renewable generation costs, and investigates the cost of restricting emissions as well as transmission and distribution costs. Part Three discusses market operation, describing how costs affect the organisation of power generation. It covers trading arrangements, ancillary services, international trading and investment. Part Four looks to future markets and technological developments that will shape the industry through the next twenty years. This includes the appraisal of investment opportunities for global power companies and implications for market performance. Written by an internationally renowned consultant engineer, this book is full of expert insight and balances fundamental methodology and academic theory with practical information and diverse worked examples. This is an excellent reference on the topic for power system engineers, regulators, banks, investors, and government energy agencies. With its many worked examples, it is also a brilliant tutorial accessible for postgraduates and senior undergraduates in electrical and power engineering.
An issue-driven introduction to industrial organization, thoroughly updated and revised. The study of industrial organization (IO)—the analysis of the way firms compete with one another—has become a key component of economics and of such related disciplines as finance, strategy, and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. Although formal in its approach, it is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. This second edition has been thoroughly updated and revised. In addition to updated examples, this edition presents a more systematic treatment of public policy implications. It features added advanced sections, with analytical treatment of ideas previously presented verbally; and exercises, which allow for a deeper and more formal understanding of each topic. The new edition also includes an introduction to such empirical methods as demand estimation and equilibrium identification. Supplemental material is available online.
Recent mergers in the seed industry have led to concerns about market concentration and its potential effects on prices, product choice, and innovation. This study provides new and detailed empirical evidence on the degree of market concentration in seed and GM technology across a broad range ...
Sebastian Knoll suggests that the successful realization of growth synergies is associated with a selective focus on specific growth opportunities, decentralized cross-business collaboration that motivates productive business unit self-interest, and a corporate management approach that guides and balances this self-interest in an evolutionary fashion.
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management has been written by an international team of leading academics, practitioners and rising stars and contains almost 550 individually commissioned entries. It is the first resource of its kind to pull together such a comprehensive overview of the field and covers both the theoretical and more empirically/practitioner oriented side of the discipline.
