Over 3,600 total pages ... Contains the following publications: Small Unit Leader's Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations Mountain Leader’s Guide to Winter Operations Mountain Leader’s Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations Cold Region Operations Mountain Warfare Operations SUMMER SURVIVAL COURSE HANDBOOK WINTER SURVIVAL COURSE HANDBOOK ASSAULT CLIMBERS HANDBOOK COLD WEATHER MEDICINE COURSE WILDERNESS MEDICINE COURSE MOUNTAIN LEADER BOOK (SUMMER) MOUNTAIN LEADER MANUAL (WINTER)
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-10, MAGTF Ground Operations November 2017 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-10, MAGTF Ground Operations, provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of ground combat operations within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). It establishes a common reference on how the ground combat element (GCE) plans, task-organizes, trains, deploys, and is employed for operations. This publication is the keystone for all ground combat-oriented publications, but it does not provide detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures for specific ground combat organizations. It incorporates validated lessons learned from the last 13 years of conflict and operations and provides the link between the tactics, techniques, and procedures of subordinate publications and Service-level doctrine. This publication is intended for Marine Corps leaders of every military occupational specialty and is recommended for commanders and planners assigned to the joint force. It concentrates primarily on the GCE's warfighting capabilities as the MAGTF's decisive maneuver force in the conduct of ground combat, including maritime expeditionary operations and subsequent sustained combat operations. Its contents are relevant to all elements of the MAGTF. This publication supersedes MCWP 3-10, Ground Combat Operations, dated 4 April 1995.
From the Foreword: "The story of the Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, which became known as Det One, is an extraordinary tale. On its face, the story would not rate a minute's glance. One small group of Marines, about a hundred in number, formed, trained, and went to war. This all happened as the nation was 18 months into the Global War on Terrorism and as the Marine Corps was deploying I Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet the story behind the basic facts is not only far more intricate and fascinating, with dramatic episodes and intrepid characters from the Pentagon to Camp Pendleton, it portended great significance for the Marine Corps. What makes the Det One story extraordinary is the shift in Marine Corps policy that brought it about, the maturation of the special operations capabilities of forward-deployed Marine expeditionary units that made it possible, and the patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities of the Marines and Navy Corpsmen who manned it. Although Det One has passed now into the history books, its legacy survives in the formation of Marine Corps Special Operations Command and in the lessons learned and experiences of its members, who now continue to serve in dozens of units. Lieutenant Colonel John P. Piedmont Marine Field Historian in Iraq in April 2004, saw the historical significance of Det One and decided to pursue its history as a project. Under the director of the History and Museums Division at the time, Colonel John W. Ripley, he was given permission to proceed with his collections with a view toward turning them into a monograph. What follows here is the culmination of his efforts, the product of two years' work, more than 60 interviews done in Iraq, Washington, D.C., Virginia, and California, and the collection of hundreds of documents."--Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer.
The Army often uses vehicles informally classified as ultra-light tactical mobility (UTM). This report assesses the demands, requirements, current ad hoc capabilities, and key considerations for developing and sustaining established Army UTM fleets.
This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. From the Preface - From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis' force seized what became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined as the "three-block war." Following TF-58's deployment during the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.-led coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat. From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine Corps' commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus' "surge strategy" in Iraq. By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone to later publish the story "How We Lost the War We Won." In recognition of the shifting tides in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. . . .
U.S. Marines in Irregular Warfare: Training and Education is a brief history that recounts how the U.S. Marine Corps adapted to fight the Global War on Terrorism during 2000-10. The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting irregular wars, including the Banana Wars in Central America during the 1920s and the Vietnam War during the 1960s. To battle the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps drew upon this experience while also implementing new plans and programs to better prepare Marines to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps updated the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and transformed the annual Combined Arms Exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper: an immersive training program that simulated the urban environments in which Marines would be operating in Southwest Asia. Most importantly, Marines adjusted in the field, as battalion and company commanders drew on their basic training and education to devise innovative tactics to better combat the new threats they now faced. ?us, as this story shows, the Marine Corps did not undergo a radical transformation to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead drew on principles that had defined it as a warfighting organization throughout most of its history. Keywords: United States Marine Corps; United States Marines; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Marines; Marines; Marine Corps; Global War on Terrorism; global war on terrorism; irregular warfare; military strategy; counterinsurgency; combat; iraq war; Iraq War; Afghanistan; military education; soldier training; combat training and tactics; Southwest Asia
Marines in World War 2 Commemorative Series. Discusses how women Marines served in noncombat billets during World War 2. The title "Free a Marine to Fight" means that women Marines served in noncombat jobs so that male Marines could fight in battles. The Marines first began to recruit women after the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942. States that 17,672 women were serving in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve in June 1945. Illustrated with many black and white photographs.
Marine Corps Reference Publication MCRP 12-10A.1 (Formerly MCRP 3-35.1A) Small Unit Leader's Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations 4 April 2018 Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-35.1A, Small Unit Leader's Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations, is a reference for all Marine leaders (team through company) to use when conducting operations in mountainous terrain, snow, cold weather, and/or high altitude. This publication is to be used in conjunction with the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.1, Mountain Warfare Operations, and its other associated MCRPs 3-35.1B, Mountain Leader's Guide to Winter Operations; 3-35.1C, Mountain Leader's Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations; and 3-35.1D, Cold Region Operations. The series covers a broad spectrum of individual and small unit tactics, techniques, and procedures across all six warfighting functions. Topics include the environment, specialized clothing and equipment, weapons considerations, patrolling considerations, route selection and navigation, basic avalanche hazard assessment and mitigation, crossing streams/ice, snowshoeing, winter camouflage, logistics, fire support, helicopter operations, and casualty evacuation. It stresses only the skills necessary for Marines to function in combat. Because of the rapid turnover in personnel, operational tempo, and the multitude of training commitments, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center cannot train all Marines or units. In combat, Marines may need to learn through doctrinal references that are augmented with instruction from their unit's qualified summer and winter mountain leaders. This MCRP gives them that capability. This publication supersedes MCRP 3-35.1A, Small Unit Leader's Guide to Cold Weather Operations, dated 16 November 1990. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS Notice: This is a paperback book version of the "Marine Corps Reference Publication MCRP 12-10A.1 (Formerly MCRP 3-35.1A) Small Unit Leader's Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations 4 April 2018". Full version, All Chapters included. This publication (current update) is available (Electronic version) in the official website of the United States Marines Corps. This book is properly formatted and printed as a perfect sized copy 8.5x11". * The version of this publication is as described above (this article is updated after each new edition). disclaimer: "The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service."
