"This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process.
This paper first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. This paper provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market.
Local Electricity Markets introduces the fundamental characteristics, needs, and constraints shaping the design and implementation of local electricity markets. It addresses current proposed local market models and lessons from their limited practical implementation. The work discusses relevant decision and informatics tools considered important in the implementation of local electricity markets. It also includes a review on management and trading platforms, including commercially available tools. Aspects of local electricity market infrastructure are identified and discussed, including physical and software infrastructure. It discusses the current regulatory frameworks available for local electricity market development internationally. The work concludes with a discussion of barriers and opportunities for local electricity markets in the future. - Delineates key components shaping the design and implementation of local electricity market structure - Provides a coherent view on the enabling infrastructures and technologies that underpin local market expansion - Explores the current regulatory environment for local electricity markets drawn from a global panel of contributors - Exposes future paths toward widespread implementation of local electricity markets using an empirical review of barriers and opportunities - Reviews relevant local electricity market case studies, pilots and demonstrators already deployed and under implementation
The electricity market has experienced enormous setbacks in delivering on the promise of deregulation. In theory, deregulating the electricity market would increase the efficiency of the industry by producing electricity at lower costs and passing those cost savings on to customers. As Electricity Deregulation shows, successful deregulation is possible, although it is by no means a hands-off process—in fact, it requires a substantial amount of design and regulatory oversight. This collection brings together leading experts from academia, government, and big business to discuss the lessons learned from experiences such as California's market meltdown as well as the ill-conceived policy choices that contributed to those failures. More importantly, the essays that comprise Electricity Deregulation offer a number of innovative prescriptions for the successful design of deregulated electricity markets. Written with economists and professionals associated with each of the network industries in mind, this comprehensive volume provides a timely and astute deliberation on the many risks and rewards of electricity deregulation.
There is a need for fundamental changes in the ways society views electric energy. Electric energy must be treated as a commodity which can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its time-and space-varying values and costs. This book presents a complete framework for the establishment of such an energy marketplace. The framework is based on the use of spot prices. In general terms: o An hourly spot price (in dollars per kilowatt hour) reflects the operating and capital costs of generating, transmitting and distributing electric energy. It varies each hour and from place to place. o The spot price based energy marketplace involves a variety of utility-customer transactions (ranging from hourly varying prices to long-term, multiple-year contracts), all of which are based in a consistent manner on hourly spot prices. These transactions may include customers selling to, as well as buying from, the utility. The basic theory and practical implementation issues associated with a spot price based energy marketplace have been developed and discussed through a number of different reports, theses, and papers. Each addresses only a part of the total picture, and often with a somewhat different notation and terminology (which has evolved in parallel with our growing experience). This book was xvii xviii Preface written to serve as a single, integrated sourcebook on the theory and imple mentation of a spot price based energy marketplace.
This book addresses the interactions between Germany’s energy transition and the EU’s energy policy framework. It seeks to analyze the manifold connections between the prospects of the proclaimed “Energy Union” and the future of Germany’s energy transition, and identifies relevant lessons for the transformation at the EU level that can be learned from the case of Germany, as a first-mover of transforming energy systems towards renewables. The various repercussions (political, economic and systemic) from the national transition are explored within the EU context as it responds to the German transition, taking into account both existing frictions and potential synergies between predominantly national sustainability policies and the EU’s push towards harmonized policies within a common market. The book’s overall aim is to identify the most critical issues, in order to avoid pitfalls and capitalize on opportunities.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
A comprehensive text on the operation and control of power generation and transmission systems In the ten years since Allen J. Wood and Bruce F. Wollenberg presented their comprehensive introduction to the engineering and economic factors involved in operating and controlling power generation systems in electric utilities, the electric power industry has undergone unprecedented change. Deregulation, open access to transmission systems, and the birth of independent power producers have altered the structure of the industry, while technological advances have created a host of new opportunities and challenges. In Power Generation, Operation, and Control, Second Edition, Wood and Wollenberg bring professionals and students alike up to date on the nuts and bolts of the field. Continuing in the tradition of the first edition, they offer a practical, hands-on guide to theoretical developments and to the application of advanced operations research methods to realistic electric power engineering problems. This one-of-a-kind text also addresses the interaction between human and economic factors to prepare readers to make real-world decisions that go beyond the limits of mere technical calculations. The Second Edition features vital new material, including: * A computer disk developed by the authors to help readers solve complicated problems * Examination of Optimal Power Flow (OPF) * Treatment of unit commitment expanded to incorporate the Lagrange relaxation technique * Introduction to the use of bounding techniques and other contingency selection methods * Applications suited to the new, deregulated systems as well as to the traditional, vertically organized utilities company Wood and Wollenberg draw upon nearly 30 years of classroom testing to provide valuable data on operations research, state estimation methods, fuel scheduling techniques, and more. Designed for clarity and ease of use, this invaluable reference prepares industry professionals and students to meet the future challenges of power generation, operation, and control.
Through an effective blend of analysis and examples this text integrates the game theory revolution with the traditional understanding of imperfectly competitive markets.
