An intimate look at war through the lives of soldiers and their families at Fort Hood Making War at Fort Hood offers an illuminating look at war through the daily lives of the people whose job it is to produce it. Kenneth MacLeish conducted a year of intensive fieldwork among soldiers and their families at and around the US Army's Fort Hood in central Texas. He shows how war's reach extends far beyond the battlefield into military communities where violence is as routine, boring, and normal as it is shocking and traumatic. Fort Hood is one of the largest military installations in the world, and many of the 55,000 personnel based there have served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. MacLeish provides intimate portraits of Fort Hood's soldiers and those closest to them, drawing on numerous in-depth interviews and diverse ethnographic material. He explores the exceptional position that soldiers occupy in relation to violence--not only trained to fight and kill, but placed deliberately in harm's way and offered up to die. The death and destruction of war happen to soldiers on purpose. MacLeish interweaves gripping narrative with critical theory and anthropological analysis to vividly describe this unique condition of vulnerability. Along the way, he sheds new light on the dynamics of military family life, stereotypes of veterans, what it means for civilians to say "thank you" to soldiers, and other questions about the sometimes ordinary, sometimes agonizing labor of making war. Making War at Fort Hood is the first ethnography to examine the everyday lives of the soldiers, families, and communities who personally bear the burden of America's most recent wars.
In After War Zoë H. Wool explores how the American soldiers most severely injured in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars struggle to build some kind of ordinary life while recovering at Walter Reed Army Medical Center from grievous injuries like lost limbs and traumatic brain injury. Between 2007 and 2008, Wool spent time with many of these mostly male soldiers and their families and loved ones in an effort to understand what it's like to be blown up and then pulled toward an ideal and ordinary civilian life in a place where the possibilities of such a life are called into question. Contextualizing these soldiers within a broader political and moral framework, Wool considers the soldier body as a historically, politically, and morally laden national icon of normative masculinity. She shows how injury, disability, and the reality of soldiers' experiences and lives unsettle this icon and disrupt the all-too-common narrative of the heroic wounded veteran as the embodiment of patriotic self-sacrifice. For these soldiers, the uncanny ordinariness of seemingly extraordinary everyday circumstances and practices at Walter Reed create a reality that will never be normal.
When Army psychiatrist Nidal Hasan walked into the Fort Hood Soldier Readiness Processing Center and opened fire on soldiers within, he perpetrated the worst mass shooting on a United States military base in our country’s history. Death on Base is an in-depth look at the events surrounding the tragic mass murder that took place on November 5, 2009, and an investigation into the causes and influences that factored into the attack. The story begins with Hasan's early life in Virginia, continues with his time at Fort Hood, Texas, covers the events of the shooting, and concludes with his trial. The authors analyze Hasan's connections to radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and demonstrate how radical Islam fueled Hasan’s hatred of both the American military and the soldiers he treated. Hasan's mass shooting is compared with others, such as George Hennard's shooting rampage at Luby's in Killeen in 1991, Charles Whitman at the University of Texas, and Virginia Tech shooter Seung-Hui Cho. The authors explore the strange paradox that the shooting at Fort Hood was classified as workplace violence rather than a terrorist act. This classification has major implications for the victims of the shooting who have been denied health benefits and compensation.
The U. S. Secretary of the Army appointed the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee(FHIRC or Committee) and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Fort Hoodcommand climate and culture, and its impact, if any, on the safety, welfare and readiness of ourSoldiers and units." In addressing this mandate, the FHIRC determined that during the time periodcovered by the Review, the command climate relative to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Responseand Prevention (SHARP) Program at Fort Hood was ineffective, to the extent that there was apermissive environment for sexual assault and sexual harassment.As set forth in this Report, specific Findings demonstrate that the implementation of theSHARP Program was ineffective. During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinateechelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexualassault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Programand an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certainvictim services. Under a structurally weak and under-resourced III Corps SHARP Program, theSexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and notthe actual substantive aspects of the Program. While a powerful tool by design, the SARB processbecame a missed opportunity to develop and implement proactive strategies to create a respectfulculture and prevent and reduce incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. From the III Corpslevel and below, the SHARP Program was chronically under-resourced, due to understaffing, lack oftraining, lack of credentialed SHARP professionals, and lack of funding. Most of all, it lackedcommand emphasis where it was needed the most: the enlisted ranks.A resonant symptom of the SHARP Program's ineffective implementation was significantunderreporting of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Without intervention from the NCOs andofficers entrusted with their health and safety, victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career. Many haveleft the Army or plan to do so at the earliest opportunity.As part of the command climate, the issues of crime and Criminal Investigation Division(CID) operations were examined. The Committee determined that serious crime issues on and offFort Hood were neither identified nor addressed. There was a conspicuous absence of an effectiverisk management approach to crime incident reduction and Soldier victimization. A militaryinstallation is essentially a large, gated community. The Commander of a military installation possessesa wide variety of options to proactively address and mitigate the spectrum of crime incidents. Despitehaving the capability, very few tools were employed at Fort Hood to do so. Both the Directorate ofEmergency Services (DES) and the CID have a mandate and a role to play in crime reduction.Each contributed very little analysis, feedback and general situational awareness to the command towardfacilitating and enabling such actions. This was another missed opportunity.The deficient climate also extended into the missing Soldier scenarios, where no onerecognized the slippage in accountability procedures and unwillingness or lack of ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep track of their subordinates. The absence of any formalprotocols for Soldiers who fail to report resulted in an ad hoc approach by units and Military Police(MP) to effectively address instances of missing Soldiers during the critical first 24 hours, again withadverse consequences.Consistent with the FHIRC Charter, this Report sets forth nine Findings and offers seventyRecommendations.
John Keegan's groundbreaking portrayal of the common soldier in the heat of battle -- a masterpiece that explores the physical and mental aspects of warfare The Face of Battle is military history from the battlefield: a look at the direct experience of individuals at the "point of maximum danger." Without the myth-making elements of rhetoric and xenophobia, and breaking away from the stylized format of battle descriptions, John Keegan has written what is probably the definitive model for military historians. And in his scrupulous reassessment of three battles representative of three different time periods, he manages to convey what the experience of combat meant for the participants, whether they were facing the arrow cloud at the battle of Agincourt, the musket balls at Waterloo, or the steel rain of the Somme. The Face of Battle is a companion volume to John Keegan's classic study of the individual soldier, The Mask of Command: together they form a masterpiece of military and human history.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Business in the Trenches shows how you can exploit the lessons of the Great War to win on the business battlefield. Business in the Trenches by David Schroeder combines compelling military history with insightful business analogies. It demonstrates clearly how companies grapple with the same problems as armies at war. Business in the Trenches describes how you can leverage the experiences war to solve vexing problems and defeat the competition. Business in the Trenches takes readers through a number of fascinating stories from World War One, a time of dramatic change in warfare. It draws parallels between the problems faced by armies on the battlefield, and the problems facing businesses today. Business in the Trenches unravels the mystery of why World War One turned into the quagmire it did, and how most organizations today follow similar paths for the same reasons. Most importantly, it provides detailed and practical advice on how to deal with specific challenges and achieve breakthrough success. Schroeder demonstrates that while times may change, human nature does not. This is especially true in the high pressure worlds of business and warfare. Schroeder's common sense yet controversial theories about World War One decisions, show them to be eerily similar to those made in business today. The same forces motivate people, and they still make similar choices for similar reasons. Understanding what produces victory or disaster, and why, enables you to succeed where most fail. About the Author David Schroeder is a globally experienced business consultant, a distinguished military officer, and a critically acclaimed designer of historical military simulations. He has helped high tech companies around the world increase their productivity and profitability. He is a Colonel in the Army Reserve, and has received awards at the highest levels. He was featured along with the Army Chief of Staff in videos on improving organizational performance. Schroeder has published a number of well-received detailed studies on the Great War.
Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.
