An in-depth analysis of the fundamental role that decentralization plays in developing countries, using detailed statistical data to examine the actual fiscal structure between tiers of government, and the effects of decentralization at the local, national and international levels.
"While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of decentralization, including the order of an introduction of decentralization policies, the number of years necessary to bring a full program on line, and the components of the transition strategy. The authors argue that the sequencing of decentralization policies is an important determinant of its success. The consequences of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from minor delays and complications to ineffectiveness and subsequent failing support of decentralization efforts, macroeconomic instability, and fundamental failure in public sector delivery. At a minimum, the strategy of "making it up as we go" will not lead to the same structure of decentralization as will a planned strategy. The paper raises two questions: First, is there an optimal sequencing for decentralization policies and implementation? The answer is that there is, and that following these sequencing rules can reduce the costs and risks of implementing fiscal decentralization. Second, to what extent do countries follow these optimal sequencing rules? The answer is, in general, they do not. The gap between theory and practice is a result of the complexity of sequencing design, which discourages fiscal planners from implementing the full process. In addition, sequencing requires a sustained discipline and vision for its implementation, as well as overcoming pressures from political actors, especially in developing countries. "-- World Bank web site.
This book draws on experiences in developing countries to bridge the gap between the conventional textbook treatment of fiscal decentralization and the actual practice of subnational government finance. The extensive literature about the theory and practice is surveyed and longstanding problems and new questions are addressed. It focuses on the key choices that must be made in decentralizing, on how economic and political factors shape the choices that countries make, and on how, by paying more attention to the need for a more comprehensive approach and the critical connections between different components of decentralization reform, everyone involved might get more for their money.
Since its adoption in 2015, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development has shaped not only international development cooperation but also the design of national trajectories for social and economic development. In tandem with other global agendas adopted that year (such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda) it remains the global and regional blueprint for sustainable development despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The term "localizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" has been used to capture the importance of subnational governments for achieving national SDG agendas. However, there is little deeper analysis of the required nexus between fiscal, political, and legal arrangements for SNGs; their involvement in national policy arenas (which discuss and decide on national SDG strategies); and the need for locally disaggregated data systems on the one hand, and effective SDG localization strategies on the other hand. It is this aspect which the present publication explores in greater detail by using country examples and conceptual analyses. The text will be of interest to policymakers, scholars, students and practitioners in public policy and public administration, decentralization, and sustainable development, with a focus on the Asia and Pacific region. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivative License (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO).
Nearly all countries worldwide are now experimenting with decentralization. Their motivation are diverse. Many countries are decentralizing because they believe this can help stimulate economic growth or reduce rural poverty, goals central government interventions have failed to achieve. Some countries see it as a way to strengthen civil society and deepen democracy. Some perceive it as a way to off-load expensive responsibilities onto lower level governments. Thus, decentralization is seen as a solution to many different kinds of problems. This report examines the origins and implications decentralization from a political economy perspective, with a focus on its promise and limitations. It explores why countries have often chosen not to decentralize, even when evidence suggests that doing so would be in the interests of the government. It seeks to explain why since the early 1980s many countries have undertaken some form of decentralization. This report also evaluates the evidence to understand where decentralization has considerable promise and where it does not. It identifies conditions needed for decentralization to succeed. It identifies the ways in which decentralization can promote rural development. And it names the goals which decentralization will probably not help achieve.
In this book, experts from across the globe highlight the state of knowledge in intergovernmental transfer design. The essays collected in the volume represent creative new thinking about challenging policy issues and offer useful options for policy makers. The book offers academics and practitioners a thorough, thematic assessment of unresolved issues in the design of equalization grants.
Over recent decades, decentralization has emerged as a key Public Sector Reform strategy in a wide variety of international contexts. Yet, despite its emergence as a ubiquitous activity that cuts across disciplinary lines in international development, decentralization is understood and applied in many different ways by parties acting from contrary perspectives. This book offers a fascinating insight into theory and practice surrounding decentralization activities in the Public Sectors of developing and transitional countries. In drawing on the expertise of established scholars, the book explores the contexts, achievements, progress and challenges of decentralization and local governance. Notably, the contributions contained in this book are genuinely international in nature; the chapters explore aspects of decentralization and local governance in contexts as diverse as Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Tanzania, Uganda, and Viet Nam. In summary, by examining the subject of decentralization with reference to specific developing and transitional Public Sector contexts in which it has been practiced, this book offers an excellent contribution towards a better understanding of the theory and practice of decentralization and local governance in international settings. This book was published as a special double issue of the International Journal of Public Administration.
The authors of this volume sift through the accumulating evidence to assess how well decentralization has fared. Focusing on consequences rather than causes, their goal is to inform future interventions in support of decentralized governance by showcasing some of the important trade-offs that it has generated so far.
This book explores the important topic of fiscal decentralization in Asian countries, and focuses on how government finance and administration are being reformed to bring budgetary decisions closer to voters. The focus on Asia is especially important because all countries in this region have been undergoing serious fiscal reforms in the past decade. They include one of the biggest decentralization reforms in Indonesia, significant reforms in democratic Philippines and Vietnam which are in transition, and Japan, whose fiscal reconstruction program is covered extensively. India and China, which are also covered, are very special cases because of their size and because their policies must fit decentralization into a significant economic growth scenario.
This book is, in essence, about incentives: the incentives for competing societal interest groups to cooperate with each other to benefit from a growing economic pie, rather than fighting over a bigger share of a smaller one. This is the conundrum of economic development. If elite interest groups have both incentive and ability to allocate resources toward themselves, and if such rent seeking causes a decline in economic inefficiency, how can economies ever grow? The book illuminates the mechanisms by which in one of the world’s recent economic success stories— Vietnam’s rapid industrialization and passage into the middle-income category—the interest in cooperating to grow the economy overrode the elites’ instinct to allocate resources through the use of political power. The book shows how the need to provide positive conditions for international investment altered pay-off structures and pushed the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam to engage in bargaining with provincial officials; provincial officials with international investors; and finally all coercive elites even with the working classes. It describes the emergence of a harmony of interest among societal groups in which each group benefits from a growing economy, and no one group can monopolize the benefits of growth without hurting itself. The Vietnam case validates Nobel-Prize winning economist Mancur Olson’s proposition that elite predation can only be kept in check when the elite itself suffers from the economic decline it causes at least as much as it gains from the rents it collects.