To determine the causes of Operation Restore Hope's ultimate failure, a journalist who reported on Somalia in 1992 and 1993 examines U.S. involvement there from the Cold War, through the country's civil war and famine, to the present. Part reportage, part analysis, Jonathan Stevenson's book aims both to inform and to provoke opinion. His dissection of the operation's disappointing results, and his suggestions about how American efforts might have been more effective, should stimulate pointed discussion at a time when the Congress is shying away from humanitarian and military commitments overseas.
Every American should read this book in order to gain a clear insight about military combat and war. From the foreword by Ross Perot Recommended for readers who enjoy suspenseful accounts of close combat. Publishers Weekly Most Americans remember...the two troubling televised images that follwed [the operation]....But there is more about that day that is told in this book and that should be known by Americans. The Wall Street Journal Among America's clearest memories of ongoing conflict in Somalia will certainly be the swollen, bloodied face of helicopter pilot Michael Durant, displayed on the international television news reports after his capture in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993. While the failed mission leading to Durant's imprisonment captured the rage and anguish of the world, few Americans truly understood how many U.S. Army Ranger compatriots shared Durant's fortitude and courage there. Indeed, Durant was only one member of the elite Task Force Ranger Regiment deployed to apprehend Mohammed Farrah Aidid, Somailia's most powerful warlord on the fateful October day. Here is the little-known story of the 15 fierce, deadly hours of fighting that followed the Americans tightly calibrated attempt to target Aidid. Moment by moment, Mogahishu! recounts how this mission, intended to deflate the heart of Somali resistance, became instead a tragic showcase for the heroism and breathtaking self-sacrifice of the American servicement--and the catalyst of U.S. withdrawal of peacekeeping troops. Mogadishu! reveals while the operation produced on the most decorated military units in American history, it cost 18 of America's best-trained servicemen their lives. Using rare testimony from other military personnel, Kent DeLong offers the first complete account of how these Americans died, not for glory but for each other, far from their loved ones in a God-forsaken place called Mogadishu.
This study examines the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.
“No matter how skilled the writer of nonfiction, you are always getting the story secondhand. Here’s a chance to go right to the source. . . . These men were there.” –MARK BOWDEN (from the Foreword) It started as a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It turned into a disastrous urban firefight and death-defying rescue operation that shocked the world and rattled a great nation. Now the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, Somalia–the incident that was the basis of the book and film Black Hawk Down–is remembered by the men who fought and survived it. Six of the best in our military recall their brutal experiences and brave contributions in these never-before-published, firstperson accounts. “Operation Gothic Serpent,” by Matt Eversmann: As a “chalk” leader, Eversmann was part of the first group of Rangers to “fast rope” from the Black Hawk helicopters. It was his chalk that suffered the first casualty of the battle. “Sua Sponte: Of Their Own Accord,” by Raleigh Cash: Responsible for controlling and directing fire support for the platoon, Cash entered the raging battle in the ground convoy sent to rescue his besieged brothers in arms. “Through My Eyes,” by Mike Kurth: One of only two African Americans in the battle, Kurth confronted his buddies’ deaths, realizing that “the only people whom I had let get anywhere near me since I was a child were gone.” “What Was Left Behind,” by John Belman: He roped into the biggest firefight of the battle and considers some of the mistakes that were made, such as using Black Hawk helicopters to provide sniper cover. “Be Careful What You Wish For,” by Tim Wilkinson: He was one of the Air Force pararescuemen or PJs–the highly trained specialists for whom “That Others May Live” is no catchphrase but a credo–and sums up his incomprehensible courage as “just holding up my end of the deal on a bad day.” “On Friendship and Firefights,” by Dan Schilling: As a combat controller, he was one of the original planners for the deployment of SOF forces to Mogadishu in the spring of 1993. During the battle, he survived the initial assault and carnage of the vehicle convoys only to return to the city to rescue his two closest friends, becoming, literally, “Last Out.” With America’s withdrawal from Somalia an oft-cited incitement to Osama bin Laden, it is imperative to revisit this seminal military mission and learn its lessons from the men who were there and, amazingly, are still here.
The Mayor of Mogadishu tells the story of one family's epic journey through Somalia's turmoil, from the optimism of independence to its spectacular unravelling.Mohamud 'Tarzan' Nur was born a nomad, and became an orphan, then a street brawler in the cosmopolitan port city of Mogadishu - a place famous for its cafes and open-air cinemas. When Somalia collapsed into civil war, Tarzan and his young family joined the exodus from Mogadishu, eventually spending twenty years in North London. But in 2010 Tarzan returned to the unrecognisable ruins of a city largely controlled by the Islamist militants of Al-Shabaab. For some, the new Mayor was a galvanising symbol of defiance. But others branded him a thug, mired in the corruption and clan rivalries that continue to threaten Somalia's revival.The Mayor of Mogadishu is an uplifting story of survival, and a compelling examination of what it means to lose a country and then to reclaim it.
This memoir is an evocative, intimate account of a country struggling how to balance tradition and modernization, as seen through the eyes of a young man coming of age. With insight and humor, the author shares his story of abandonment, love, and family through Somalias greatest period of social and political upheaval.
By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.
