In most years, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides a five- or six-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), associated with the budget that it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget well beyond that period, this report has examined the programs and plans contained in DoD's FYDP and projected their budgetary impact in subsequent years. For this analysis, the report used the FYDP provided to the Congress in April 2010, which covers fiscal years 2011 through 2015 the most recent plan available when this analysis was conducted. The report's projections span 2011 through 2028. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
In January 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans (ADA410669), which was based on the fiscal year 2003 budget and the Department of Defense's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) of that same year. CBO updated that analysis in July 2003 (ADA416284); its publication The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2004 revised CBO's earlier work to take into account changes incorporated in the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 and the 2004 FYDP. Because it was a summary, the July 2003 paper omitted many of the detailed data displays contained in CBO's January 2003 study. This briefing updates those omitted displays consistent with the 2004 FYDP. The briefing does not incorporate changes to the FYDP resulting from Congressional action on the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request.
In most years, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides a five- or six-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), associated with the budget that it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget well beyond that period, the the programs and plans contained in DoD's FYDP have been examined and their budgetary impact in subsequent years has been projected. For this analysis, the FYDP provided to the Congress in April 2011was used, which covers fiscal years 2012 to 2016. The projections span the years 2012 to 2030. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find report.
In most years, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides a five-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), associated with the budget that it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget well beyond that period, CBO regularly examines DoD's FYDP and projects its budgetary impact roughly a decade beyond the period covered by the FYDP. For this analysis, CBO used the FYDP that was provided to the Congress in April 2013; that FYDP spans fiscal years 2014 to 2018, and CBO's projections span the years 2014 to 2028
In most years, the Dept. of Defense (DoD) provides a five-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), associated with the budget that it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget well beyond that period, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly examines DoD's FYDP and projects its budgetary impact roughly a decade beyond the period covered by the FYDP. This analysis used the FYDP that DoD provided to the Congress in April 2013; that FYDP spans FY 2014 to 2018, and CBO's projections span the years 2014 to 2028. For FY 2014, DoD requested appropriations totaling $607 billion. Of that amount, $527 billion was to fund the "base" programs that constitute the department's normal activities, such as the development and procurement of weapon systems and the day-to-day operations of the military and civilian workforce. The remaining $79 billion was requested to pay for what are termed overseas contingency operations (OCO) -- the war in Afghanistan and other nonroutine military activities elsewhere. Figures and tables. This is a print on demand report.
This testimony is an analyses of DoD¿s budget requests and preliminary projections for FY 2011 through 2028. Those projections are based in part on the President¿s 2010 budget request and budget justification materials the Admin. provided to the Congress with that request. Among the other sources consulted to supplement this analysis were DoD press releases and briefing materials and the Sec. of Defense¿s announcement in April 2009 of changes to the nation¿s defense plans. The long-term demand for defense resources could be larger than the auditor¿s base projections. The auditor estimates that supporting the number of deployed service members would require recurring annual appropriations of about $20 billion in 2010 dollars. Illus.
In most years, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides a five-year plan, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), associated with the budget that it submits to the Congress. Because decisions made in the near term can have consequences for the defense budget well beyond that period, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly examines DoD's FYDP and projects its budgetary impact roughly a decade beyond the period covered by the FYDP. For this analysis, CBO used the FYDP that was provided to the Congress in April 2013; that FYDP spans fiscal years 2014 to 2018, and CBO's projections span the years 2014 to 2028. For fiscal year 2014, DoD requested appropriations totaling $607 billion. Of that amount, $527 billion was to fund the "base" programs that constitute the department's normal activities, such as the development and procurement of weapon systems and the day-to-day operations of the military and civilian workforce. The remaining $79 billion was requested to pay for what are termed overseas contingency operations (OCO)-the war in Afghanistan and other nonroutine military activities elsewhere. The FYDP describes DoD's plans for its normal activities and therefore generally corresponds to the base budget. DoD's 2014 plans are similar to its 2013 plans. CBO produced two projections of the base-budget costs of DoD's plans (expressed in terms of total obligational authority for each fiscal year) as reflected in the FYDP and other long-term planning documents released by DoD. The "CBO projection" uses CBO's estimates of the costs of military activities and the extent to which those costs will change over time; those estimates reflect DoD's experience in recent years. For comparison, the "extension of the FYDP" starts with DoD's estimates of the costs of its plans through 2018 and extends them beyond 2018 using DoD's estimates if available and CBO's projections of price and compensation trends for the overall economy if DoD's estimates are not available. Neither projection should be viewed as a prediction of future funding for DoD's activities; rather, the projections are estimates of the costs of executing the department's current plans without changes. Under either projection, the costs of DoD's plans would rise steadily over time. In addition, those costs would significantly exceed the limits on budget authority established by the automatic enforcement provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011, as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012-hereafter referred to collectively as the Budget Control Act (BCA)-for all remaining years subject to those limits (2014 through 2021). To close that gap, which CBO estimates will average between about $60 billion and about $90 billion per year, DoD would have to make sharp cuts to the size of its forces, the development and purchase of weapons, the extent of its operations and training, or some combination of the three.
Essential reading for business leaders and policymakers, an in-depth investigation of red teaming, the practice of inhabiting the perspective of potential competitors to gain a strategic advantage Red teaming. The concept is as old as the Devil's Advocate, the eleventh-century Vatican official charged with discrediting candidates for sainthood. Today, red teams are used widely in both the public and the private sector by those seeking to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of institutional rivals. In the right circumstances, red teams can yield impressive results, giving businesses an edge over their competition, poking holes in vital intelligence estimates, and troubleshooting dangerous military missions long before boots are on the ground. But not all red teams are created equal; indeed, some cause more damage than they prevent. Drawing on a fascinating range of case studies, Red Team shows not only how to create and empower red teams, but also what to do with the information they produce. In this vivid, deeply-informed account, national security expert Micah Zenko provides the definitive book on this important strategy -- full of vital insights for decision makers of all kinds.
