The buildup of American armies under General Eisenhower in the United Kingdom in preparation for the Normandy invasion and an account of how they were supplied during the first three months of operations on the Continent. Both volumes emphasize the influence of logistical support on the planning and conduct of combat operations by field armies.
The buildup of American armies under General Eisenhower in the United Kingdom in preparation for the Normandy invasion and an account of how they were supplied during the first three months of operations on the Continent. Both volumes emphasize the influence of logistical support on the planning and conduct of combat operations by field armies.
This volume completes the story of the logistic support of U.S. forces in the European theater, carrying the account forward from mid-September 1944 to the end of hostilities in May 1945. It follows the pattern, established in "Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I", of focusing on the influence which logistical support or lack of it had on the planning and the conduct of tactical operations. The inclination consequently has been to concentrate on the problem areas in logistic support, such as port discharge and transportation difficulties, and supply and manpower shortages. It is as important a book for combat commanders as for those who have to plan and execute logistical operations. It will leave the nonmilitary reader in no doubt of the enormous weight and complexity of the administrative burden that the Army had to assume to assure the success of its ground and air forces, and the resourcefulness with which it managed that burden. On the other hand, those who have to think about the future can here study a test of the principle of a single service of supply supporting the national element of allied forces under a coalition headquarters and a supreme allied commander.
War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.
This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)
