In this book Tibor R. Machan analyses the state of the debate on libertarianism post Nozick. Going far beyond the often cursory treatment of libertarianism in major books and other publications he examines closely the alternative non-Nozickian defences of libertarianism that have been advanced and, by applying these arguments to innumerable policy areas in the field, Machan achieves a new visibility and prominence for libertarianism.
Ever since the publication in 1974 of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, libertarianism has been much discussed within political philosophy, science and economy circles. Yet libertarianism has been so strongly identified with Nozick's version of it that little attention has been devoted to other than Nozick's ideas and arguments. While Nozick's version of libertarianism has preoccupied the academic discussion Nozick himself did not respond to the many criticisms raised and yet other defenders of libertarianism have not remained silent. Jan Narveson, Loren Lomasky, Eric Mack, Douglas Rasmussen, Douglas Den Uyl and many others have contributed impressive arguments of their own in support of the libertarian idea that a political system is just when it successfully secures the rights of individuals understood within the Lockean classical liberal tradition. In this book Tibor R. Machan analyses the state of the debate on libertarianism post Nozick. Going far beyond the often cursory treatment of libertarianism in major books and other publications he examines closely the alternative non-Nozickian defenses of libertarianism that have been advanced and, by applying these arguments to innumerable policy areas in the field, Machan achieves a new visibility and prominence for libertarianism.
Elaborating on and defending a rigorous, rights-based libertarianism, Mark D. Friedman here develops the seminal ideas articulated by Robert Nozick in his landmark work Anarchy, State and Utopia. Consolidating more than three decades of scholarly and popular writing to have emerged in the wake of Nozick's text, Friedman offers a 21st century defense of the minimal libertarian state. In the course of this analysis, and drawing on further insights offered by the work of F.A. Hayek, Nozick's Libertarian Project shows that natural rights libertarianism can offer convincing answers to the fundamental questions that lie at the heart of political theory. The book also rebuts many of the most common criticisms to have been levelled at this worldview, including those from left libertarians and from egalitarians such as as G.A. Cohen.
Michael Otsuka sets out to vindicate left-libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. Otsuka reclaims the ideas of John Locke from the libertarian Right, and shows how his Second Treatise of Government provides the theoretical foundations for a left-libertarianism which is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberal theories of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Otsuka's libertarianism is founded on a right of self-ownership. Here he is at one with 'right-wing' libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, in endorsing the highly anti-paternalistic and anti-moralistic implications of this right. But he parts company with these libertarians in so far as he argues that such a right is compatible with a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare. In embracing this principle, his own version of left-libertarianism is more strongly egalitarian than others which are currently well known. Otsuka argues that an account of legitimate political authority based upon the free consent of each is strengthened by the adoption of such an egalitarian principle. He defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society as a confederation of voluntary associations. Part I of Libertarianism without Inequality concerns the natural rights of property in oneself and the world. Part II considers the natural rights of punishment and self-defence that form the basis for the government's authority to legislate and punish. Part III explores the nature and limits of the powers of governments which are created by the consensual transfer of the natural rights of the governed. Libertarianism without Inequality is a book which everyone interested in political theory should read.
In A Consequentialist Defense of Libertarianism, Richard Fumerton argues that empirical facts concerning consequences must always play a crucial role in a plausible defense of freedom. After making distinctions between morality and law, he defends the view that it is a fundamental mistake to think that the law should always, or even usually, attempt to mirror morality. With this framework in place, Fumerton addresses various controversial questions concerning when the law ought to side with freedom. He offers a nuanced defense of several positions shared by many "moderate" libertarians. This consequentialist defense of freedom offers a fresh perspective on some very old philosophical debates. As more people become frustrated with a perceived lack of principled attempts by established political parties to appreciate important concerns people have involving their desire for freedom, the issues discussed in this book are particularly timely.
This book probes the depths of libertarian philosophy and highlights the need for laws that protect all individuals in society. This book defines libertarianism as a theory of what is just law, it is predicated upon the non-aggression principle (NAP). This legal foundation of the libertarian philosophy states that it should be illicit to threaten or engage in initiatory violence against innocent people. Ultimately, this book presents the notion, defend the “undefendable.” This book defines that as; any person, institution, professional, worker, which is either reviled by virtually everyone, or prohibited by law, and does not violate the NAP. Weaved throughout, this book uses political philosophy to present three fundamental premises to explain this libertarian point of view. Firstly, this book defines the non-aggression principle (NAP). Secondly, demonstrates the importance and relevance of private property rights in this context. This book uses practical examples to demonstrate the theoretical application of freedom rights using libertarianism principles.
Contemporary civil libertarians claim that their works preserve a worthy American tradition of defending free-speech rights dating back to the framing of the First Amendment. Transforming Free Speech challenges the worthiness, and indeed the very existence of one uninterrupted libertarian tradition. Mark A. Graber asserts that in the past, broader political visions inspired libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment. In reexamining the philosophical and jurisprudential foundations of the defense of expression rights from the Civil War to the present, he exposes the monolithic free-speech tradition as a myth. Instead of one conception of the system of free expression, two emerge: the conservative libertarian tradition that dominated discourse from the Civil War until World War I, and the civil libertarian tradition that dominates later twentieth-century argument. The essence of the current perception of the American free-speech tradition derives from the writings of Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (1885-1957), the progressive jurist most responsible for the modern interpretation of the First Amendment. His interpretation, however, deliberately obscured earlier libertarian arguments linking liberty of speech with liberty of property. Moreover, Chafee stunted the development of a more radical interpretation of expression rights that would give citizens the resources and independence necessary for the effective exercise of free speech. Instead, Chafee maintained that the right to political and social commentary could be protected independent of material inequalities that might restrict access to the marketplace of ideas. His influence enfeebled expression rights in a world where their exercise depends increasingly on economic power. Untangling the libertarian legacy, Graber points out the disjunction in the libertarian tradition to show that free-speech rights, having once been transformed, can be transformed again. Well-conceived and original in perspective, Transforming Free Speech will interest political theorists, students of government, and anyone interested in the origins of the free-speech tradition in the United States.
The state is often ascribed a special sort of authority, one that obliges citizens to obey its commands and entitles the state to enforce those commands through threats of violence. This book argues that this notion is a moral illusion: no one has ever possessed that sort of authority.
Political philosophy is dominated by a myth, the myth of the necessity of the state. The state is considered necessary for the provision of many things, but primarily for peace and security. In this provocative book, Gerard Casey argues that social order can be spontaneously generated, that such spontaneous order is the norm in human society and that deviations from the ordered norms can be dealt with without recourse to the coercive power of the state. Casey presents a novel perspective on political philosophy, arguing against the conventional political philosophy pieties and defending a specific political position, which he identifies as 'libertarian anarchy'. The book includes a history of the concept of anarchy, an examination of the possibility of anarchic societies and an articulation of the nature of law and order within such societies. Casey presents his specific form of anarchy, undergirded by a theory of human action that prioritises liberty, as a philosophically and politically viable alternative to the standard positions in political theory.
Islam, the second largest religion in the world, has several authoritarian interpretations today that defy human freedom—by executing “apostates” or “blasphemers,” imposing religious practices, or discriminating against women or minorities. In Why, as a Muslim, I Support Liberty, Mustafa Akyol offers a bold critique of this trouble, by frankly acknowledging its roots in the religious tradition. But Akyol also shows that Islam has “seeds of freedom” as well—in the Qur'an, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and the complex history of the Islamic civilization. It is past time, he argues, to grow those seeds into maturity, and reinterpret Islamic law and politics under the Qur'anic maxim, “No compulsion in religion.” Akyol shows that the major reinterpretation Islam needs now is similar to the transformation that began in Western Christianity back in the 17th century, with the groundbreaking ideas of classical liberal thinkers such as John Locke. The author goes back and forth between classical liberalism and the Islamic tradition, to excavate little-noticed parallels, first highlighted by the “Islamic liberals” of the late Ottoman Empire, unknown to many Muslims and non-Muslims today. In short chapters, Akyol digs into big questions. Why do Muslims need to “reform” the Sharia? But is there something to “revive” in the Sharia as well? Should Muslims really glorify “conquest,” or rather believe in social contract? Is capitalism really alien to Islam, which has a rich heritage of free markets and civil society? Finally, he addresses a suspicion common among Muslims today: What if liberty is a mere cover used by Western powers to advance their imperialist schemes? With personal stories, historical anecdotes, theological insights, and a very accessible prose, this is the little big book on the intersection of Islam and liberty.
