This paper measures the extent to which South Korea participated in global value chains (GVCs) from 1995 through 2011 and scrutinizes the consequences of such participation on the Korean economy. To this end, the World Input Output Database is utilized to calculate GVC income, GVC employment, and value-added exports created by Korean and foreign industries. Our findings show that Korea radically internationalized its production activities during the sample period, widening the gap between gross exports and value-added exports. We also document that Korea's participation in GVCs has changed the value-added and employment structures in domestic industries in accordance with their comparative advantages while exacerbating the degree of wage inequality.
The expansion of global value chains during the past 20 years has widened the gap between export value and domestic value added, diminishing the per-unit contribution of exports to the country's economic growth. Thus, policies now need to target creating value added rather than increasing gross exports and focus on enhancing the competitiveness of input and production activities. In particular, regulatory reform must take place in the service sector to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to competitiveness. Moreover, to utilize global value chains more effectively, efforts should be made to enhance the efficiency of offshoring and attract production to the country's shores in order to create more domestic valued added and jobs.
The term “value chain” refers to the whole production process of a good or service from the design and raw material processing to manufacturing and market services for the final customers. A global value chain (GVC) indicates production across multiple countries (Simola 2021). Wang et al. (2017) distinguish between simple and complex GVC activities and classify GVC participation in the following four activities: (i) export its domestic value added in intermediate exports used by a direct importing country to produce products for the importing country's final consumption (simple GVC); (ii) export its domestic value added in intermediate exports used by a direct importing country to produce products for importing countries' exports to third countries (complex GVC forward participation); (iii) importing foreign value added in intermediate imports to produce products for domestic use (simple GVC); (iv) importing foreign value-added in intermediate imports to produce products for its gross exports (complex GVC backward participation).Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are considered to be the main driving factors of Vietnam's economic growth. However, Vietnam's growth rates became substantially lower in the first decade of the 21st century and even lower after 2008, putting the country in high danger of falling into a middle-income trap (Nguyen and Truong 2022). Overcoming this huge challenge will require Vietnam to make greater progress in GVC participation, which can only be obtained by implementing the appropriate policy reforms and adjustments, particularly in FDI, trade, and industrial and institutional areas. In this regard, assistance and cooperation from Korea - an advanced economy, especially a top trade and FDI partner of Vietnam - would play a significant role in improving Vietnam's GVCs participation.Against this backdrop, this study aims to examine Vietnam's GVC participation. It then assesses the major challenges faced by Vietnam's GVC participation. Based on this, the research draws relevant policy implications for Vietnam-South Korea (hereafter Korea) economic cooperation to improve Vietnam's GVC participation in the following years.
Global Value Chains (GVCs) are known to have a skill-biased effect on the wage structure in developed countries. If the skill groups are divided into two - high-skilled vs low-skilled groups - then the direction of the skill-biased effect is clear in the existing literature. Many studies have pointed out that deepening of GVCs has more detrimental effects on the low-skilled group, though the size of the effect was controversial. The OECD (2015) argued that a skill-biased effect on wages was not that large, and it was also associated with the type of engagement of GVC participation.If the skill levels are divided by three - high-skilled, medium-skilled, and low-skilled groups - then the direction of the skill-biased effect is obscure, especially that of the medium-skilled group. It is about which groups - medium-skilled vs low-skilled- suffers more detrimental effects from deepening GVCs. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) argued that employment and wages in many developed countries were recently polarized, which means that international competition due to globalization has targeted primarily medium-skilled labor. Low-skilled jobs, such as cleaning or nursing care services, are relatively difficult to off-shore, since those jobs are offered on a person-to-person basis. However, technology development and its impact on GVCs have intensified in recent years, and the negative impact on low-skilled workers is more significant.This study analyzes the skill-biased effect of GVCs on wages in Korean manufacturing and derives policy implications. Skill groups are divided into three groups - high-skilled, medium-skilled, and low-skilled- according to the education level. To derive the policy implications, we also refer to the German case. The German economy, as well as the Korean economy, has grown significantly with the GVCs in the 2000s.
The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea's largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea's exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US-China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
The link between exchange rate and trade has been studied for a long time, but there is no consensus about their relation. This paper tests the old argument, whether depreciation of real effective exchange rates (REERs) raises exports. We differentiate the test with earlier studies by employing a new measurement of REER and incorporating the effect of GVCs. We measured REER at industry level with value-added trade weights. We analysed the topic with LSDV and system GMM for China, Japan and Korea since these counties are known to participate actively in GVCs. Our main finding is that exchange rate has significant impact on trade for three countries. However, the movement of elasticity of export to REER varies by country. While the elasticity in China decreased over time, Korea and Japan experienced increasing patterns between mid-1990s and mid-2000s and decreasing trends afterwards. This study also tests whether the level of incorporation in GVCs causes a change in elasticity. The results show that growing participation in GVCs lowers the elasticity of export to REER in absolute value. However, this result is only statistically significant in Korea.
Economic, technological, and political shifts as well as changing business strategies have driven firms to unbundle production processes and disperse them across countries. Thanks to these changes, developing countries can now increase their participation in global value chains (GVCs) and thus become more competitive in agriculture, manufacturing and services. This is a paradigm shift from the 20th century when countries had to build the entire supply chain domestically to become competitive internationally. For policymakers, the focus is on boosting domestic value added and improving access to resources and technology while advancing development goals. However, participating in global value chains does not automatically improve living standards and social conditions in a country. This requires not only improving the quality and quantity of production factors and redressing market failures, but also engineering equitable distributions of opportunities and outcomes - including employment, wages, work conditions, economic rights, gender equality, economic security, and protecting the environment. The internationalization of production processes helps with very few of these development challenges. Following this perspective, Making Global Value Chains Work for Development offers a strategic framework, analytical tools, and policy options to address this challenge. The book conceptualizes GVCs and makes it easier for policymakers and practitioners to discuss them and their implications for development. It shows why GVCs require fresh thinking; it serves as a repository of analytical tools; and it proposes a strategic framework to guide policymakers in identifying the key objectives of GVC participation and in selecting suitable economic strategies to achieve them.
This short paper highlights various forms of global value chain (GVC)-oriented policies implemented by the Korean government in different periods to promote local firms' integration and upgrading in sectors such as apparel, automotive, shipbuilding, electronics, and animation. It discusses the recent growing interest in GVC-oriented industrial policy and the role of the state in GVCs. Based on Korea's experiences in GVCs, the paper highlights the key features of GVC-oriented policy measures in Korea, focusing on three aspects: moving into (integration), moving upward (upgrading), and moving outward (internationalization). The paper conclude with a discussion of some of the challenges posed by disruptions in GVCs prompted by the China-U.S. trade war and the global pandemic of covid-19.
