A highly illustrated account of The North African campaign of November 1942-May 1943 during World War II. This campaign was a baptism of fire for the US Army. After relatively straightforward landings, the US II Corps advanced into Tunisia to support operations by the British 8th Army. Rommel, worried by the prospect of an attack, decided to exploit the inexperience of the US Army and strike a blow against their overextended positions around the Kasserine Pass. However, the Germans were unable to exploit their initial success, and later attacks were bloodily repulsed. The fighting in Tunisia taught the green US Army vital combat lessons, and brought to the fore senior commanders such as Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley.
This text covers the desert battle at Kasserine Pass in February 1943, the first real confrontation between American and German troops and the one that pitted Eisenhower's and Patton's leadership against Rommel's.
In North Africa on Valentine's Day 1943, 30,000 inexperienced young American troops faced an attack by Germany's Desert Fox, Rommel, and his battle-hardened Afrika Korps. In the slaughter that ensued, Rommel left behind a shaken, confused, and deeply shamed American army and a nearly collapsed Allied front. This is the full story of that massacre of youthful innocents. 31 photos.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass proved to be a shock both to American military forces in the field and to the American public at home. The defeat of the Allied forces in the battle put doubt into the minds of many—all of whom assumed the righteous democracies of the western Allies could not be defeated in the field by the armies of Fascism. The defeat suffered by the Allies had nothing to do with right versus wrong, however, but was very much a product of a number of operational shortcomings on the part of the Allies. Poor logistics, failures on the part of American leadership, lack of unity of effort on the part of the Allies, the lack of combat experience, and inferior equipment all combined to contribute to the failure at Kasserine. Despite the setback at Kasserine Pass, the Americans proved quick learners, and applied the lessons of the North African experience to the remainder of their campaign in the European theater.
As the Afrika Korps withdrew after a bruising defeat at El Alamein, it became apparent that Axis forces would not be able to maintain their hold over Libya. Rommel pulled his troops back to Tunisia, digging in along the Mareth Line, and turned westwards t
American troops invaded North Africa in November 1942, but did not face serious resistance until the following February, when they finally tangled with Rommel’s Afrika Korps—and the Germans gave the inexperienced Americans a nasty drubbing at Kasserine Pass. After this disaster, Gen. George Patton took command and reinvigorated U.S. troops with tough training and new tactics. In late March, at El Guettar in Tunisia, Patton’s men defeated the Germans. It was a morale-boosting victory—the first American success versus the Germans and the first of Patton’s storied World War II career—and proved to the enemy, the British, and the Americans themselves that the U.S. Army could fight and win.
Throughout 1943, the German army, heirs to a military tradition that demanded and perfected relentless offensive operations, succumbed to the realities of its own overreach and the demands of twentieth-century industrialized warfare. In his new study, prizewinning author Robert Citino chronicles this weakening Wehrmacht, now fighting desperately on the defensive but still remarkably dangerous and lethal. Drawing on his impeccable command of German-language sources, Citino offers fresh, vivid, and detailed treatments of key campaigns during this fateful year: the Allied landings in North Africa, General von Manstein's great counterstroke in front of Kharkov, the German attack at Kasserine Pass, the titanic engagement of tanks and men at Kursk, the Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and Belgorod, and the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy. Through these events, he reveals how a military establishment historically configured for violent aggression reacted when the tables were turned; how German commanders viewed their newest enemy, the U.S. Army, after brutal fighting against the British and Soviets; and why, despite their superiority in materiel and manpower, the Allies were unable to turn 1943 into a much more decisive year. Applying the keen operational analysis for which he is so highly regarded, Citino contends that virtually every flawed German decision-to defend Tunis, to attack at Kursk and then call off the offensive, to abandon Sicily, to defend Italy high up the boot and then down much closer to the toe-had strong supporters among the army's officer corps. He looks at all of these engagements from the perspective of each combatant nation and also establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt the synergistic interplay between the fronts. Ultimately, Citino produces a grim portrait of the German officer corps, dispelling the longstanding tendency to blame every bad decision on Hitler. Filled with telling vignettes and sharp portraits and copiously documented, The Wehrmacht Retreats is a dramatic and fast-paced narrative that will engage military historians and general readers alike.
This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom in highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's formidable strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book's last section explores the final year of the war and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.
A highly illustrated account of the hard fighting in North Africa, from the battle of El Alamein to defeat of the Axis forces in May 1943. The battle of El Alamein saw the shattering of Germany's hopes for victory in North Africa and from this point on the end was inevitable. In the six months that passed before the final surrender there was much hard fighting, as the defeated German and Italian armies sought to hold off the encroaching Eighth Army. Rommel, his health suffering, fought a number of major actions during this campaign before his forces settled into the pre-war French defensive position the Mareth Line. All the way he was pursued by an increasingly confident Eighth Army under the command of General Montgomery, although he was unable to outflank the retreating German and Italian forces decisively, and Rommel was even able to divert forces to inflict a sharp defeat on the newly arrived US forces at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. This was one of Rommel's last acts in the Desert War as his health problems forced his return to Germany shortly afterwards. In this detailed examination, Ken Ford explores the lead-up to and execution of the last great battle of the Desert War, as the veteran formations of the British Eighth Army took on their foes in the Afrikakorps for the final time in the major set-piece battle for the Mareth Line.
