The Japanese automotive industry enjoyed spectacular success in the 1980s. This was largely due to the so-called 'Lean Production System' - the combination of an efficient production system, an effective supplier system, and a product development system. In the 1990s the industry fell on hard times because of the Japanese asset price bubble and extreme currency appreciation. In this book, eminent industry specialist Koichi Shimokawa draws on his thirty years of research and fieldwork with Japanese and American firms, to show how the Japanese automotive industry has managed to recover from this difficult period. He shows how firms like Toyota were able to transfer Japanese systems to overseas plants and how they have changed in order to compete in increasingly globalized markets. In addition, the book also addresses the two major challenges to the current industry model: the rise of China and the environmental and energy supply situation.
As the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies reflected on the deteriorating position of the domestic auto industry in the fall of 1980, and the strong competitive threat being posed by the Japanese automakers, we were struck by the extraordinary low quality of the public discussion of these critical issues. The national importance of the issues seemed only matched by the superficiality of the analyses being offered. The tendency to think in terms of scapegoats was particularly evident. The Japanese as the basic cause of our problems has been a particularly notable theme. To be sure, cooperation with the Japanese in formulating a rational overall trade policy may be an important part of the solution. It has also been fashionable to blame it all on American auto industry management for not concentrating on the production of small cars when "everyone knew" that was the thing to do. Alternatively, government meddling was blamed for all our problems. Clearly, the complex problem we faced required more penetrating analyses. It seemed therefore, that the time was ripe for a public seminar which moved beyond the rhetoric of the moment and probed some of the deeper causes of our problems and possible directions for future policy. In holding the January 1981 auto conference, the Center took it as their task to begin addressing the critical issues facing the industry, with particular, but not exclusive, attention to examining the role of the Japanese auto industry. They had in mind not to simply conduct a rational discussion of the trade issue but to probe the sources of Japanese competitive strength, especially those features whose study might profit them. In these proceedings, they bring those discussions to a wider audience. Question and answer sessions at the conference were necessarily short and a few speakers delivered abbreviated remarks; this volume restores a number of omissions, and provides additional answers to some pertinent questions put by the audience. The Center hopes to encourage the serious problem-solving these complex issues demand. Far too much time has been spent trying to fix the blame. [intro]
When the war ended on August IS, 1945, I was a naval engineering cadet at the Kure Navy Yard near Hiroshima, Japan. A week later, I was demobi lized and returned to my home in Tokyo, fortunate not to find it ravaged by firebombing. At the beginning of September, a large contingent of the Ameri can occupation forces led by General Douglas MacArthur moved its base from Yokohama to Tokyo. Near my home I watched a procession of American mili tary motor vehicles snaking along Highway 1. This truly awe-inspiring cavalcade included jeeps, two-and-a-half-ton trucks, and enormous trailers mounted with tanks and artillery. At the time, I was a 21-year-old student in the Machinery Section of Engineering at the Tokyo Imperial University. Watching that mag nificent parade of military vehicles, I was more than impressed by the gap in industrial strength between Japan and the U. S. That realization led me to devote my whole life to the development of the Japanese auto industry. I wrote a small article concerning this incident in Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (one of the leading business newspapers in Japan) on May 2, 1983. The English translation of this story was carried in the July 3, 1983 edition of the Topeka Capital-Journal and the September 13, 1983 issue of the Asian Wall Street Journal. The Topeka Capital-Journal headline read, "MacArthur's Jeeps Were the Toyota Catalyst.
At its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, automobile manufacturing was the largest, most profitable industry in the United States and residents of industry hubs like Detroit and Flint, Michigan had some of the highest incomes in the country. Over the last half-century, the industry has declined, and American automakers now struggle to stay profitable. How did the most prosperous industry in the richest country in the world crash and burn? In Wrecked, sociologists Joshua Murray and Michael Schwartz offer an unprecedented historical-sociological analysis of the downfall of the auto industry. Through an in-depth examination of labor relations and the production processes of automakers in the U.S. and Japan both before and after World War II, they demonstrate that the decline of the American manufacturers was the unintended consequence of their attempts to weaken the bargaining power of their unions. Today Japanese and many European automakers produce higher quality cars at lower cost than their American counterparts thanks to a flexible form of production characterized by long-term sole suppliers, assembly and supply plants located near each other, and just-in-time delivery of raw materials. While this style of production was, in fact, pioneered in the U.S. prior to World War II, in the years after the war, American automakers deliberately dismantled this system. As Murray and Schwartz show, flexible production accelerated innovation but also facilitated workers’ efforts to unionize plants and carry out work stoppages. To reduce the efficacy of strikes and combat the labor militancy that flourished between the Depression and the postwar period, the industry dispersed production across the nation, began maintaining large stockpiles of inventory, and eliminated single sourcing. While this restructuring of production did ultimately reduce workers’ leverage, it also decreased production efficiency and innovation. The U.S. auto industry has struggled ever since to compete with foreign automakers, and formerly thriving motor cities have suffered the consequences of mass deindustrialization. Murray and Schwartz argue that new business models that reinstate flexible production and prioritize innovation rather than cheap labor could stem the outsourcing of jobs and help revive the auto industry. By clarifying the historical relationships between production processes, organized labor, and industrial innovation, Wrecked provides new insights into the inner workings and decline of the U.S. auto industry.
This volume presents realistic estimates for the level of fuel economy that is achievable in the next decade for cars and light trucks made in the United States and Canada. A source of objective and comprehensive information on the topic, this book takes into account real-world factors such as the financial conditions in the automotive industry, costs and benefits to consumers, and marketability of high-efficiency vehicles. The committee is composed of experts from the fields of science, technology, finance, and regulation and offers practical evaluations of technological improvements that could contribute to increased fuel efficiency. The volume also examines potential barriers to improvement, such as high production costs, regulations on safety and emissions, and consumer preferences. This practical book is of considerable interest to car and light truck manufacturers, policymakers, federal and state agencies, and the public.
