Performance Incentives in the Public Sector
Performance Incentives in the Public Sector

Author: Michael Cragg

Publisher:

Published: 1997

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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It is curious that more government programs do not use performance-based contacts for human resource-oriented programs. Theoretical explanations for their limited use are that: agents' risk aversion limits the effectiveness of performance incentives, and moral hazard can restrict the efficacy of performance incentives if the performance measures do not fully reflect program goals. This paper examines the validity of these explanations by studying the performance management system used in the major federal job training program, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Existing JTPA performance measures lead to problems of moral hazard. The paper provides empirical evidence for the notion that unless performance standards are carefully designed, problems of moral hazard may preclude the wide-spread use of performance incentives in government programs.

Meta-Analysis for Public Management and Policy
Meta-Analysis for Public Management and Policy

Author: Evan Ringquist

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

Published: 2013-01-09

Total Pages: 590

ISBN-13: 1118190130

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Meta-Analysis for Public Management and Policy is a groundbreaking book that introduces meta-analysis and includes proven techniques for research in public management and policy. The book provides statistical approaches to meta-analysis most useful for public policy and management and features five examples of original meta-analyses of important questions in public management and policy conducted by the author and his team. These original studies show step-by-step how to conduct a meta-analysis and contribute original research on ...

Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector
Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector

Author: Naureen Karachiwalla

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 56

ISBN-13:

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We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, promotions are associated with wage increases, higher wage increases are associated with better performance, and teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility but reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.

What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail
What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail

Author: Elisabeth Paul

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2006-06

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13:

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This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.