How Incentive Contracts and Task Complexity Influence and Facilitate Long-term Performance
Author: Leslie Berger
Publisher:
Published: 2009
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
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Author: Leslie Berger
Publisher:
Published: 2009
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Leslie Anne Berger
Publisher:
Published: 2009
Total Pages: 179
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe purpose of this study is to investigate how different incentive contracts that include forward-looking and contemporaneous goals motivate managers to make decisions consistent with the organization's long-term objectives, in tasks of varying complexity. Two research questions are addressed. First, in a long-term horizon setting, how do incentive contracts based on various combinations of forward-looking and contemporaneous measures influence decisions? Second, how does task complexity influence the expected effect of various incentive contracts on management decisions?
Author: Edwin A. Locke
Publisher:
Published: 1990
Total Pages: 440
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Svenja C. Sommer
Publisher:
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKMany novel projects are characterized by ambiguity (impossibility to recognize all influence variables and to foresee all possible events) and complexity (interaction of many performance influence variables, making the overall performance difficult to estimate). Two fundamental approaches to project management under these conditions have been identified: Selectionism, or pursuing multiple approaches independently of one another and picking the best one ex post, and trial & error learning, or flexibly adjusting to new information about the environment as it emerges. While the actions to be taken under the selectionist approach can be defined at the outset, and thus standard contracting theory applies, trial & error learning involves taking actions after ambiguity has been resolved, making it inherently difficult to set incentives for managers. Actions and targets cannot be specified at the outset, since they would no longer be optimal at the time the actions should be executed. In a search model in a complex performance landscape, this paper first shows that trial & error learning is more attractive than selectionism when ambiguity and high complexity combine. Second, for this situation of trial & error learning, we construct incomplete contracts between a principal (e.g., the firm) and an agent (e.g., a project manager) that can re-instate optimal incentives for the agent. This is achieved by a priori defining time points and aspects of re-negotiation, depending on what each party learns. As the project manager, as an employee, is ambiguity averse, he must be protected from unforeseeable variations in his compensation. The principal, in contrast, is willing to accept ambiguity, and the incomplete contract offers him a means to optimally re-direct the agent's actions in return or insuring the agent against payment ambiguity.
Author: Yehui Zhang
Publisher:
Published: 2023
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe increasing demand for aviation complex products makes complex product manufacturers pay more attention to delivery efficiency, and the efficiency and effect of delivery problems are the key factors that restrict the delivery efficiency. This study aims to design a long-term effective incentive contract, which stimulates the subjective initiative of each technical business department to deal with delivery problems so as to improve delivery efficiency. We consider the behavioral characteristics of each technical business department (fairness preference, interrelationship diversity, technical capability, etc.) to expand the benchmark incentive model. The multi-stage incentive mechanism which combines the explicit incentives and implicit incentives are developed to explore the optimal delivery strategies based on a benchmark model. The results show that the incentive contracts can improve delivery efficiency and benefit delivery centers and technical business departments. The delivery decisions of the department are influenced by the closeness of department relationships and the fairness of assignment, and the departments tend to pay more effort in tasks with high relative importance and low effort cost. When the relative importance of tasks is equal to the ratio of marginal cost, a weak incentive zone in the delivery incentive contract is existed. The incentive effect of reputation effect is obvious except for the last stage. Base on the designed incentive contracts, the subjective initiative of the participants can be effectively stimulated to empower complex product delivery.
Author: Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
Publisher:
Published: 2014
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis paper reports the results of an experiment that examines how incentive-based compensation contracts compare to flat-wage compensation contracts in motivating individual learning and performance. I use a multiperiod cognitive task where the accounting system generates information (feedback) that has both a contracting role and a belief-revision role. The results suggest that incentives enhance performance and the rate of improvement in performance by increasing both: (1) the amount of time participants devoted to the task, and (2) participants' analysis and use of information. Further, I find evidence that incentives improve performance only after considerable feedback and experience, which may help explain why many prior one-shot decision-making experiments show no incentive effects. Collectively, the results suggest that incentives induce individuals to work longer and smarter, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will develop and use the innovative strategies frequently required to perform well in complex judgment tasks and learning situations.
Author: Deniz S Ones
Publisher: SAGE
Published: 2021-08-04
Total Pages: 3173
ISBN-13: 1473942780
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe second edition of this best-selling Handbook presents a fully updated and expanded overview of research, providing the latest perspectives on the analysis of theories, techniques, and methods used by industrial, work, and organizational psychologists. Building on the strengths of the first edition, key additions to this edition include in-depth historical chapter overviews of professional contexts across the globe, along with new chapters on strategic human resource management; corporate social responsibility; diversity, stress, emotions and mindfulness in the workplace; environmental sustainability at work; aging workforces, among many others. Providing a truly global approach and authoritative overview, this three-volume Handbook is an indispensable resource and essential reading for professionals, researchers and students in the field. Volume One: Personnel Psychology and Employee Performance Volume Two: Organizational Psychology Volume Three: Managerial Psychology and Organizational Approaches
Author: Ohene Aku Kwapong
Publisher: Songhai
Published: 2005-04
Total Pages: 310
ISBN-13: 0976724103
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe objective of this book is to provide the fundamental building blocks of an MBA education so working professionals can become more effective in solving business problems.
Author: Marks, Linda
Publisher: Policy Press
Published: 2014-07-23
Total Pages: 286
ISBN-13: 1447304950
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDrawing on in-depth case studies across England, this book argues that governance and population health are inextricably linked. Using original research, it shows how these links can be illustrated at a local level through commissioning practice related to health and wellbeing. Exploring the impact of governance on decision- making, Governance, commissioning and public health analyses how principles, such as social justice, and governance arrangements, including standards and targets, influence local strategies and priorities for public health investment. In developing ‘public health governance’ as a critical concept, the study demonstrates the complexity of the governance landscape for public health and the leadership qualities required to negotiate it. This book is essential reading for students, academics, practitioners and policy-makers with an interest in governance and decision-making for public health.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 308
ISBN-13: 9780674020634
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.