Since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which Heidegger delivered his most celebrated salvo against logic, he has frequently been portrayed as an anti-logician, a classic example of the obscurity resultant upon a rejection of the discipline of logic, a champion of the irrational, and a variety of similar things. Because many of Heidegger's statements on logic are polemical in tone, there has been no little misunderstanding of his position in regard to logic, and a great deal of distortion of it. All too frequently the position which is attacked as Heidegger's is a barely recognizable caricature of it. Heidegger has, from the very beginning of his career, written and said much on logic. Strangely enough, in view of all that he has said, his critique of logic has not been singled out as the subject of any of the longer, more detailed studies on the various aspects of his thought.
There is a tradition of interpreting Heidegger's remarks on logic as an attempt to flout, revise, or eliminate logic, and of thus characterizing Heidegger as an irrationalist. Heidegger and Logic looks closely at Heidegger's writings on logic in the Being and Time era and argues that Heidegger does not seek to discredit logic, but to determine its scope and explain its foundations. Through a close examination of the relevant texts, Greg Shirley shows that this tradition of interpretation rests on mischaracterizations and false assumptions. What emerges from Heidegger's remarks on logic is an account of intelligibility that is both novel and relevant to issues in contemporary philosophy of logic. Heidegger's views on logic form a coherent whole that is an important part of his larger philosophical project and helps us understand it better, and that constitutes a unique contribution to the philosophy of logic
Heidegger’s radical thinking on the meaning of truth in a “clear and comprehensive critical edition” (Philosophy in Review). Martin Heidegger’s 1925–26 lectures on truth and time provided much of the basis for his momentous work, Being and Time. Not published until 1976—three months before Heidegger’s death—as volume 21 of his Complete Works, it is nonetheless central to Heidegger’s overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth. The text shows the degree to which Aristotle underlies Heidegger’s hermeneutical theory of meaning. It also contains Heidegger’s first published critique of Husserl and takes major steps toward establishing the temporal bases of logic and truth. Thomas Sheehan’s elegant and insightful translation offers English-speaking readers access to this fundamental text for the first time.
Martin Heidegger's 1925-26 lectures on truth and time provided much of the basis for his work, "Being and Time". This title is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth. It shows the degree to which Aristotle underlies Heidegger's hermeneutical theory of meaning.
A new 2024 translation of Heidegger's early work "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic'', originally published in 1913 under the German title "Die lehre vom urteil im psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik ". This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for Existentialist terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. The document explores the nature of judgment, its relation to perception, and the psychological underpinnings of logical thought. Heidegger argues for the need to make a clear distinction between psychological and transcendental methods in logic, arguing for an independent and intrinsic understanding of logic beyond psychological interpretations.
Does adherence to the principles of logic commit us to a particular way of viewing the world? Or are there ways of being – ways of behaving in the world, including ways of thinking, feeling, and speaking – that ground the normative constraints that logic imposes? Does the fact that assertions, the traditional elements of logic, are typically made about beings present a problem for metaphysical (or post-metaphysical) prospects of making assertions meaningfully about being? Does thinking about being (as opposed to beings) accordingly require revising or restricting logic's reach – and, if so, how is this possible? Or is there something precious about the very idea of thinking the limits of thinking? Contemporary scholars have become increasing sensitive to how Heidegger, much like Wittgenstein, instructively poses such questions. Heidegger on Logic is a collection of new essays by leading scholars who critically ponder the efficacy of his responses to them.
Offering a full-scale study of the theory of reality hidden beneath modern logic, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, a lecture course given in 1928, illuminates the transitional phase in Heidegger's thought from the existential analysis of Being and Time to the overcoming of metaphysics in his later philosophy. In a searching exposition of the metaphysical problems underpinning Leibniz's theory of logical judgment, Heidegger establishes that a given theory of logic is rooted in a certain conception of Being. He explores the significance of Western logic as a system-building technical tool and as a cultural phenomenon that is centuries old.
“This excellent translation” presents Heidegger’s mature thought on the essence of Truth as he was writing his major work, Contributions to Philosophy (Library Journal). This is the first English translation of a lecture course Martin Heidegger presented at the University of Freiburg in 1937–1938. Heidegger’s task here is to reassert the question of the essence of truth, not as a “problem” or as a matter of “logic,” but precisely as a genuine philosophical question, in fact the one basic question of philosophy. Thus, this course is about the essence of truth as well as the essence of philosophy itself. On both sides Heidegger draws extensively upon the ancient Greeks, on their understanding of truth as aletheia and their determination of the beginning of philosophy as the disposition of wonder. In addition, these lectures were presented at the time that Heidegger was composing his second magnum opus, Beiträge zur Philosophie, and provide the single best introduction to that complex and crucial text.
"Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is one of the greatest conundrums in the modern philosophical world, by turns inspiring and mind-bogglingly frustrating. In this critical introduction S. J. McGrath offers not a comprehensive summary of Heidegger but a series of incisive takes on Heidegger's thought, leading readers to a point from which they can begin or continue their own relationship with him."--BOOK JACKET.
