Hegel's Moral Corporation is about two versions of a corporation, one business oriented and dedicated to shareholder-value and profit-maximisation and one dedicated to moral life, Sittlichkeit, in Hegelian terms.
Hegel's Moral Corporation is about two versions of a corporation, one business oriented and dedicated to shareholder-value and profit-maximisation and one dedicated to moral life, Sittlichkeit, in Hegelian terms.
Hegel's Moral Corporation is about two versions of a corporation, one business oriented and dedicated to shareholder-value and profit-maximisation and one dedicated to moral life, Sittlichkeit, in Hegelian terms.
The legal regulations and formal rules of democracy alone are not enough to hold a society together and govern its processes. Yet the irreducible ethical pluralism that characterizes contemporary society seems to make it impossible to impose a single system of values as a source of social cohesion and identity reference. In this book, Lucio Cortella argues that Hegel's theory of ethical life can provide such a grounding and makes the case through an analysis of Hegel's central political work, the Philosophy of Right. Although Hegel did not support democratic political ends and wrote in a historical and cultural context far removed from the current liberal-democratic scene, Cortella maintains that the Hegelian theory of ethical life, with its emphasis on securing a framework conducive to human freedom, nevertheless offers a convincing response to the problem of the ethical uprootedness of contemporary democracy.
Yeomans reconstructs Hegel's expansion of Kant's notion of autonomy and argues that the result is a striking pluralism in moral psychology and the concept of action.
In this significant contribution to Hegel scholarship, Robert Williams develops the most comprehensive account to date of Hegel's concept of recognition (Anerkennung). Fichte introduced the concept of recognition as a presupposition of both Rousseau's social contract and Kant's ethics. Williams shows that Hegel appropriated the concept of recognition as the general pattern of his concept of ethical life, breaking with natural law theory yet incorporating the Aristotelian view that rights and virtues are possible only within a certain kind of community. He explores Hegel's intersubjective concept of spirit (Geist) as the product of affirmative mutual recognition and his conception of recognition as the right to have rights. Examining Hegel's Jena manuscripts, his Philosophy of Right, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and other works, Williams shows how the concept of recognition shapes and illumines Hegel's understandings of crime and punishment, morality, the family, the state, sovereignty, international relations, and war. A concluding chapter on the reception and reworking of the concept of recognition by contemporary thinkers including Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze demonstrates Hegel's continuing centrality to the philosophical concerns of our age.
Hegel for Social Movements by Andy Blunden is an introduction to the reading of Hegel for social change activists, focusing a non-metaphysical reading of the Logic and the Philosophy of Right.