In this paper, the author differentiates and characterizes terrorists and insurgents, and he conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This work lays out the case that terrorism and insurgency differ, and that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency. As a result, the United States must amend and adapt its strategy to one of global counterinsurgency, beyond a global war on terrorism alone.
"Anyone who wants to understand the world we live in now should read this book." —Lawrence Wright To eliminate the scourge of terrorism, we must first know who the enemy actually is, and what his motivations are. In Anatomy of Terror, former FBI special agent and New York Times best-selling author Ali Soufan dissects Osama bin Laden’s brand of jihadi terrorism and its major offshoots, revealing how these organizations were formed, how they operate, their strengths, and—crucially—their weaknesses. This riveting account examines the new Islamic radicalism through the stories of its flag-bearers, including a U.S. Air Force colonel who once served Saddam Hussein, a provincial bookworm who declared himself caliph of all Muslims, and bin Laden’s own beloved son Hamza, a prime candidate to lead the organization his late father founded. Anatomy of Terror lays bare the psychology and inner workings of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their spawn, and shows how the spread of terror can be stopped. Winner of the Airey Neave Memorial Book Prize
This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, and uses qualitative and quantitative data to assess whether this movement has strengthened. The author uses this analysis to examine U.S. strategic options to counter al Qa’ida and other terrorist groups based on the threat level and the capacity of local governments.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on strategic targets inside the United States by al Qaeda, scholars, analysts, and policy specialists began to interpret and frame those events within the larger context of war. But was it war? And if it was, what kind of war was it? Al Qaeda was not a state but a nonstate actor. Many labeled al Qaeda a transnational terrorist organization. Could such a nonstate armed group go to war with a major state actor? What kind of war could it carry out? There were no easily decipherable answers to these questions, for al Qaeda did not reflect or emulate the conduct of war as it was known and practiced in the past.Within a short period of time the US government began to describe the post 9/ 11 conflict environment—one in which America found itself engaged in a fight against unconventional and asymmetrical enemies who could pose major, even strategic, security threats—as a global war on terrorism. This generated a great deal of discussion and differences of opinion. Was this an accurate portrayal of the post 9/ 11 security environment or did such a characterization lack strategic clarity?By the summer of 2005 senior Bush administration officials expressed serious doubts about this terminology and recast how they described the fight against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other terrorist groups. Illustrative of this was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. At news conferences and in public addresses he began to speak of a global struggle against violent extremism—“the long war”—rather than a global war on terrorism. Other senior military leaders, to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, followed suit.But this begged the question, how should we understand those conducting “the long war?” Who are they and what kind of battle are they fighting? What are their objectives and what kind of strategy and tactics do they employ in this fight to achieve them? One possible answer that has been suggested is that the United States and its allies are now confronted by a global Salafi Jihad insurgency.
Product Description: Discussion of armed groups which are considered to include classic insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, police agencies, criminal organizations, war-lords, privatized military organizations, mercenaries, pirates, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, orchestrated rioters and mobs, and tribal factions. To study armed groups use of history, political science, anthropology, sociology, theology, and economics are traditional areas of research. The book also delves into matters of ethics, technology, intelligence, education, the law, diplomacy, military science, and even mythology. The book is divided into five sections: History and armed groups, Present context and environment, Religion and inspiration, thinking differently about armed groups, the shpae of things to come.
For decades, a new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. America's ability to remain oblivious to these new movements ended on September 11, 2001. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Marc Sageman challenges conventional wisdom about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective defense against future attacks is a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new terrorists to proliferate. Based on intensive study of biographical data on 172 participants in the jihad, Understanding Terror Networks gives us the first social explanation of the global wave of activity. Sageman traces its roots in Egypt, gestation in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war, exile in the Sudan, and growth of branches worldwide, including detailed accounts of life within the Hamburg and Montreal cells that planned attacks on the United States. U.S. government strategies to combat the jihad are based on the traditional reasons an individual was thought to turn to terrorism: poverty, trauma, madness, and ignorance. Sageman refutes all these notions, showing that, for the vast majority of the mujahedin, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill. The tight bonds of family and friendship, paradoxically enhanced by the tenuous links between the cell groups (making it difficult for authorities to trace connections), contributed to the jihad movement's flexibility and longevity. And although Sageman's systematic analysis highlights the crucial role the networks played in the terrorists' success, he states unequivocally that the level of commitment and choice to embrace violence were entirely their own. Understanding Terror Networks combines Sageman's scrutiny of sources, personal acquaintance with Islamic fundamentalists, deep appreciation of history, and effective application of network theory, modeling, and forensic psychology. Sageman's unique research allows him to go beyond available academic studies, which are light on facts, and journalistic narratives, which are devoid of theory. The result is a profound contribution to our understanding of the perpetrators of 9/11 that has practical implications for the war on terror.
The threat of terrorism has become an ever present preoccupation, necessitating the constant review and updating of defensive strategies to counter it from national governments and policymakers. This book presents selected articles based on some of the lectures delivered at the NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism (COE – DAT) Advanced Training Course (ATC) Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat, held in Algiers, Algeria, in October 2011. Subjects covered by these articles include an overview of terrorism; respecting human rights in the countering of terrorism; suicide terrorism; terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction; bioterrorism; terrorism, media and public information; strategic communications in the defence against terrorism; the challenges posed by non-state armed groups; and sources of instability. This collection of articles will be of interest to all those involved in countering the threat of terrorism worldwide.
This book is primarily an effort to study the phenomenon called insurgency that has been posing a huge challenge to the internal security of the country. Though a wealth of literature on the subject already exists, a need was felt to analyse the multiple facets of insurgency as no country barring India has witnessed this endemic for a prolonged period. The subject is so vast and dynamic that no strait-jacketed solution can be prescribed to curb this menace overnight. However, an attempt has been made to analyse this phenomenon and prescribe remedial antidotes. The author has attempted to capture the origin of insurgency which dates back to a late 18th century, and study various causes and numerous factors that fuel it. In addition, he has also attempted to study the doctrines and strategies, with special emphasis on both Islamic insurgency and other forms of uprisings in the country that continue to pose challenges to the Indiansecurity environment. Owing allegiance to his uniform, the author has also attempted to bring out the role of air power in counterinsurgency operations. The penultimate chapter deals with shaping a viable counter-insurgency strategy and spells out the essential parameters, principles and pitfalls of such a strategy. The chapter also dwells on the political aim and the importance of a socio-economic turnabout to scale down insurgency. The use of calibrated force rather than brutal armed suppressive methods is advocated. Will insurgencies ever end? This lingering question is discussed in the final chapter and certain essential strategies, both military and non-military, are spelt out which would provide occasions and opportunities to forge a lasting solution to insurgency in India.\
This book is the first detailed study of the causes of de-radicalization in armed Islamist movements. It is based on frontline research that includes interviews with Jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, and young sympathizers, as well as former security and intelligence officers and state officials. Additionally, it is also the first book to analyze the particular conditions under which successful de-radicalization can take place. The current literature on Islamist movements attempts to explain two principal issues: their support of violence (radicalization) and their changing a.
