This volume is an account of the many currents, some ongoing, that informed the Army's struggle to design a basic training course acceptable to the nation's civil and military leadership, the general public, various special iterest groups, and the young men and women undergoing their first experience as soldiers. Employs a mixture of topical and chronological organization. The major focus is on the period from 1973 to 2004. Tells the Army's story of mixed-gender training at the initial-entry level.
This volume is an account of the many currents, some ongoing, that informed the Army's struggle to design a basic training course acceptable to the nation's civil and military leadership, the general public, various special iterest groups, and the young men and women undergoing their first experience as soldiers. Employs a mixture of topical and chronological organization. The major focus is on the period from 1973 to 2004. Tells the Army's story of mixed-gender training at the initial-entry level.
On 24 January 2013, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DCAR) that excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. In doing so, the SecDef directed the opening of all occupational specialties, positions and units to women; the validation of gender-neutral standards for those positions; and establishment of milestones for implementation. In a March 2013 memorandum, Commander USSOCOM directed several initiatives as a result of the SecDef's DCAR rescission. While other studies examined individual performance and standards, the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research examined the effects on team dynamics. The challenge for this study was to determine if changing the gender component of Special Operations Forces elite teams from single-gender (masculine) to mixed-gender would affect team dynamics in a way that would compromise the ability of the team to meet a mission objective.
The Department of Defense is unequivocal in its commitment to ensure that victims of sexual assault be protected, treated with dignity and respect, provided proper medical and psychological care, and that the perpetrators of such assaults be held accountable. Task Force Charter On February 5, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S.C. Chu, to undertake a 90-day review of all sexual assault policies and programs among the Services and DoD, and recommend changes necessary to increase prevention, promote reporting, enhance the quality and support provided to victims, especially within combat theaters, and improve accountability for offender actions. Review Methodology On February 13, 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness established an eight member Department of Defense Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults Task Force. The Task Force formulated a review plan, which included the following: Request and analyze sexual assault incidence and demographic data from the Services. Request and assess current DoD-wide, Service-wide and Combatant Command-wide sexual assault policies and programs. Perform literature review on sexual assault, including review of prior studies and reports on DoD sexual assault and related programs. Discuss sexual assault prevention, reporting, response, and disposition issues with commanders, non-commissioned officers, junior enlisted personnel, service providers (medical, mental health, victim advocate, victim witness advocate, chaplains, law enforcement, investigative agencies, and legal personnel), and victims. Consult with subject matter experts within the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, civilian experts, and sexual assault support organizations about matters that should inform our review with respect to prevention, reporting, response, and disposition of sexual assault cases.
