The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.
Recounts the events of the Bretton Woods accords, presents portaits of the two men at the center of the drama, and reveals Harry White's admiration for Soviet economic planning and communications with intelligence officers.
At the close of the Second World War, when industrialized nations faced serious trade and financial imbalances, delegates from forty-four countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in order to reconstruct the international monetary system. In this volume, three generations of scholars and policy makers, some of whom participated in the 1944 conference, consider how the Bretton Woods System contributed to unprecedented economic stability and rapid growth for 25 years and discuss the problems that plagued the system and led to its eventual collapse in 1971. The contributors explore adjustment, liquidity, and transmission under the System; the way it affected developing countries; and the role of the International Monetary Fund in maintaining a stable rate. The authors examine the reasons for the System's success and eventual collapse, compare it to subsequent monetary regimes, such as the European Monetary System, and address the possibility of a new fixed exchange rate for today's world.
Commentaries by top scholars alongside the most important documents and speeches concerning the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 The two world wars brought an end to a long-standing system of international commerce based on the gold standard. After the First World War, the weaknesses in the gold standard contributed to hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, and ultimately World War II. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 arose out of the Allies' desire to design a postwar international economic system that would provide a basis for prosperity, trade, and worldwide economic development. Alongside important documents and speeches concerning the adoption and evolution of the Bretton Woods system, this volume includes lively, readable, original essays on such topics as why the gold standard was doomed, how Bretton Woods encouraged the adoption of Keynesian economics, how the agreements influenced late-twentieth-century ideas of international development, and why the agreements ultimately had to give way to other arrangements.
We reinterpret the commonly held view in the U.S. that France, by following a policy from 1965 to 1968 of deliberately converting their dollar holdings into gold helped perpetuate the collapse of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. We argue that French international monetary policy under Charles de Gaulle was consistent with strategies developed in the interwar period and the French Plan of 1943. France used proposals to return to an orthodox gold standard as well as conversions of its dollar reserves into gold as tactical threats to induce the United States to initiate the reform of the international monetary system towards a more symmetrical and cooperative gold-exchange standard regime.
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.
This book describes the history of the IMF from its birth, through the Bretton Woods era, and in the aftermath. Special attention is paid to integrating IMF history with the macro-economic policies of member countries and of other international institutions as well. This collection of work presents a clear understanding, inter alia, of the influence of the United States over IMF policy via the National Advisory Committee; the dealings of the IMF with the UK on pound sterling policy; the institutional change of the IMF brought about by Per Jacobsson, the third managing director; and France, Italy, Germany, Canada, and Japan vis-à-vis IMF consultations. It also provides the reader with topics concerning the bankers’ acceptance market function and international liquidity issues in relation to IMF policy; the final chapter sheds light on the long-standing relations between the IMF and China, from the Bretton Woods Agreement to the contemporary period. All the chapters are archive-based academic studies providing deep insights with historical background, which makes this book the first thoroughly independent achievement in the field of IMF history. This book is highly recommended to readers interested in contemporary monetary and financial history and those who seek to obtain a coherent image of postwar international institutions and markets.
"Gavin demonstrates that Bretton Woods was in fact a highly politicized system that was prone to crisis and required constant intervention and controls to continue functioning. More important, postwar monetary relations were not a salve to political tensions, as is often contended.
After a century and a half of efforts at constructing arrangements and rules for international monetary interaction, present-day national authorities do not seem to have come much closer to achieving the aim of enduring exchange rate stability combined with a good macroeconomic performance. A distinguished group of economists and economic historians offers new insights into the working of the most important of such experiences, including nineteenth century bimetallism, the 'classical' gold standard, Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System.
