An Introduction to Auction Theory

An Introduction to Auction Theory

Author: Flavio M. Menezes

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 200

ISBN-13: 0199275998

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This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.


Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications

Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications

Author: Gerhard Illing

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2003-12-23

Total Pages: 332

ISBN-13: 9780262263214

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Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience. In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.


Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions

Author: Peter C. Cramton

Publisher: MIT Press (MA)

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 678

ISBN-13:

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A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.


Auctions

Auctions

Author: Paul Klemperer

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2004-03-28

Total Pages: 262

ISBN-13: 0691119252

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Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.


Legal Theory of Auction

Legal Theory of Auction

Author: Kristijan Poljanec

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Published: 2022-09-09

Total Pages: 245

ISBN-13: 1000647153

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The widespread understanding of auction structure considers auction as consisting of three contracts: contract between the seller and the auctioneer, contract between the auctioneer and the buyer and the sale contract between the seller and the buyer. The book challenges this concept, arguing that the traditional tripartite concept of auction is too narrow and does not correspond to the actual structure of auction relations. Demonstrating that an auction structure consists of a plethora of legal relationships, including noncontractual relations, this book explores the legal concept of auction sale and the structure of accompanying relations. The book provides a historical overview of auctions and different auction models. Following a brief introduction to the economic theory, auction models are examined against the following legal criteria: price formation, publicity, parties’ autonomy, legal form and applied technology to find a legal concept and nature of auction. The book explores the legal position of key auction figures and auction objects to identify the categories of legal relations that appear at auction. It explores the legal nature of the main contract, as well as the relations between the consignor and the auctioneer, the auctioneer and the bidders, the bidders themselves, the consignor and the bidders. The book covers relations arising from droit de suite, financial and bidding agreements to provide a comprehensive overview of lesserknown legal relations that commonly arise in auction practice.


Discovering Prices

Discovering Prices

Author: Paul Milgrom

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2017-05-23

Total Pages: 222

ISBN-13: 023154457X

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Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.


Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Dimitris Fotakis

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2019-09-16

Total Pages: 401

ISBN-13: 3030304736

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019, held in Athens, Greece, in September/October 2019. The 25 full papers presented together with 3 invited talks and one abstract paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games; Network Games and Congestion Games; Social Choice; and Matchings and Fair Division.