The most comprehensive and interdisciplinary anthology of corporate law material available, this reader reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in business organization and legal scholarship since the hostile takeover was introduced in the 1980s. The second edition has both completely revised and expanded the material covered in the first edition. New and revised topics include capital markets, agency theory, behavioral economics, state competition for corporate charters, boards of directors, shareholder voting rights, executive compensation, activist investors, takeovers, securities regulation and comparative corporate governance.
This book explores the foundations and evolution of modern corporate fiduciary law in the United States and the United Kingdom. Today US and UK fiduciary law provide very different approaches to the regulation of directorial behaviour. However, as the book shows, the law in both jurisdictions borrowed from the same sources in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English fiduciary and commercial law. The book identifies the shared legal foundations and authorities and explores the drivers of corporate fiduciary law's contemporary divergence. In so doing it challenges the prevailing accounts of corporate legal change and stability in the US and the UK.
This book is a primer on corporate law for law students and anyone else interested in the foundations of corporate law. The book provides a self-contained, accessible presentation of the field's essentials: what corporations are, how they are governed, their interactions with their investors and other stakeholders, major transactions (M&A), and parallels with alternative entities including partnerships. Optional background chapters cover the investor ecosystem, contemporary corporate governance, and corporate finance. The book's exposition of doctrine and policy is nuanced and sophisticated yet short and simple enough for a quick read. "An astonishingly lucid summary, I wish I had it when I was in law school." -Sarath Sanga, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law "Corporations in 100 Pages achieves the impossible: it offers a masterfully clear and concise exposition of corporate law and its motivating principles, without dumbing down the subject matter. I recommend it to all of my students-it's an invaluable resource." -Elisabeth de Fontenay, Duke University School of Law
This book takes a comparative law and economics approach to the study of corporate governance. It looks at the overall impact of corporate law on separation of ownership and control across different jurisdictions and in doing so reappraises the existing framework for economic analysis of corporate law.
This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts, framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets.
This book serves as a compact introduction to the economic analysis of law and organization. At the same time it covers a broad spectrum of issues. It is aimed at undergraduate economics students who are interested in law and organization, law students who want to know the economic basis for the law, and students in business and public policy schools who want to understand the economic approach to law and organization. The book covers such diverse topics as bankruptcy rules, corporate law, sports rules, the organization of Congress, federalism, intellectual property, crime, accident law, and insurance. Unlike other texts on the economic analysis of law, this text is not organized by legal categories but by economic theory. The purpose of the book is to develop economic intuition and theory to a sufficient degree so that one can apply the ideas to a variety of areas in law and organization.
Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that prove shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper-level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and accountants.
Foundations for the LPC covers the compulsory foundation areas of the Legal Practice Course as set out in the LPC outcomes: professional conduct, tax and revenue law, and wills and administration of estates. The book also discusses human rights law, a topic now taught pervasively across theLPC course.Using worked examples and scenarios throughout to illustrate key points, this guide is essential reading for all students and a useful reference source for practitioners. To aid understanding and test comprehension of the core material, checkpoints and summaries feature in every chapter.Online ResourcesOnline resources accompanying the text include useful web links, forms, and diagrams.
