Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Author: Barry Leonard

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2008-11

Total Pages: 21

ISBN-13: 1437900844

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The Intell. Community produces annual reports containing the latest intelligence on ballistic missile (BM) develop. and threats and a discussion of non-missile threat options. This paper is an unclassified summary of the Nat. Intell. Estimate that is the 4th annual report. It describes: new BM develop. and their projections of likely BM threats to the U.S., U.S. interests overseas, and military forces or allies through 2015; updates assessments of theater BM forces worldwide; discusses the evolving proliferation environment; and provides a summary of forward-based threats and cruise missiles. Examines future BM capabilities of several countries that have BM and BM develop. programs: Russia, China, N. Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, India, and Pakistan.


Foreign Missile Threats

Foreign Missile Threats

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 1996

Total Pages: 16

ISBN-13:

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This report evaluates national intelligence estimates prepared by the U.S. intelligence community on the threat to the United States posed by foreign missile systems. The main judgment of national intelligence estimate 95-19 (Emerging Missile Threats to North American During the Next 15 Year)--"No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada"--Was worded with clear certainty. GAO believes that this level of certainty is overstated. The estimate also had other shortcomings. It did not (1) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments, (2) identify explicitly its critical assumptions, and (3) develop alternative futures. However, the estimate did acknowledge dissenting views from several agencies and also noted what information the U.S. intelligence community does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat. The 1993 national intelligence estimates met more of the standards than 95-19 did. National intelligence estimate 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 national intelligence estimate, even though the judgments in all three national intelligence estimates were not inconsistent with each other. That is, although the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading, they did not contradict each other.


Foreign Missile Threats

Foreign Missile Threats

Author: U S Government Accountability Office (G

Publisher: BiblioGov

Published: 2013-06

Total Pages: 24

ISBN-13: 9781289010775

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Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO analyzed the soundness of certain national intelligence estimates (NIE) on the threat to the United States from foreign missile systems, focusing on comparing the content and conclusions of NIE 95-19, which analyzed emerging threats to North America during the next 15 years, with the content and conclusions of two previous NIEs prepared in 1993. GAO found that: (1) the main judgment of NIE 95-19, that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada, was worded with clear, 100-percent certainty; (2) GAO believes this level was overstated, based on the caveats and the intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19; (3) NIE 95-19 had additional analytic shortcomings, since it did not: (a) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments; (b) identify explicitly its critical assumptions; and (c) develop alternative futures; (4) however, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the U.S. intelligence community does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat; (5) the 1993 NIEs met more of the standards than NIE 95-19 did; and (6) NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other, that is, while the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other.


Foreign Missile Threats

Foreign Missile Threats

Author: United States Accounting Office (GAO)

Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Published: 2018-06-14

Total Pages: 34

ISBN-13: 9781721080854

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Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates


Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 21

ISBN-13:

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This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) describes new missile developments and our projections of possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the United States, U.S. interests overseas, and military forces or allies through 2015; updates assessments of theater ballistic missile forces worldwide; discusses the evolving proliferation environment; and provides a summary of forward-based threats and cruise missiles. We examine future ballistic missile capabilities of several countries that have ballistic missiles and ballistic missile development programs. Each country section includes a discussion of theater-range systems and current and projected long-range systems. Our assessments of future missile developments are inexact and subjective because they are based on often fragmentary information. Many countries surround their ballistic missile programs with extensive secrecy and compartmentalization, and some employ deception. Although such key milestones as flight-testing are difficult to hide, we may miss others. To address these uncertainties, we assess both the earliest date that countries could test various missiles, based largely on engineering judgments made by experts inside and outside the Intelligence Community, on the technical capabilities and resources of the countries in question, and, in many cases, on continuing foreign assistance; and when countries would be likely to test such missiles, factoring into the above assessments potential delays caused by technical, political, or economic hurdles. We judge that countries are much less likely to test as early as the hypothetical "could" dates than they are by our projected "likely" dates. In making these projections, we examine the level of success and the pace individual countries have experienced in their missile development efforts and consider foreign technology transfers, political motivations, military incentives, and economic resources.