Financial Reporting Quality and Voluntary Disclosure

Financial Reporting Quality and Voluntary Disclosure

Author: William F. Floyd

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This thesis is comprised of two essays that explore how investors' uncertainty over financial reporting quality influences firms' voluntary disclosures. I consider two shocks that cause investors to assign a higher likelihood of restatement and examine how managers respond using voluntary disclosures. Managers inform stakeholders of the firm through mandatory disclosures (e.g. financial statements) and voluntary disclosures (e.g. earnings forecasts, conference calls, press releases). Financial reporting quality represents the extent to which financial statements faithfully reflect the underlying economics of the firm, and therefore, how much stakeholders can learn from these mandatory disclosures alone. The focus of this thesis is on how managers use voluntary channels to inform stakeholders following shocks to investors' expectations of financial reporting quality.


The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting

The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting

Author: Sarah L. C. Zechman

Publisher:

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 50

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and keep debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash-constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. I find that managers of firms with incentives to use off-balance-sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash-constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.


Do Voluntary Disclosures that Disavow the Reliability of Mandated Fair Value Information Reflect Legitimate Concerns About Reliability?

Do Voluntary Disclosures that Disavow the Reliability of Mandated Fair Value Information Reflect Legitimate Concerns About Reliability?

Author: Walter G. Blacconiere

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

One consequence of the shift to fair value measurement is the emergence of voluntary disclosures in audited financial statements that question the reliability of mandated fair value information. We refer to these disclosures as reliability disavowals and address three questions: Are fair value estimates less reliable for firms that disavow? Do managers of disavowal firms have reason to believe that they cannot reliably estimate the disavowed fair values? Are factors indicative of reliability problems associated with the decision to disavow? We address these questions in the context of managers' stock option compensation estimates disclosed under SFAS 123. Our results suggest reliability disavowals reflect legitimate reliability concerns, consistent with managers believing that supplemental disclosures about fair value estimates provide useful information about the limitations of the estimates, which is the FASB's position in SFAS 157.


Voluntary Disclosures and Information Production By Analysts

Voluntary Disclosures and Information Production By Analysts

Author: Nisan Langberg

Publisher:

Published: 2007

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.


Non-Financial Disclosure and Integrated Reporting

Non-Financial Disclosure and Integrated Reporting

Author: Lucrezia Songini

Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing

Published: 2020-03-12

Total Pages: 240

ISBN-13: 1838679650

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

For researchers and managers interested in performance measurement, this volume includes innovative research that sheds light on topics such as the determinants of disclosure quality, the identification of appropriate metrics, the relationship among the different disclosure mechanisms and between voluntary and mandatory disclosure, and many more.