A study of the postwar developent of the South Korean financial sector tthrough 1978. A detailed description of the structure of the financial sector is provided, followed by discussions of Korea's regulated and unregulated financial institutions and markets, government policies to influence resource allocation and mobilization, price-stabilization problems and policies, and lessons from the Korean experience.
The analysis shows how financial development has occurred in two distinct phases. Initially, interest rates were regulated to remain below market levels, entry of new financial institutions was restricted, financial markets were segmented, and domestic finance was insulated from world financial markets. The second phase has seen a steady, if sometimes slow, removal of these restrictions.
Preliminary Material -- Theories of Financial Development and the Relevance of Korean Experience -- The Financial System: Size, Structure, and Patterns of Intermediation -- Korea's Regulated Financial Institutions -- The Unregulated Financial Institutions and Markets -- Interactions of the Regulated and Unregulated Financial Markets -- Policies to Influence Resource Allocation -- Policies to Influence Resource Mobilization: The Monetary Reform of 1965 -- Price-Stabilization Problems and Policies -- Financial Development and Economic Development -- Lessons from the Korean Experience -- Epilogue -- Farmers' and Fishermen's Usurious Debts Resettlement Order -- Summary of Principal Recommendations Made by Gurley, Patrick, and Shaw -- Readjustment of Curb-Market Borrowings -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Harvard East Asian Monographs.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) presents the full text of the December 2000 paper entitled "Financial Development and Economic Growth: An Overview," prepared by Mohsin S. Khan and Abdelhak S. Senhadji. The text is available in PDF format and the paper is part of the IMF's Working Paper series. This paper provides a review of literature on financial markets and discusses the relationship between financial development and economic growth.
For dozens of developing countries, the financial upheavals of the 1980s have set back economic development by a decade or more. Poverty in those countries has intensified as they struggle under the burden of an enormous external debt. In 1988, more than six years after the onset of the crisis, almost all the debtor countries were still unable to borrow in the international capital markets on normal terms. Moreover, the world financial system has been disrupted by the prospect of widespread defaults on those debts. Because of the urgency of the present crisis, and because similar crises have recurred intermittently for at least 175 years, it is important to understand the fundamental features of the international macroeconomy and global financial markets that have contributed to this repeated instability. This project on developing country debt, undertaken by the National Bureau of Economic Research, provides a detailed analysis of the ongoing developing country debt crisis. The project focuses on the middle-income developing countries, particularly those in Latin America and East Asia, although many lessons of the study should apply as well to other, poorer debtor countries. The project analyzes the crisis from two perspectives, that of the international financial system as a whole (volume 1) and that of individual debtor countries (volumes 2 and 3). This third volume contains lengthy and detailed case studies of four very different Asian countries—Turkey, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines.
The Korean economy has experienced astoundingly rapid growth during the period 1960-90 and is now able, despite its late start, to compete with mature industrialised economies. This book focuses on the underlying economic factors behind this unprecedented growth performance examining the failures as well as the undoubted successes of such development.
The book analyses and evaluates the development role and impact of the state in East Asia, in both capitalist (South Korea and Taiwan) and socialist (China) contexts. It makes use of new research data on the mechanisms and impact of state intervention in East Asian development and presents an original theory, taking issue with the conventional view that East Asian development reflects the power of market forces.
The Asian crisis has sparked a thoroughgoing reappraisal of current international financial norms, the policy prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, and the adequacy of the existing financial architecture. To draw proper policy conclusions from the crisis, it is necessary to understand exactly what happened and why from both a political and an economic perspective. In this study, renowned political scientist Stephan Haggard examines the political aspects of the crisis in the countries most affected—Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Haggard focuses on the political economy of the crisis, emphasizing the longer-run problems of moral hazard and corruption, as well as the politics of crisis management and the political fallout that ensued. He looks at the degree to which each government has rewoven the social safety net and discusses corporate and financial restructuring and greater transparency in business-government relations. Professor Haggard provides a counterpoint to the analysis by examining why Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines escaped financial calamity.
