In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable. Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to blame: resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot. Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.
In the aftermath of September 11 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) embarked on a program to reform its intelligence and national security programs. Many experts agree the FBI has made progress in some areas (dissemination of raw intelligence), but some believe that the FBI has shown little progress in other areas (establishing an integrated and proactive intelligence program) while the FBI's budget increased by 68 per cent from 2001-2005. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has recommended, and the White House has approved, the establishment of a National Security Service within the FBI. This Service would integrate the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Division with the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Whether this organisational change will yield substantive results is an open question. This book analyses the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field.
Impressively researched and eloquently argued, former special agent Mike German’s Disrupt, Discredit, and Divide tells the story of the transformation of the FBI after the 9/11 attacks from a law enforcement agency, made famous by prosecuting organized crime and corruption in business and government, into arguably the most secretive domestic intelligence agency America has ever seen. German shows how FBI leaders exploited the fear of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 to shed the legal constraints imposed on them in the 1970s in the wake of Hoover-era civil rights abuses. Empowered by the Patriot Act and new investigative guidelines, the bureau resurrected a discredited theory of terrorist “radicalization” and adopted a “disruption strategy” that targeted Muslims, foreigners, and communities of color, and tarred dissidents inside and outside the bureau as security threats, dividing American communities against one another. By prioritizing its national security missions over its law enforcement mission, the FBI undermined public confidence in justice and the rule of law. Its failure to include racist, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, and xenophobic violence committed by white nationalists within its counterterrorism mandate only increased the perception that the FBI was protecting the powerful at the expense of the powerless. Disrupt, Discredit, and Divide is an engaging and unsettling contemporary history of the FBI and a bold call for reform, told by a longtime counterterrorism undercover agent who has become a widely admired whistleblower and a critic for civil liberties and accountable government.
The documents contained within this updated edition incorporate all amendments since the release of Winter 2012 version through February 26, 2016 and verified against the United States Code maintained by the United States Library of Congress and Westlaw private company. The documents cited in this volume range from principles of professional ethics and transparency for the Intelligence Community, several Acts including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that includes information sharing, privacy, and civil liberties, and security clearances, plus Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Classified Information Procedures Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Cybersecurity Act of 2015, numerous executive orders, presidential policy directives, and more. American citizens, law enforcement, especially U.S. Federal agency personnel that engage with intelligence surveillance, classified information, and national security efforts may be interested in this updated edition. Additionally, attorneys, civil servants involved within information technology departments, and records management may also be interested in this resource. Students pursuing courses in the areas of Ethics in Criminal Justice, Computer Forensics, Criminal Law in Criminal Justice, Homeland Security and Terrorism, Information Storage and Retrieval, Computer Security, or Military Science may be interested in this reference for research. Lastly, public, special, and academic libraries may want this legal reference available for their patrons. Related products: Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book, Winter 2012 - Limited quantities while supplies last - can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00278-3 Intelligence and Espionage resources collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/intelligence-espionage Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice topical books can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/law-enforcement-criminal-justice Mail & Communications Security collection is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/mail-communications-security
Introduction to Intelligence Studies (third edition) provides an overview of the US intelligence community, to include its history, organization, and function. Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) has undergone an extensive overhaul. This textbook provides a comprehensive overview of intelligence and security issues, defining critical terms and reviewing the history of intelligence as practiced in the United States. Designed in a practical sequence, the book begins with the basics of intelligence, progresses through its history, describes best practices, and explores the way the intelligence community looks and operates today. The authors examine the "pillars" of the American intelligence system—collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert operations—and demonstrate how these work together to provide "decision advantage." The book offers equal treatment to the functions of the intelligence world—balancing coverage on intelligence collection, counterintelligence, information management, critical thinking, and decision-making. It also covers such vital issues as laws and ethics, writing and briefing for the intelligence community, and the emerging threats and challenges that intelligence professionals will face in the future. This revised and updated third edition addresses issues such as the growing influence of Russia and China, the recent history of the Trump and Biden administrations and the IC, and the growing importance of the cyber world in the intelligence enterprise. This book will be essential reading for students of intelligence studies, US national security, foreign policy and International Relations in general.
During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed and the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic. They thus came with some 'story'. Terrorists do not. States were 'over there', but terrorists are there and here. They thus put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, foreign and domestic, as well as presenting the issues of value that arise as new targets require collecting more information at home.
How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.
This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~