This book presents an updated and expanded discussion of theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods.
Public-goods theory constituted a major element in James M. Buchanan’s research agenda throughout the 1960s. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods is a major part of that work. At the time that Buchanan was elaborating on his theories of public goods, the prevailing trend in public economics was the emergence of public-expenditure theory, which attempted to form a comprehensive theory of the state around the notion of market failure. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods established Buchanan’s broad purpose of explicitly comparing market performance with political performance. As such, the book is an important part of Buchanan’s contractarian theory of the "productive state.” Conceived originally as a series of lectures given at Cambridge University in 1961 and 1962, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods is written for students, but is in no way a textbook of dry pedagogy. Instead, as Geoffrey Brennan writes in the foreword, "What Buchanan provides here is a clear statement of the contractarian approach to public goods problems, very much in the 'voluntary exchange’ tradition of Wicksell and Lindhal.” James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. The entire series will include: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events Volume 20: Indexes
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan’s papers in this area.” Buchanan’s work on the subject of what governments should do and his insistence on Knut Wicksell’s ideal that taxation and public expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey Brennan summarizes Buchanan’s central themes in this way, "There are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper sense of the extent of market failure, rather than its mere presence, is relevant in all cases; the other is that 'correcting’ for such market failure is often a complex multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market output.” The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: 1.Public Services and Collective Action 2.Externalities 3.Clubs and Joint Supply 4.Public Goods Theory 5.Applications--City, Health, and Social Security 6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan’s two most famous articles: "Externality,” which he wrote with William Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs.” James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. ERRATA Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra charge. Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index. The entire series will include: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order
The second edition of Public Finance and Public Policy retains the first edition's themes of investigation of responsibilities and limitations of government. The present edition has been rewritten and restructured. Public choice and political economy concepts and political and bureaucratic principal-agent problems are introduced at the beginning for application to later topics. Fairness, envy, hyperbolic discounting, and other concepts of behavioral economics are integrated throughout. The consequences of asymmetric information and the tradeoff between efficiency and ex-post equality are recurring themes. Key themes investigated are markets and governments, institutions and governance, public goods, public finance for public goods, market corrections (externalities and paternalist public policies), voting, social justice, entitlements and equality of opportunity, choice of taxation, and the need for government. The purpose of the book is to provide an accessible introduction to the use of public finance and public policy to improve on market outcomes.
Public expenditure policy, together with efforts to raise revenue,is at the core of efficient and equitable adjustment. Public expenditureproductivity has critical implications for fiscal adjustment, particularly as the competition for limited public resources intensifies.By providing a framework for defining and analyzing public expenditureproductivity and unproductive expenditures, this pamphlet discusseshow economic policymakers may approach these issues.
Assertions of market failure are usually based on Paul Samuelson's theory of public goods and externalities. This book both develops that theory and challenges the conclusion of many economists and policy-makers that market failures cannot be corrected by market forces. The volume includes major case studies of private provision of public goods. Among the goods considered are lighthouse services, education, municipal services, and environmental conservation.
This state-of-the art collection of papers analyses various aspects of the theory of externalities and public goods. The contributions employ new analytical techniques like the aggregative game approach, and discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the theory. Furthermore, they highlight a range of topical empirical applications including climate policy and counterterrorism. This contributed volume was written in memory of Richard C. Cornes, a pioneer in the theory of externalities and public goods.
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.
Featuring a general equilibrium framework that is both cohesive and versatile, the Second Edition of Public Finance: A Normative Theory brings new and updated information to this classic text. Through its concentration on the microeconomic theory of the public sector in the context of capitalist market economics it addresses the subjects traditionally at the heart of public sector economics, including public good theory, theory of taxation, welfare analysis, externalities, tax incidence, cost benefit analysis, and fiscal federalism. Its goal of providing a foundation, rather than attempting to present the most recent scholarship in detail, makes this Second Edition both a valuable text and a resource for professionals. * Second edition provides new and updated information * Focuses on the heart of public sector economics, including public expenditure theory and policy, tax theory and policy, cost benefit-analysis, and fiscal federalism * Features a cohesive and versatile general equilibrium framework