This article argues that corporations and armed opposition groups have obligations under international law. It is suggested that the scope of the obligations turns on the capacity of the entities in question. While there may be no international court to hear complaints against such entities, understanding their legal obligations under international law is important in situations where national courts have jurisdiction over violations of international law committed by non-state actors. Furthermore, it is vital to realizing the potential of claims of corporate complicity in international crimes and the impact such claims may have in the field of ethical investment.
The threats to human rights posed by non-state actors are of increasing concern. Human rights activists increasingly address the activity of multinational corporations, the policies of international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, and international crimes committed by entities such as armed opposition groups and terrorists. This book presents an approach to human rights that goes beyond the traditional focus on states and outlines the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Furthermore, it addresses some of the ways in which these entities can be held legally accountable for their actions in various jurisdictions. The political debate concerning the appropriateness of expanding human rights scrutiny to non-state actors is discussed and dissected. For some, extending human rights into these spheres trivializes human rights and allows abusive governments to distract us from ongoing violations. For others such an extension is essential if human rights are properly to address the current concerns of women and workers. The main focus of the book, however, is on the legal obligations of non-state actors. The book discusses how developments in the fields of international responsibility and international criminal law have implications for building a framework for the human rights obligations of non-state actors in international law. In turn these international developments have drawn on the changing ways in which human rights are implemented in national law. A selection of national jurisdictions, including the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom are examined with regard to the application of human rights law to non-state actors. The book's final part includes suggestions with regard to understanding the parameters of the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Key to understanding the legal obligations of non-state actors are concepts such as dignity and democracy. While neither concept can unravel the dilemmas involved in the application of human rights law to non-state actors, a better understanding of the tensions surrounding these concepts can help us to understand what is at stake.
The number of non-state actors, in the past not accountable for committing international crimes or violating human rights, is proliferating rapidly. Their ways of operating evolve, with some groups being increasingly fragmented and others organizing transnationally or in cyber space. As non-state armed groups are involved in the vast majority of todays armed conflicts and crisis situations, a new and increasingly important question has to be raised as to whether, and at what point, these groups are bound by international law and thereby accountable for their acts. Breaking new ground in addressing international human rights law, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law in one swoop, Rodenhäusers text will be essential to academics and practitioners alike.
Biolaw and International Criminal Law: Towards Interdisciplinary Synergies investigates the foundational, conceptual and interdisciplinary aspects of an emerging field: International Criminal Biolaw.
This book examines whether and how non-state armed groups might be required to provide reparations for the harm caused by their violations of international law committed during situations of non-international armed conflict. Most of today’s armed conflicts are waged between states and non-state armed groups or between such groups. Societies ravaged by these conflicts endure extensive harm resulting from violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. This reality prompts a series of pressing questions. Akin to states, should non-state armed groups be held responsible for making reparation when violating international law? And if so, what measures can these groups take to repair the harm they have caused? The book begins by clarifying if there exists, in contemporary international law, a duty for armed groups to provide reparation. It considers whether non-state armed groups have primary international obligations as distinct duty bearers, and whether reparation can be one of the legal consequences when violating these obligations. Subsequently, the book sheds new light on how non-state armed groups’ duty of reparation can be operationalised in international law. This involves elucidating both the conceptualisation and practical application of this duty. Combining this legal analysis with practical perspectives, the book unveils important insights for international law, drawn from an in-depth analysis of Colombia’s experiences with reparations by armed groups in the context of transitional justice. This book will be of interest to scholars and practitioners working in the fields of international law related to armed conflict, accountability and redress, and transitional justice more broadly.
This book provides a critical introduction to the core elements of international criminal law. It does so by provoking thought on what international criminal law is, or could be, by contrasting the practice of widely recognised state-based actors and institutions such as the International Criminal Court with practices associated with non-state actors in particular citizens' tribunals. International criminal law is now established as an essential legal and institutional response to atrocity. However, it faces a series of political and practical challenges. It is vital to consider its limits and potential, as well as the ways and extent to which those limitations might be addressed. Many actors with very different visions of its nature and parameters play a role in shaping the meaning of international criminal law whether that be in official or unofficial spaces. This book explores the principles and institutions of international criminal law alongside the alternative visions of it put forward by citizens' tribunals. In so doing it encourages reflection on that law's multiple meanings and usages in order to provoke consideration of what it means, and might mean, to deploy international criminal law today.
Presents theories, practices and critiques alongside each other to engage students, scholars and professionals from multiple fields. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This book fills a major gap in the ever-increasing secondary literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought by providing a dedicated and coherent treatment of the many, various and interesting things which Arendt had to say about law. Often obscured by more pressing or more controversial aspects of her work, Arendt nonetheless had interesting insights into Greek and Roman concepts of law, human rights, constitutional design, legislation, sovereignty, international tribunals, judicial review and much more. This book retrieves these aspects of her legal philosophy for the attention of both Arendt scholars and lawyers alike. The book brings together lawyers as well as Arendt scholars drawn from a range of disciplines (philosophy, political science, international relations), who have engaged in an internal debate the dynamism of which is captured in print. Following the editors' introduction, the book is split into four Parts: Part I explores the concept of law in Arendt's thought; Part II explores legal aspects of Arendt's constitutional thought: first locating Arendt in the wider tradition of republican constitutionalism, before turning attention to the role of courts and the role of parliament in her constitutional design. In Part III Arendt's thought on international law is explored from a variety of perspectives, covering international institutions and international criminal law, as well as the theoretical foundations of international law. Part IV debates the foundations, content and meaning of Arendt's famous and influential claim that the 'right to have rights' is the one true human right.
International criminal law lacks a coherent account of individual responsibility. This failure is due to the inability of international tribunals to capture the distinctive nature of individual responsibility for crimes that are collective by their very nature. Specifically, they have misunderstood the nature of the collective action or framework that makes these crimes possible, and for which liability may be attributed to intellectual authors, policy makers and leaders. In this book, the author draws on insights from comparative law and methodology to propose doctrines of perpetration and secondary responsibility that reflect the role and function of high-level participants in mass atrocity, while simultaneously situating them within the political and social climate which renders these crimes possible. This new doctrine is developed through a novel approach which combines and restructures divergent theoretical perspectives on attribution of responsibility in English and German domestic criminal law, as major representatives of the common law and civil law systems. At the same time, it analyses existing theories of responsibility in international criminal law and assesses whether there is any justification for their retention by international criminal tribunals.
This book considers the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms in response to corporate human rights abuses. Corporations and other business enterprises often operate in countries affected by conflict or repressive regimes. As such, they may become involved in human rights violations and crimes under international law ‒ either as the main perpetrators or as accomplices by aiding and abetting government actors. Transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials, truth commissions, and reparations, have usually focused on abuses by state authorities or by non-state actors directly connected to the state, such as paramilitary groups. Innovative transitional justice mechanisms have, however, now started to address corporate accountability for human rights abuses and crimes under international law and have attempted to provide redress for victims. This book analyzes this development, assessing how transitional justice can provide remedies for corporate human rights abuses and crimes under international law. Canvassing a broad range of literature relating to international criminal law mechanisms, regional human rights systems, domestic courts, truth and reconciliation commissions, and land restitution programmes, this book evaluates the limitations and potential of each mechanism. Acknowledging the limited extent to which transitional justice has been able to effectively tackle the role of corporations in human rights violations and international crimes, this book nevertheless points the way towards greater engagement with corporate accountability as part of transitional justice. A valuable contribution to the literature on transitional justice and on business and human rights, this book will appeal to scholars, researchers and PhD students in these areas, as well as lawyers and other practitioners working on corporate accountability and transitional justice.