This Element offers a way to understand the evolution of authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia. The theoretical framework is based on a set of indicators (judged for their known advantages and mimicry of democratic attributes) as well as a typology (conceptualized as two discreet categories of 'retrograde' and 'sophisticated' authoritarianism). Working with an original dataset, the empirical results reveal vast differences within and across authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, but also a discernible shift towards sophisticated authoritarianism over time. The Element concludes with a reflection of its contribution and a statement on its generalizability.
Challenging Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia is one of the first substantial comparative studies of contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia, homes to the world's largest Muslim population. Following the collapse of New Order rule in Indonesia in 1998, this book provides an in-depth examination of anti-authoritarian forces in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia, assessing their problems and prospects. The authors discuss the roles played by women, public intellectuals, arts workers, industrial workers as well as environmental and Islamic activists. They explore how different forms of authoritarianism in the two countries affect the prospects of democratization, and examine the impact and legacy of the diverse social and political protests in Indonesia and Malaysia in the late 1990s.
In recent decades, several East Asian nations have undergone democratic transitions accompanied by changes in the balance of power between civilian elites and military leaders. These developments have not followed a single pattern: In Thailand, failure to institutionalize civilian control has contributed to the breakdown of democracy; civil-military relations and democracy in the Philippines are in prolonged crisis; and civilian control in Indonesia is yet to be institutionalized. At the same time, South Korea and Taiwan have established civilian supremacy and made great advances in consolidating democracy. These differences can be explained by the interplay of structural environment and civilian political entrepreneurship. In Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia, strategic action, prioritization, and careful timing helped civilians make the best of their structural opportunities to overcome legacies of military involvement in politics. In Thailand, civilians overestimated their ability to control the military and provoked military intervention. In the Philippines, civilian governments forged a symbiotic relationship with military elites that allowed civilians to survive in office but also protected the military's institutional interests. These differences in the development of civil-military relations had serious repercussions on national security, political stability, and democratic consolidation, helping to explain why South Korea, Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, Indonesia have experienced successful democratic transformation, while Thailand and the Philippines have failed to establish stable democratic systems.
Exploring the remarkable political and economic changes sweeping Southeast Asia, the authors take as their starting point the trend?albeit uneven?toward democratization. They focus specifically on ?Asian democracy, '? a form that has been adapted by Southeast Asians to suit their own particular needs.This book begins by building a framework for understanding democracy in its broadest sense. The authors investigate the uniquely Asian style of democracy, which borrows democratic political institutions and meshes them with the cultural patterns specific to each country. In separate chapters, the authors trace the evolutionary historical processes within each country, as well as citizen participation, electoral practices, and civil liberties. The chapters end with an assessment of the prospects for democracy in that nation as well as an evaluation of whether democratic regimes are necessary for developing successful economies and societies in the new international era.
This book rejects the notion that the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis was further evidence that ultimately capitalism can only develop within liberal social and political institutions.
This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to the political systems of all ASEAN countries and Timor-Leste from a comparative perspective. It investigates the political institutions, actors and processes in eleven states, covering democracies as well as autocratic regimes. Each country study includes an analysis of the current system of governance, the party and electoral system, and an assessment of the state, its legal system and administrative bodies. Students of political science and regional studies will also learn about processes of democratic transition and autocratic persistence, as well as how civil society and the media influence the political culture in each country.
This volume explores the sources and manifestations of political violence in South and Southeast Asia and the myriad roles that it plays in everyday life and as part of historical narrative. It considers and critiques the manner in which political violence is understood and constructed, and the common assumptions that prevail regarding the causes, victims, and perpetrators of this violence. By focusing on the social and political context of these regions, the book presents a critical understanding of the nature of political violence and provides an alternative narrative to that found in mainstream analysis of terrorism. "Political Violence in South and Southeast Asia" brings together political scientists and anthropologists with intimate knowledge of the politics and society of these regions, who present unique perspectives on topics including assassinations, riots, state violence, the significance of geographic borders, external influences and intervention, and patterns of recruitment and rebellion. Contributors include Paula Banerjee (Calcutta University and Calcutta Research Group), Vincent Boudreau (City College of New York), Paul R. Brass (University of Washington), Naureen Chowdhury Fink (International Peace Institute, New York), Natasha Hamilton-Hart (National University of Singapore), Sankaran Krishna (University of Hawaii--Manoa), Darini Rajasingham (Social Scientists Association and International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka), Geoffrey Robinson (UCLA), Varun Sahni (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi), Shamuel Tharu (Jawaharlal Nehru University).
Southeast Asia’s Internet users are far more diverse than usually reported. They range from the urban youth with laptops and highspeed Wi-Fi, to the older generation semi-rural and rural users with affordable mobile phones for Facebook and WhatsApp. Southeast Asians generally trust social media platforms more than in Western societies. This trust in social media reflects a lack of trust in local mainstream media and official sources of information. What campaign information (and disinformation) is being spread and which ones are most successful are essential for understanding how voters in Southeast Asia use and trust social media. Social media platforms and Southeast Asia’s “app industry” need clearer and enforced regulation on their use of data and the extent to which they can sell data to advertisers. These advertisers include, but are not limited to, politicians and political parties. Since the future of social media usage will likely lie in closed groups, the role of big data analyses that have dominated research on social media over the past ten years, is likely to regress. Instead, ethnographic scholars who can access these groups and engage with their particular interests and identities are more likely to be useful in understanding the digital sphere in the future.
Since the mid-2000s, the quality of democracy around the world has been in decline, and Southeast Asia is no exception. This Element analyzes the extent, patterns and drivers of democratic deconsolidation in the three Southeast Asian countries that boast the longest history of electoral democracy in the region: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. While the exact deconsolidation outcomes differ, all three nations have witnessed similar trends of democratic erosion. In each case, long-standing democratic deficiencies (such as clientelism, politicized security forces and non-democratic enclaves) have persisted; rising wealth inequality has triggered political oligarchization and subsequent populist responses embedded in identity politics; and ambitious middle classes have opted for non-democratic alternatives to safeguard their material advancement. As a result, all three polities have descended from their democratic peaks between the late 1980s and early 2000s, with few signs pointing to a return to previous democratization paths.
