Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand
Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand

Author: P.M Alsemgeest

Publisher:

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders.

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Author: Charles R. Plott

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2008-08-21

Total Pages: 1175

ISBN-13: 0444826424

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While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appears blurred and may produce uncertain results. The contributors to this volume have provided brief notes describing specific experimental results.

Essays on Multi-unit Auctions
Essays on Multi-unit Auctions

Author: Jinsoo Bae (Ph. D. in economics)

Publisher:

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 114

ISBN-13:

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Chapter 3 studies a pro-competitive effect of joint bidding in multi-unit uniform price auctions where bidders have private values and demand different quantities of units. I analyze a simple model with three identical items for sale, two small bidders each demanding a single unit, and a big bidder demanding two units. I show that joint bidding of the two small bidders, which recovers the symmetry of bidders, enhances competition among the bidders and increases efficiency and revenue of the auction.

Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions
Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions

Author: Dirk Engelmann

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.

Large-scale Multi-item Auctions
Large-scale Multi-item Auctions

Author: Sascha Michael Schweitzer

Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing

Published: 2014-10-16

Total Pages: 212

ISBN-13: 3866449046

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This book presents two experimental studies that deal with the comparison of multi-item auction designs for two specific applications: the sale of 2.6 GHz radio spectrum rights in Europe, and the sale of emissions permits in Australia. In order to tackle the complexity of these experiments, a cognitively based toolkit is proposed, including modularized video instructions, comprehension tests, a learning platform, a graphical one-screen user interface, and comprehension-based group matching.