Based on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower s actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control. "
Using contemporary sources and formerly inaccessible Eisenhower papers, it studies the dominant event of the 50s, the development of the H-bomb by both the United States and Russia.
This volume, the third in the official history of the Atomic Energy Commission, makes sizable contributions in several areas, including the Eisenhower presidency. During the years in which work on the book has moved forward, that presidency has been one of historiographical frontiers, an area of exciting explorations and new developments. A "revisionism" has emerged to challenge a conception that had taken shape earlier and was quite negative in its appraisal of Eisenhower. Some findings of the revisionists now seem quite firmly established, but the new interpretation has not swept the field. Challenges to it have also appeared. A volume focusing on nuclear energy cannot make contributions to all aspects of the controversy over President Eisenhower, but this book can and does have much to say about some main features of the debate. In the process, the book illustrates, as did the earlier volumes in the series, how very good "official history" can be.This book on the Atomic Energy Commission is not a narrow history of a government agency. Dealing with the AEC during the period when issues concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear power emerged as large public concerns, the volume ranges well beyond the commission. Much of the work deals with Eisenhower. Although not uncritical, the authors find much to admire in him.Subjects and topics covered include: Dwight Eisenhower, Harold Stassen, Lewis Strauss, Nuclear Testing, nuclear power, EURATOM, AEC, nuclear test ban, Clinton Anderson (U.S. Senator), Argonne National Laboratory, Hans Bethe, Candor Operation, Castle Test Series, John Foster Dulles, disarmament, nuclear fallout, General Electric, Christian Herfer, Bourke Hickenlooper, Chet Holifield, IAEA, JCAE, Los Alamos, John McCone, Thomas Murray, Richard Nixon, NATO, Oak Ridge, Open Skies, J. Robert Oppenheimer, plutonium, PWR, Hyman Rickover, Seawolf, Roy Snapp, Edward Teller, Soviet Union, USSR, Upshot-Knothole test series, On the Beach movie.Atoms For Peace and War 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission * Chapter 1 - A Secret Mission * Chapter 2 - The Eisenhower Imprint * Chapter 3 - The President and the Bomb * Chapter 4 - The Oppenheimer Case * Chapter 5 - The Political Arena * Chapter 6 - Nuclear Weapons: A New Reality * Chapter 7 - Nuclear Power for the Marketplace * Chapter 8 - Atoms for Peace: Building American Policy * Chapter 9 - Pursuit of the Peaceful Atom * Chapter 10 - The Seeds of Anxiety * Chapter 11 - Safeguards, EURATOM, and the International Agency * Chapter 12 - Nuclear Issues: A Time for Decision * Chapter 13 - Nuclear Issues: The Presidential Campaign of 1956 * Chapter 14 - In Search of a Nuclear Test Ban * Chapter 15 - Politics of the Peaceful Atom * Chapter 16 - EURATOM and the International Agency, 1957-1958 * Chapter 17 - Toward a Nuclear Test Moratorium * Chapter 18 - A New Approach to Nuclear Power * Chapter 19 - Science for War and Peace * Chapter 20 - The Test Ban: A Fading Hope * Chapter 21 - The Great Debate
This book explores how Pugwash scientists established a role in conflict moderation, what held this project together and how state actors in East and West perceived their efforts, complicating existing narratives about “Pugwash” and challenging notions about the naivety of scientists.
A leading historian’s guide to great-power competition, as told through America’s successes and failures in the Cold War “If you want to know how America can win today's rivalries with Russia and China, read this book about how it triumphed in another twilight struggle: the Cold War.”— Stephen J. Hadley, national security adviser to President George W. Bush The United States is entering an era of great-power competition with China and Russia. Such global struggles happen in a geopolitical twilight, between the sunshine of peace and the darkness of war. In this innovative and illuminating book, Hal Brands, a leading historian and former Pentagon adviser, argues that America should look to the history of the Cold War for lessons in how to succeed in great-power rivalry today. Although the threat posed by authoritarian powers is growing, America’s muscle memory for dealing with dangerous foes has atrophied in the thirty years since the Cold War ended. In long-term competitions where the diplomatic jockeying is intense and the threat of violence is omnipresent, the United States will need all the historical insight it can get. Exploring how America won a previous twilight struggle is the starting point for determining how America can successfully prosecute another high-stakes rivalry today.
Thousands of nuclear antiaircraft arms were designed, tested and deployed in the United States during Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency. These Army "Nike-Hercules" missiles, Air Force "Genie" rockets, and "BOMARC" and "Falcon" missiles were meant to counter a raid by attacking Soviet bombers. U.S. policy makers believed that the American weapons could safely compensate for technological limitations which otherwise made it difficult to destroy high flying, fast moving airplanes. Continental Defense in the Eisenhower Era traces this armament from conception through deployment. Bright recounts official actions, doctrinal decisions, and public policies. It also discusses the widespread acceptance of these weapons by the American public, a result of being touted in news releases, featured in films and television episodes, and disseminated throughout society as a whole.
Written by two preeminent authors in the field, this book provides an accessible global narrative of the nuclear arms race since 1945 that focuses on the roles of key scientists, military chiefs, and political leaders. The first book of its kind to provide a global perspective of the arms race, this two-volume work connects episodes worldwide involving nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, narrative fashion. Beginning with a discussion of the scientific research of the 1930s and 1940s and the Hiroshima decision, the authors focus on five basic themes: political dimensions, technological developments, military and diplomatic strategies, and impact. The history of the international nuclear arms race is examined within the context of four historical eras: America's nuclear monopoly, America's nuclear superiority, superpower parity, and the post-Cold War era. Information about the historical development of the independent deterrence of Britain, France, and China, as well as the piecemeal deterrence of newcomers Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea is also included, as is coverage of the efforts aimed at the international control of nuclear weapons and the diplomatic architecture that underpins the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
In his farewell speech, President Dwight Eisenhower famously warned us of the dangers of a military-industrial complex (MIC). In Paul Koistinen's sobering new book, that warning appears to have been both prophetic and largely ignored. As the final volume in his magisterial study of the political economy of American warfare, State of War describes the bipolar world that developed from the rivalry between the U.S. and USSR, showing how seventy years of defense spending have bred a monster that has sunk its claws into the very fabric of American life. Koistinen underscores how during the second half of the twentieth century and well into the twenty-first, the United States for the first time in its history began to maintain large military structures during peacetime. Many factors led to that result: the American economy stood practically alone in a war-ravaged world; the federal government, especially executive authority, was at the pinnacle of its powers; the military accumulated unprecedented influence over national security; and weaponry became much more sophisticated following World War II. Koistinen describes how the rise of the MIC was preceded by a gradual process of institutional adaptation and then supported and reinforced by the willing participation of Big Science and its industrial partners, the broader academic world, and a proliferation of think tanks. He also evaluates the effects of ongoing defense budgets within the context of the nation's economy since the 1950s. Over time, the MIC effectively blocked efforts to reduce expenditures, control the arms race, improve relations with adversaries, or adopt more enlightened policies toward the developing world-all the while manipulating the public on behalf of national security to sustain the warfare state. Now twenty years after the Soviet Union's demise, defense budgets are higher than at any time during the Cold War. As Koistinen observes, more than six decades of militaristic mobilization for stabilizing a turbulent world have firmly entrenched the state of war as a state of mind for our nation. Collectively, his five-volume opus provides an unparalleled analysis of the economics of America's wars from the colonial period to the present, illuminating its impact upon the nation's military campaigns, foreign policy, and domestic life.
All four post-Cold War presidents have attempted to negotiate and ratify at least one major arms control agreement. However, their experiences with arms control treaty ratification have differed greatly from those of their Cold War predecessors. The main theme of this book is that domestic politics have significantly impacted attempts to ratify arms control treaties in the polarized post-Cold War political environment. Each president and each treaty faced varying amounts of support and opposition from the numerous institutions and agents within American foreign policy-making. This book uses an eight-point analytical framework to examine five post-Cold War arms control treaty ratification debates in order to try and determine what political conditions or variables account for their success or failure.
