Efficiency in Family Bargaining
Author: Liliana E. Pezzin
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 40
ISBN-13:
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Efficiency in Family Bargaining
Author: Liliana E. Pezzin
Publisher:
Published: 2010
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn this article, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the first stage regarding transfers at the second stage. Because coresidence is likely to reduce the bargaining power of the coresident child relative to her siblings, coresidence may fail to emerge as the equilibrium living arrangement even when it is Pareto efficient. That is, the outcome of the two-stage game need not be Pareto efficient.
Intrafamily Bargaining and Household Decisions
Author: Notburga Ott
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 251
ISBN-13: 3642457088
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA model of household decisions based on a bargaining approach is developed providing a comprehensive framework for the analysis of family behavior. Treating the family as an economic organization, household behavior is explained by the cooperation of utility maximizing individuals. The difference to traditional microeconomic household models is that theassumption of a joint household utility function is abandoned. Instead of this, a game theoretic approach is used to model family decisions as a result of intrafamily bargaining. Considering the development of the spouses` human capital in a dynamic approach, the long-term effects of intrafamily specialization in market work and work at home are analyzed. Onemajor finding is that in a dynamic setting non-Pareto efficient allocations may result. Empirical tests demonstrate the relevanace of the bargaining approach.
Efficiency in Family Bargaining
Author: Liliana E. Pezzin
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 40
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKGender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage
Author: Helmut Rainer
Publisher:
Published: 2017
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as “equal sharing” are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.
Family Bargaining with Altruism
Author: Robert A. Pollak
Publisher:
Published: 2022
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe theoretical literature on bargaining ignores altruism and assumes that everyone is an egoist. Because the importance of altruism in the family is widely recognized, the egoism assumption is especially problematic in the economics of the family. This paper shows that incorporating altruism into cooperative bargaining models shrinks the set potential cooperative bargaining solutions. The analysis depends on the implications of altruism for Pareto efficiency and the implications of Pareto efficiency for potential cooperative bargaining solutions. The analysis here applies not only to Nash bargaining but to all cooperative bargaining models. For noncooperative bargaining, the analysis implies that any solution that lies outside the shrunken set of potential cooperative bargaining solutions is not Pareto efficient.
Bargaining over Time Allocation
Author: Miriam Beblo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 156
ISBN-13: 364257579X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn this book, time use behavior within households is modeled as the outcome of a bargaining process between family members who bargain over household resource allocation and the intrafamily distribution of welfare. In view of trends such as rising female employment along with falling fertility rates and increasing divorce rates, a strategic aspect of female employment is analyzed in a dynamic family bargaining framework. The division of housework between spouses and the observed leisure differential between women and men are investigated within non-cooperative bargaining settings. The models developed are tested empirically using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the German Time Budget Survey.
Economics of the Family
Author: Martin Browning
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2014-06-05
Total Pages: 511
ISBN-13: 1107728924
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe family is a complex decision unit in which partners with potentially different objectives make consumption, work and fertility decisions. Couples marry and divorce partly based on their ability to coordinate these activities, which in turn depends on how well they are matched. This book provides a comprehensive, modern and self-contained account of the research in the growing area of family economics. The first half of the book develops several alternative models of family decision making. Particular attention is paid to the collective model and its testable implications. The second half discusses household formation and dissolution and who marries whom. Matching models with and without frictions are analyzed and the important role of within-family transfers is explained. The implications for marriage, divorce and fertility are discussed. The book is intended for graduate students in economics and for researchers in other fields interested in the economic approach to the family.
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1985-11-29
Total Pages: 402
ISBN-13: 0521267579
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.
Economics of the Family and Family Policies
Author: Christina Jonung
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1997-10-16
Total Pages: 190
ISBN-13: 1134750935
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume wil be an invaluable, up-to-date, one-stop resource for economists and those involved in the social sciences and gender studies, as well as policy makers themselves.
