Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.
The Internet is connecting an increasing number of individuals, organizations, and devices into global networks of information flows. It is accelerating the dynamics of innovation in the digital economy, affecting the nature and intensity of competition, and enabling private companies, governments, and the non-profit sector to develop new business models. In this new ecosystem many of the theoretical assumptions and historical observations upon which economics rests are altered and need critical reassessment.
The Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden
This book further develops both the traditional and the behavioural approach to competition law, and applies these approaches to a variety of timely issues. It discusses several fundamental questions regarding competition law and economics, and explores the applications of competition law and economics. In turn, the book analyses the interplay of intellectual property rights and patents in various aspects of competition law, and investigates the impacts that developments in information technology, such as big data analytics, have on competition law. The book also discusses the impact of energy law reforms on energy markets from a competition law perspective. Competition law is a classic field of economic analysis. This is largely due to the fact that competition law uses terms such as market, price, and competition and must therefore rely on economic know-how and analyses. In the United States, economic analysis has greatly influenced not just the scholarship on antitrust law, but also judicial decisions and agency enforcement. Antitrust law and economics are based on the traditional paradigm of neoclassical economics, which relies on the assumption that the market players, i.e. consumers and producers, are rational. This approach to competition law was later received in Europe under the banner of a “more economic approach”. For the past two decades, behavioural law and economics, which seeks to generate better insights into legal phenomena by providing more realistic psychological foundations for economic models, and to offer a multitude of applications in legislation and legal adjudication, has challenged the traditional economic approach to law in general and, more recently, to competition law specifically.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Vertical agreements between undertakings at the various levels of a supply chain have long been seen as a fundamental focus for antitrust legislation, such as the European Union’s Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER). It goes without saying that such issues are particularly prevalent in digital markets. This authoritative commentary analyses the main restrictions in vertical agreements, emphasising the numerous new and contentious issues arising in the context of Internet distribution. It offers both legal and economic perspectives, as well as examines enforcement and possible changes to the legislation. The contributors – leading competition authority officials, lawyers, economists, and academics – provide in-depth discussions of topics that have emerged as areas for conscious policy choices, including the following: restrictions of online sales; price parity obligations; resale price maintenance; the duration of non-compete obligations; sustainability agreements; geo-blocking practices; and restraint of trade in pharmaceuticals. The contributions have emerged from the 2020 conference of the Global Competition Law Centre at the College of Europe in the context of the currently ongoing review of the VBER and vertical guidelines. With its multidisciplinary approach highlighting the efficiencies and harms caused by the restrictions at stake, this important book clearly shows how law and practice apply to specific issues relating to digital markets and how the law is likely to change in the near future. It will be of immeasurable value to lawyers and officials concerned with European competition law and academics in the field.
With the rise of digital platforms and the natural tendency of markets involving platforms to become concentrated, competition authorities and courts are more frequently in a position to investigate and decide merger and abuse cases that involve platforms. This report provides guidance on how to define markets and on how to assess market power when dealing with two-sided platforms. DEFINITION Competition authorities and courts are well advised to uniformly use a multi-markets approach when defining markets in the context of two-sided platforms. The multi-markets approach is the more flexible instrument compared to the competing single-market approach that defines a single market for both sides of a platform, as the former naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on the two sides of the platform. While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under rare circumstances. To fully appreciate business activities in platform markets from a competition law point of view, and to do justice to competition law’s purpose, which is to protect consumer welfare, the legal concept of a “market” should not be interpreted as requiring a price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the “unpaid side” of the platform only indirectly by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the “paid side” of the platform. Such an approach would exclude certain activities and ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognize straightforwardly that there can be “markets” for products offered free of charge, i.e. without monetary consideration by those who receive the product. ASSESSMENT The application of competition law often requires an assessment of market power. Using market shares as indicators of market power, in addition to all the difficulties in standard markets, raises further issues for two-sided platforms. When calculating revenue shares, the only reasonable option is to use the sum of revenues on all sides of the platform. Then, such shares should not be interpreted as market shares as they are aggregated over two interdependent markets. Large revenue shares appear to be a meaningful indicator of market power if all undertakings under consideration serve the same sides. However, they are often not meaningful if undertakings active in the relevant markets follow different business models. Given potentially strong cross-group external effects, market shares are less apt in the context of two-sided platforms to indicate market power (or the lack of it). Barriers to entry are at the core of persistent market power and, thus, the entrenchment of incumbent platforms. They deserve careful examination by competition authorities. Barriers to entry may arise due to users’ coordination failure in the presence of network effect. On two-sided platforms, users on both sides of the market have to coordinate their expectations. Barriers to entry are more likely to be present if an industry does not attract new users and if it does not undergo major technological change. Switching costs and network effects may go hand in hand: consumer switching costs sometimes depend on the number of platform users and, in this case, barriers to entry from consumer switching costs increase with platform size. Since market power is related to barriers to entry, the absence of entry attempts may be seen as an indication of market power. However, entry threats may arise from firms offering quite different services, as long as they provide a new home for users’ attention and needs.
This book presents the 2020 Digital Platform Economy Index (DPE Index). The DPE Index integrates two separate but related literatures on ecosystems, namely, the digital ecosystem and the entrepreneurial ecosystem. This new framework situates digital entrepreneurship within the broader context of users, platforms, and institutions, such that two biotic entities (users and agents) actuate individual agency, and two abiotic components (digital infrastructure and digital platforms) form the external environment. The DPE Index framework includes 12 pillars that integrate the digital and the entrepreneurship ecosystems. Here, the authors report on the DPE Index, the four sub-indices, and the 12 pillar values for 116 countries as well as provide a cluster analysis based on the 12 pillars.
The book addresses the prevalent digital transformation and focuses on its significant disruption in healthcare. In light of the distinctive characteristics and evolution of the Chinese healthcare industry, private multi-sided platform (MSP) companies emerge to offer novel values and explore the industry value chain. Drawing on the management and economics literature of MSPs, this book examines the selected Chinese MSPs and compares them with the counterpart MSPs in the U.S. This analysis highlights how the unfolding healthcare disruption is valuable for both scholars and practitioners to understand the trends and to take effective actions. “Disruptive Innovation through Digital Transformation: Multi-Sided Platforms of E-Health in China” provides readers in the developing and developed countries with insights on how to approach the current multi-sided platform and to resolve the current problems to better serve customers and patients in the healthcare market.
