Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring

Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring

Author: Tomasz Piskorski

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 56

ISBN-13:

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We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral-hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the intensity of performance-based incentives, reducing the likelihood of costly termination. We present a novel characterization of optimal dynamic incentive provision when performance-based incentives may decline continuously to zero. Termination happens in equilibrium only if its costs are relatively low. In general, the intensity of both monitoring and performance-based compensation can be non-monotonic functions of the quality of past performance. Our results can also help explain puzzling empirical findings on the relationship between performance history and future pay-performance sensitivity and on the linkage between termination, performance, and monitoring. We also discuss implications of our model for optimal security design and endogenous financing constraints.


Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Contract Law

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Contract Law

Author: Nicole Petrick

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 25

ISBN-13: 3640394127

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Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.


Penalizing Success in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

Penalizing Success in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

Author: Tracy R. Lewis

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present. We find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower- powered incentive contract. Penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent's initial incentive to understate his ability.


Foundations of Insurance Economics

Foundations of Insurance Economics

Author: Georges Dionne

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 1992

Total Pages: 748

ISBN-13: 0792392043

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Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.


Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Author: Amy Finkelstein

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2014-12-02

Total Pages: 161

ISBN-13: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice


Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Author: Daniel Gottlieb

Publisher:

Published: 2015

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We study a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We obtain conditions under which the optimal mechanism offers a single contract to all types. These conditions are always satisfied, for example, if output is binary or if the distribution of outputs is multiplicatively separable and ordered by FOSD (if it is not ordered, the optimal mechanism offers at most two contracts). If, in addition, the marginal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, this single contract is a debt contract. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard, where offering flexible menus of contracts provides gaming opportunities to the agent.


Allocation, Information and Markets

Allocation, Information and Markets

Author: John Eatwell

Publisher: Springer

Published: 1989-09-21

Total Pages: 321

ISBN-13: 1349202150

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This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.