"T. A. Cavanaugh articulates and defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. Cavanaugh here offers the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial, yet indispensable approach to hard cases."--BOOK JACKET.
This book offers a comprehensive history of the principle of double effect and its applications in ethics. Written from a non-theological perspective, it makes the case for the centrality of the double effect reasoning in philosophical ethics. The book is divided into two parts. The first part thoroughly examines the history of double effect reasoning. The author’s history spans from Thomas Aquinas’s opera omnia to the modern and influential understanding of the principle known as proportionalism. The second part of the book elucidates the principle and addresses various objections that have been raised against it, including those that arise from an in-depth discussion of the trolley problem. Finally, the author examines the role of intentions in ethical thinking and constructs a novel defense of the principle based on fine distinctions between intentions. The Principle of Double Effect: A History and Philosophical Defense will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral philosophy, the history of ethics, bioethics, medical ethics, and the Catholic moral tradition.
Ethical issues facing anesthesiologists are more far-reaching than those involving virtually any other medical specialty. In this clinical ethics textbook, authors from across the USA, Canada and Europe draw on ethical principles and practical knowledge to provide a realistic understanding of ethical anesthetic practice. The result is a compilation of expert opinion and international perspectives from clinical leaders in anesthesiology. Building on real-life, case-based problems, each chapter is clinically focused and addresses both practical and theoretical issues. Topics include general operating room care, pediatric and obstetrical patient care, the intensive care unit, pain practice, research and publication, as well as discussions of lethal injection, disclosure of errors, expert witness testimony, triage in disaster and conflicts of interest with industry. An important reference tool for any anesthesiologist, whether clinical or research-oriented, this book is especially valuable for physicians involved in teaching residents and students about the ethical aspects of anesthesia practice.
The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason our moral minds, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don't come easily. However, despite the heavy influence of automatic and unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, we needn't reject ordinary moral psychology as fundamentally flawed or in need of serious repair. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but a special pessimism about morality in particular is unwarranted. Moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.
Philosophers and ethicists debate this controversial moral principle (including actions, intentions, consequences, unintended consequenses, intentional-unintentional evil, etc.) illustrating its application to current moral dilemmas such as war, suicide, nuclear power, affirmative action, and morphine use for terminal cancer patients.
T. A. Cavanaugh defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. DER plays a role in anti-consequentialist ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realize a good without also causing a foreseen, but not intended, bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when bombing a military target). This study is the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial approach to hard cases. It will be indispensable in theoretical ethics, applied ethics (especially medical and military), and moral theology. It will also interest legal and public policy scholars.
In choosing between moral alternatives -- choosing between various forms of ethical action -- we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What Larry Temkin's book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. Temkin shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. His book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options -- reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it -- Temkin is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.