Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation

Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation

Author: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 37

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak.Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak.The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].


Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?

Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?

Author: Ms.Enrica Detragiache

Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Published: 2000-01-01

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781451841893

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.


Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?

Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?

Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt

Publisher:

Published: 2000-01-01

Total Pages: 29

ISBN-13: 9781462320851

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.


Deposit Insurance

Deposit Insurance

Author: Richard L. Fogel

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 1998-04

Total Pages: 197

ISBN-13: 0788147560

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Deposit insurance was initiated in the 1930s to help restore confidence in the banking system after thousands of banks failed and millions of dollars in deposits were lost during the Great Depression. In 1990, the federal government insured about $3 trillion in deposits in the nation1s banks, thrifts, and credit unions and has to date fulfilled its goal of maintaining the stability of the banking system. This report discusses issues associated with reforming the deposit insurance system, specifically changes to the system that will promote a safe, sound, and stable banking industry. Charts and tables.


Deposit Insurance Around the Globe

Deposit Insurance Around the Globe

Author: Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.


Does Deposit Insurance Increase Moral Hazard in Banks? The Case of the Australian Financial Claims Scheme

Does Deposit Insurance Increase Moral Hazard in Banks? The Case of the Australian Financial Claims Scheme

Author: Giusy Chesini

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 22

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In this paper we analyze the relation between deposit insurance, bank risk and bank stability.Although there is a voluminous literature on the impact of deposit insurance on bank stability and bank risk, the consequences of deposit insurance remain controversial. In particular, deposit insurance is widely offered in a ever growing number of countries as part of a financial safety net to promote stability even if there is a wide empirical evidence relating to the failure of deposit insurance in maintaining banking stability because of the well known moral hazard problem.In order to study these relations we chose the particular case of the Australian "Financial Claims Scheme", because Australia was one of the few developed countries that did not have explicit deposit insurance facilities in place. With the growing uncertainty surrounding the health of the global financial markets in 2008, the Government decided to introduce protection for deposits and wholesale funding. So, deposit insurance measures were introduced not because of a serious threat to domestic stability of the banking system but mainly as a precautionary action to face deteriorating conditions in overseas financial markets.By using a probit regression model we found that in Australia the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme produced a decrease in the bank risk, that is banks are less risky than the period before. Results also demonstrate that the introduction of the scheme produced an increase in the bank stability and generalizing an increase in the stability of the Australian banking system as well.


Deposit Insurance Around the World

Deposit Insurance Around the World

Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt

Publisher: MIT Press

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 415

ISBN-13: 0262042541

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.