This is the story of an airpower-dominated campaign, one that was deeply flawed in its design yet impressive in its efficiency. This quick-look study is based upon visits to damaged sites, villages, towns, and cities; discussions with government and military officials; and experience of having evaluated airpower and its effects in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia (and previously in Lebanon). Months of follow-up research included exchanges with Israeli, Lebanese, Hezbollah, and US experts. The intent was to develop a timely airpower narrative to enhance professional military education and planning. About the author: William M. Arkin is an independent military analyst, journalist, and author. He writes the "Early Warning" column for washingtonpost.com (where he previously wrote the "DOT.MIL" column from 1998 to 2003) and is a longtime NBC News military analyst.(Originally published by Air University Press)
How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.
In response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a "failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government's decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF's more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF's conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.--Publisher description.
Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989. It argues that despite the efforts of Western military organizations to comply with the laws of armed conflict, the level of collateral damage produced by Western military operations is the inevitable outcome of the strategies and methods through which their military organizations fight wars. Drawing on their superior technology and the strategic advantage of not having to fight on their own territory, such states employ highly-concentrated and overwhelming military force against a wide variety of political, economic, and military targets under conditions likely to produce high civilian casualties. As a result, collateral damage in western-fought wars is largely both foreseeable and preventable. The book title is derived from the name of a computer program that had been used by the Pentagon to calculate probable civilian casualties prior to launching air attacks.
Armies of Sand asks, 'why have Arab militaries fought so poorly in the modern era?' It examines the performance of over two-dozen Arab militaries from 1948 to 2017, and compares them to a half-dozen non-Arab militaries, to conclude that politics, economics, and culture all contributed to the past weakness of Arab armies.
The Gaza Strip is among the most densely populated places in the world. More than two-thirds of its inhabitants are refugees, and more than half are under eighteen years of age. Since 2004, Israel has launched eight devastating "operations" against Gaza's largely defenseless population. Thousands have perished, and tens of thousands have been left homeless. In the meantime, Israel has subjected Gaza to a merciless illegal blockade. Norman G. Finkelstein presents a meticulously researched inquest into Gaza's martyrdom. He shows that although Israel justified its assaults in the name of self-defense, in fact these actions constituted flagrant violations of international law. He also documents that the guardians of international law -- from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the UN Human Rights Council -- ultimately failed Gaza.
A fascinating look at the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout history with a concentration on the 20th and 21st centuries. This encyclopedia examines insurgencies—and the counterinsurgency efforts they prompt—through history, addressing military actions and the techniques and technologies employed in each conflict, significant insurgency leaders, and the leading theorists, with emphasis on the "small wars" of the 20th century and most recent decades. The clear, concise entries provide a breadth of coverage that ranges from the Maccabean Revolt in 168–143 BCE and the Peasants' Revolt in Germany in the 1500s to the American Revolutionary War and the ongoing insurgency in Syria. Readers will gain a solid understanding of how insurgency warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has played a key role in the U.S. conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century, and grasp how this important military strategy has evolved during modern times.
This book examines the local and international dynamics and strategies that have come to define the often violent relationship between Israel and Lebanon. Since the end of the Cold War, academic debate over the nature of war in the contemporary world has focused upon the asymmetric nature of conflict among a raft of failed or failing states, often held together by only a fragile notion of a shared communal destiny. Little scholarly attention has been paid, however, to one such conflict that predates the ending of the Cold War, yet still appears as intractable as ever: Israel’s hostile relationship with Lebanon and in particular, its standoff with the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, Hizbollah. As events surrounding the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 demonstrate, the clear potential for further cross border violence as well as the potential for a wider regional conflagration that embraces Damascus and Tehran remains as acute as ever. This book focuses on the historical background of the conflict, while also considering the role that other external actors, most notably Syria, Iran and the United Nations, play in influencing the conduct and outcomes of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In addition, it also looks at Hizbollah’s increasing sway in Lebanese domestic politics, its increased military cooperation with Iran and Syria, and the implications of such developments. This book will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, War and Conflict Studies, International Security and International Relations in general. Clive Jones is Professor of Middle East Studies and International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Leeds, UK. His books include Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989-92 (1996), Israel: Challenges to Democracy, Identity and the State (with Emma Murphy, 2002), and co-editor The al-Aqsa Intifada: Between Terrorism and Civil War (2005). Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies and MA Programme Director for the MA in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Politics, University of Sussex. He is the author of Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (2008).
Hizbullah is not only a leading political actor in Lebanon and a dynamic force in the Middle East, but it is also distinguished by a sophisticated communication strategy. From relatively humble beginnings in the 1980s, Hizbullah's political clout and its public perception have followed an upward trajectory, thanks to a political programme that blends military, social, economic and religious elements and adapts to changes in its environment. Its communication strategy is similarly adaptive, supporting the group's political objectives. Hizbullah's target audience has expanded to a regional and global viewership. Its projected identity, too, shifted from an Islamist resistance party opposed to Israel's presence in Lebanon to a key player within the Lebanese state. At the same time, Hizbullah's image has retained fixed features, including its image as an ally of Iran; its role as a resistance group (to Israel); and its original base as a religious party representative of the Lebanese Shiites. The authors of this book address how Hizbullah uses image, language and its charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, to legitimise its political aims and ideology and appeal to different target groups.
From the chilling threats of the "ISIS vampire" to the view of al-Qaeda as the "Frankenstein the CIA created," terrorism seems to be inextricably bound with monstrosity. But why do the media and government officials often portray terrorists as monsters? And perhaps more puzzling, why do terrorists sometimes want to be perceived as such? This book, the first of its kind, examines the use of archetypal metaphors of monstrosity in relation to terrorism, from the gorgons of Robespierre's "reign of terror" to the dragons and lycanthropes of anarchism, the beasts and blood-licking demons of ethnonational terrorism, and the hydras and Frankenstein's monsters of Islamic jihadism. Marco Pinfari argues that politicians frame terrorists as unmanageable monsters not only in an effort at cultural "othering" and dehumanization, but also to secure popular backing for rule-breaking behavior in counter-terrorism. The book also explores the way that terrorists themselves impersonate monsters, showing that several groups have pursued such a tactic throughout the history of terrorism. It contributes to a number of ongoing public debates by highlighting how, even when actors like the Islamic State present themselves as mad and irrational, their tactics remain in essence rational. Pinfari also provides an original historical outlook on the roots of monster metaphors and discusses several types of terrorism, including state terrorism, left-wing terrorism, anarchism, ethnonationalist terrorism, and white supremacist groups. In unpacking the functions played by monster metaphors and by their impersonation, Terrorists as Monsters helps the reader understand the political processes that hide behind the fangs.
