Deterrence Now

Deterrence Now

Author: Patrick M. Morgan

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 331

ISBN-13: 9780511070471

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This authoritative book examines the place of deterrence after the Cold War. Patrick Morgan explores the state of deterrence theory and its continuing relevance under conditions of nuclear proliferation, collective security organisations, and a revolution in military affairs. This book makes a significant contribution to strategic studies and international relations.


Deterrence Now

Deterrence Now

Author: Patrick M. Morgan

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2003-04-17

Total Pages: 362

ISBN-13: 9780521529693

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Patrick Morgan's authoritative study revisits the place of deterrence after the Cold War.


Deterrence Now

Deterrence Now

Author: Patrick M. Morgan

Publisher:

Published: 2003-04-17

Total Pages: 331

ISBN-13: 9780521822572

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Patrick Morgan's authoritative study revisits the place of deterrence after the Cold War.


Deterrence

Deterrence

Author: Patrick M. Morgan

Publisher:

Published: 1983-01-01

Total Pages: 240

ISBN-13: 9780803919785

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Deterrence

Deterrence

Author: Patrick M. Morgan

Publisher: SAGE Publications, Incorporated

Published: 1977

Total Pages: 224

ISBN-13:

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Newly revised in the light of the renewed debate of the last five years, this second edition of Patrick Morgan's book is a comprehensive review of the logic and the practice of deterrence. Morgan highlights the difficulties involved in immediate deterrence, the use of threat to deter in a specific, immediate situation. He then explores the irrationality of the strategic options that general nuclear deterrence offers. He shows how differences in theories of how decisions are made alter views of how deterrence works -- and how an opponent will respond to threat. Finally, he considers a way of reducing our dependence on a policy that relies on the threat of nuclear weapons. Reviews of the first edition: `This


Cross-Domain Deterrence

Cross-Domain Deterrence

Author: Erik Gartzke

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2019-02-01

Total Pages: 399

ISBN-13: 019090867X

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The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in practice. In Cross-Domain Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.


Arms and Influence

Arms and Influence

Author: Thomas C. Schelling

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 2020-03-17

Total Pages: 337

ISBN-13: 0300253486

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“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.


Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear Deterrence

Author: Lawrence Freedman

Publisher: Penguin UK

Published: 2018-10-04

Total Pages: 57

ISBN-13: 1405934522

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Part of the new Ladybird Expert series, Nuclear Deterrence is an accessible and authoritative introduction to the deterrent tactics employed to prevent war, drawing on the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons. Written by celebrated historian and professor of War Studies Sir Lawrence Freedman, Nuclear Deterrence explores the history behind the world's most lethal weapon. You'll learn about the history of the arms race, the implications of mutual assured destruction, the consequences of nuclear proliferation, and why disarmament proved to be so difficult. Written by the leading lights and most outstanding communicators in their fields, the Ladybird Expert books provide clear, accessible and authoritative introductions to subjects drawn from science, history and culture. For an adult readership, the Ladybird Expert series is produced in the same iconic small hardback format pioneered by the original Ladybirds. Each beautifully illustrated book features the first new illustrations produced in the original Ladybird style for nearly forty years.


Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Author: Robert Powell

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 1990-03-30

Total Pages: 248

ISBN-13: 9780521375276

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Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.