This is the first time that Sir Arthur Bomber' Harris's own papers covering his three and a half years at Bomber Command have been published and made available to the general public. The book also contains an introduction by Sebastian Cox, an Air Staff Memorandum written immediately after the war and a revisionist German viewpoint by Horst Boog. It
The bombing campaign conducted against Germany and German-occupied Europe in the Second World War was, and remains, one of the most controversial operations of the entire war. Much of Bomber Command's effort was what was defined as 'area' bombing, in which whole cities or districts were targeted. The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area, Sir Arthur Harris wrote in one of his despatches, is to break the morale of the population which occupies it ... namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death.??This strategy was so successful it almost brought Germany to the point of collapse until Churchill, worried about the devastation it was causing and the number of civilian deaths which resulted, ordered it to cease.??Harris' despatches explain in great detail the success of his methods which, if given full reign, may have brought the war to a speedier conclusion but would have meant even more German casualties. Such was the controversy surrounding Bomber Command's operations, Harris' despatches were not published by the government, even though the despatches of every other branch of the armed services, and all of their operations, were made public. ??The full text of Harris' despatches is reproduced here along with an explanation why these documents were withheld for so many years.
This invaluable book provides an account of Operational Research in Britain, the country of its inception, from the late 1930s to 1970. Originating in response to the country's air defence needs against the Luftwaffe, Operational Research had outstanding achievements as part of the 'secret war' against Nazi Germany. After 1945, the discipline began to be adopted in an increasing range of industries and services. In the 1960s -- by which time it was being incorporated in to university curricula -- the discipline began to penetrate into civil government departments. The history of Operational Research provides unique insights into the conduct of modern warfare, the professionalisation of business management and the modernisation of the civil service. The chronological coverage, from the late 1930s to 1970, coincides with 'golden age' of Operational Research, when the discipline was presented as a means of achieving optimum solutions to complex managerial problems. The book will be of interest to military and business historians, as well as to historians of public administration and higher education.
Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.
This fascinating historical revelation goes to the very heart of British and Allied Intelligence during World War II, specifically in the context of planning, control and implementation of the combined bomber offensive against Germany. There are sound arguments based on official archives that the handling of much air intelligence was faulty and reasons to believe that some departments within Whitehall were influenced by parochial and personal attitudes that interfered with the selection of strategic targets and the planning of the bombing offensives. In some departments within Whitehall and even the Air Ministry, there was a culpable failure to understand and appreciate the operational capabilities and limitations of the RAF and USAAF bomber forces. After the evacuation of the BEF the only means of destroying the Axis production of arms and munitions fell to the RAF and this was their prime objective for the rest of the war. The destruction of arms factories, power stations, air and ship production was the underlining objective, although when special targets, such as the break-outs of the German navy's major warships and U-Boats were deemed vital, the RAF were expected to react immediately. Much of Britain's intelligence was gathered from the German ENIGMA signals and became known as ULTRA with a security classification of MOST SECRET. Apart from the brilliant work at Bletchley Park there were other inputs from partisans throughout occupied Europe, Allied agents and various forms of reconnaissance. It was a new type of warfare that developed and improved as the war progressed but all too often the bomber squadrons were put into unnecessary peril through imprecise and unthinking demands from the highest levels of government.
The bombing campaign conducted against Germany and German-occupied Europe in the Second World War was, and remains, one of the most controversial operations of the entire war. Much of Bomber Command's effort was what was defined as 'area' bombing, in which whole cities or districts were targeted. The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area, Sir Arthur Harris wrote in one of his despatches, is to break the morale of the population which occupies it ... namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death.This strategy was so successful it almost brought Germany to the point of collapse until Churchill, worried about the devastation it was causing and the number of civilian deaths which resulted, ordered it to cease.Harris' despatches explain in great detail the success of his methods which, if given full reign, may have brought the war to a speedier conclusion but would have meant even more German casualties. Such was the controversy surrounding Bomber Command's operations, Harris' despatches were not published by the government, even though the despatches of every other branch of the armed services, and all of their operations, were made public. The full text of Harris' despatches is reproduced here along with an explanation why these documents were withheld for so many years.
The "forgotten offensive" of the title is RAF Coastal Command's offensive against German sea-trade between 1940 and 1945. The fortunes of the campaign are followed throughout the war, and its success is then evaluated in terms of the shipping sunk, and the impact on the German economy.
