A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government. Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability. From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.
The presidency and the agencies of the executive branch are deeply interwoven with other core institutions of American government and politics. While the framers of the Constitution granted power to the president, they likewise imbued the legislative and judicial branches of government with the powers necessary to hold the executive in check. The Executive Branch, edited byJoel D. Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson, examines the delicate and shifting balance among the three branches of government, which is constantly renegotiated as political leaders contend with the public's paradoxical sentiments-yearning for strong executive leadership yet fearing too much executive power, and welcoming the benefits of public programs yet uneasy about, and indeed often distrusting, big government. The Executive Branch, a collection of essays by some of the nation's leading political scientists and public policy scholars, examines the historical emergence and contemporary performance of the presidency and bureaucracy, as well as their respective relationships with the Congress, the courts, political parties, and American federalism. Presidential elections are defining moments for the nation's democracy-by linking citizens directly to their government, elections serve as a mechanism for exercising collective public choice. After the election, however, the work of government begins and involves elected and appointed political leaders at all levels of government, career civil servants, government contractors, interest organizations, the media, and engaged citizens. The essays in this volume delve deeply into the organizations and politics that make the executive branch such a complex and fascinating part of American government. The volume provides an assessment from the past to the present of the role and development of the presidency and executive branch agencies, including analysis of the favorable and problematic strategies, and personal attributes, that presidents have brought to the challenge of leadership. It examines the presidency and the executive agencies both separately and together as they influence-or are influenced by-other major institutions of American government and politics, with close attention to how they relate to civic participation and democracy.
Presents a collection of essay that provide an examination of the Executive branch in American government, explaining how the Constitution created the executive branch and discusses how the executive interacts with the other two branches of government at the federal and state level.
A defense of regulatory agencies' efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens "This exceptional exploration of how four advanced democracies pursue legitimacy in the bureaucratic implementation of regulatory law makes an invaluable contribution."--Peter M. Shane, author of Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
Legal scholar Peter M. Shane confronts U.S. presidential entitlement and offers a more reasonable way of conceptualizing our constitutional presidency in the twenty-first century. In the eyes of modern-day presidentialists, the United States Constitution’s vesting of “executive power” means today what it meant in 1787. For them, what it meant in 1787 was the creation of a largely unilateral presidency, and in their view, a unilateral presidency still best serves our national interest. Democracy’s Chief Executive challenges each of these premises, while showing how their influence on constitutional interpretation for more than forty years has set the stage for a presidency ripe for authoritarianism. Democracy’s Chief Executive explains how dogmatic ideas about expansive executive authority can create within the government a psychology of presidential entitlement that threatens American democracy and the rule of law. Tracing today’s aggressive presidentialism to a steady consolidation of White House power aided primarily by right-wing lawyers and judges since 1981, Peter M. Shane argues that this is a dangerously authoritarian form of constitutional interpretation that is not even well supported by an originalist perspective. Offering instead a fresh approach to balancing presidential powers, Shane develops an interpretative model of adaptive constitutionalism, rooted in the values of deliberative democracy. Democracy’s Chief Executive demonstrates that justifying outcomes explicitly based on core democratic values is more, not less, constraining for judicial decision making—and presents a model that Americans across the political spectrum should embrace.
This title brings together seven presidential politics scholars to address the Trump presidency and the current functioning of American democracy based on recent provocative research. These studies focus on several important topics, including presidential leadership theory and the Trump presidency, examining its mistruths, analyzing its record in the lower federal courts, probing its use of the pardon power, debating whether it requires an entirely new United States constitution to prevent future authoritarian threats, and assessing Trump's contribution to presidential power research. Taken together, these chapters represent a snapshot view of the early Trump presidency and its implications for US politics moving forward.
The rise of presidential power poses a significant threat to America's democratic values. As the presidency apparently eclipses Congress, the courts in power, and public/media attention, the balance of powers has tilted. In this accessible book, leading scholars explore the reasons for and implications of the rising power of the presidency.
Reveals how the U.S. Supreme Court's presidentialism threatens our democracy and what to do about it. Donald Trump's presidency made many Americans wonder whether our system of checks and balances would prove robust enough to withstand an onslaught from a despotic chief executive. In The Specter of Dictatorship, David Driesen analyzes the chief executive's role in the democratic decline of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey and argues that an insufficiently constrained presidency is one of the most important systemic threats to democracy. Driesen urges the U.S. to learn from the mistakes of these failing democracies. Their experiences suggest, Driesen shows, that the Court must eschew its reliance on and expansion of the "unitary executive theory" recently endorsed by the Court and apply a less deferential approach to presidential authority, invoked to protect national security and combat emergencies, than it has in recent years. Ultimately, Driesen argues that concern about loss of democracy should play a major role in the Court's jurisprudence, because loss of democracy can prove irreversible. As autocracy spreads throughout the world, maintaining our democracy has become an urgent matter.
