This updated edition incorporates lessons from the war in Afghanistan, other developemnts since September 11, and a critical assessment of the Bush administration's defense strategy and budget plan, both of which were formulated and publicly unveiled after the release of the book's first edition. "O'Hanlon has insightfully separated what the nation needs to maintain an adequate defense from what the military and its suppliers want, crafting a realistic and affordable proposal for defense spending for the coming decade." --Robert D. Reischauer, President, Urban Institute "The best unclassified study to date of the military implications of a China-Taiwan conflict for the United States. His sobering analysis makes a compelling case for a cautious arms sales policy toward Taiwan as well as prudent U.S. military planning." --Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, journalists, commentators, and others have published accounts of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. But no senior Pentagon official has offered an inside view of those years, or has challenged the prevailing narrative of that war—until now. Douglas J. Feith, the head of the Pentagon's Policy organization, was a key member of Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle as the Administration weighed how to protect the nation from another 9/11. In War and Decision, he puts readers in the room with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and other key players as the Administration devised its strategy and war plans. Drawing on thousands of previously undisclosed documents, notes, and other written sources, Feith details how the Administration launched a global effort to attack and disrupt terrorist networks; how it decided to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime; how it came to impose an occupation on Iraq even though it had avoided one in Afghanistan; how some officials postponed or impeded important early steps that could have averted major problems in Iraq's post-Saddam period; and how the Administration's errors in war-related communications undermined the nation's credibility and put U.S. war efforts at risk. Even close followers of reporting on the Iraq war will be surprised at the new information Feith provides—presented here with balance and rigorous attention to detail. Among other revelations, War and Decision demonstrates that the most far-reaching warning of danger in Iraq was produced not by State or by the CIA, but by the Pentagon. It reveals the actual story behind the allegations that the Pentagon wanted to "anoint" Ahmad Chalabi as ruler of Iraq, and what really happened when the Pentagon challenged the CIA's work on the Iraq–al Qaida relationship. It offers the first accurate account of Iraq postwar planning—a topic widely misreported to date. And it presents surprising new portraits of Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, Richard Armitage, L. Paul Bremer, and others—revealing how differences among them shaped U.S. policy. With its blend of vivid narrative, frank analysis, and elegant writing, War and Decision is like no other book on the Iraq war. It will interest those who have been troubled by conflicting accounts of the planning of the war, frustrated by the lack of firsthand insight into the decision-making process, or skeptical of conventional wisdom about Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism—efforts the author continues to support.
This book examines the transformation in US thinking about the role of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in national security policy since the end of the Cold War. The evolution of the BMD debate after the Cold War has been complex, complicated and punctuated. As this book shows, the debate and subsequent policy choices would often appear to reflect neither the particular requirements of the international system for US security at any given time, nor indeed the current capabilities of BMD technology. Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy traces the evolution of policy from the zero-sum debates that surrounded the Strategic Defense Initiative as Ronald Reagan left office, up to the relative political consensus that exists around a limited BMD deployment in 2012. The book shows how and why policy evolved in such a complex manner during this period, and explains the strategic reasoning and political pressures shaping BMD policy under each of the presidents who have held office since 1989. Ultimately, this volume demonstrates how relative advancements in technology, combined with growth in the perceived missile threat, gradually shifted the contours and rhythm of the domestic missile defence debate in the US towards acceptance and normalisation. This book will be of much interest to students of missile defence and arms control, US national security policy, strategic studies and international relations in general.
From the war on terror to the rise of China, this book unlocks the major strategic themes and security challenges of the early twenty-first century. Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific provides the analytical frameworks needed to make sense of this complex but exciting strategic universe. Offering a unique mix of global strategic thinking and Asia-Pacific security analysis, this book is for readers from Sydney to Seoul who want to put their own local security challenges in a wider regional and global context. It is also for North American and European readers requiring an understanding of the dynamic security developments in the Asia-Pacific region around which so much of global strategy is increasingly based. The really vital questions facing the international community are dealt with here: Why do governments and groups still use armed force? Has warfare really changed in the information age? Why should we be concerned about non-traditional security challenges such as water shortages and the spread of infectious disease? Is a great clash imminent between the United States and China? What are the prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula and between India and Pakistan? Can Southeast Asia survive the challenges of transnational terrorism? What does security mean for the Pacific island countries and for Australia and New Zealand? With contributions from leading commentators and analysts, Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific offers a comprehensive and authoritative introduction to the field.
This book examines the Army's role in the war on terrorism; the Army's homeland security needs; the implications of increased emphasis on Asia; the Army's role in coalition operations; the unfinished business of jointness-the lessons learned from operations and how to prepare for the future; the Army's deployability, logistical, and personnel challenges; and whether the Army can afford its Transformation. These examinations are bracketed by an introduction, a description of the Army's place in the new national security strategy, and a summary of the authors' conclusions.
Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, few issues have been more hotly debated than the United States' role in the world. In this hard-nosed but sophisticated examination, Colin S. Gray argues that America is the indispensable guardian of world order. Gray's constructive critique of recent trends in national security is holistic, rooting defense issues and prospective answers both in U.S. national security policy, broadly defined, and in the emerging international security environment. Colin S. Gray is professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. He is the author of seventeen books, including Modern Strategy and Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History.
Inside Defense brings together scholars, policy experts and practitioners to provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. military to understand the military's role in international politics and its relationship with domestic institutions and society.
As the War in Iraq continues to rage, many in the White House, State Department, Department of Defense, and outside government are left to wonder if it was possible to foresee the difficulty the United States is currently having with Sunni nationalists and Islamic extremists. Recent American military experience offers significant insight into this question. With the fog of the Cold War finally lifting and clarity returning to the nature of conflict, the dominance of asymmetry in the military experience of the United States is all too evident. Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994), and Afghanistan (2001-2004) offer recent and relevant insight into successes and failures of American attempts to fight adversaries utilizing asymmetric conflict to combat the United States when it intervened in these three states. The results illustrate the difficulty of engaging adversaries unwilling to wage a conventional war and the need for improved strategic and tactical doctrine. It is easy, Lowther writes, for Americans to forget the lessons of past conflicts as the politics of the present dominate.... His purpose here is to highlight some of history's recent lessons so that we may move forward with an awareness of what experience offers.
"Nobody approaches the objectivity and precision of Bush and O'Hanlon when it comes to analysis of the military and political dimensions of the Taiwan issue. This is one challenge that U.S. policymakers and military strategists cannot afford to get wrong, and scholars cannot afford to ignore." - Michael Green, former Senior Director for Asian Affairs National Security Council The Showdown to Come In 1995, during a heated discussion about that year's Taiwan crisis, a Chinese general remarked to a U.S. diplomat, "In the end, you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei." In a single sentence, he both questioned the level of America's commitment to a longtime ally and threatened massive, perhaps nuclear, retaliation should the United States intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf. In the end, President Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the region, and China ceased its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. A decade later, however, China is much stronger, both economically and militarily, and it holds a significant amount of America's national debt. If another Taiwan crisis should occur--as it almost certainly will--would China back down? In A War Like No Other, you'll discover how little it would take to transform the close cooperation and friendly rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China into the first-ever shooting war between two nuclear powers. This chilling look into one possible future offers thoughtful advice to both governments on how to reduce the chances of such a nightmare actually occurring. Two Brookings Institution scholars offer specific prescriptions on how the two nations can improve communications, especially in times of crisis; avoid risky behavior, even when provoked; and, above all, remember which buttons not to push.
