This volume identifies the pattern of military spending in the Southeast Asian region over the past ten to fifteen years and provides explanations for the variations in spending rates. Two overview essays evaluate the role of threat perceptions and systemic variables on the shaping of defence spending while a third examines the methodological problems involved in assessing defence expenditures. In the case studies that follow, eight Southeast Asian countries are looked at systematically to see how their heterogeneous defence spending patterns are shaped by factors such as the geopolitical environment, the sense of threat and vulnerability, the decision-making structures, the military procurement patterns, and external affiliations.
This edited volume examines the impact of globalisation on the economies, security policies and military-industrial complexes of the Asia-Pacific region. The work is structured into three main parts. The first explores globalization and its general effects on the policy-making of the nation-state; the second section looks at how globalisation affects a country's threat perception and defence posture within the specific context of the Asia-Pacific region; while the third explores how it impacts on a state's allocation of resources to defence, and how economic globalization affects the defence industry, with specific reference to the procurement policies and practices of different states across the Asia-Pacific.
This important report was issued by the Department of Defense in June 2019. The Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense's priority theater. The United States is a Pacific nation; we are linked to our Indo-Pacific neighbors through unbreakable bonds of shared history, culture, commerce, and values. We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition. The continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations. In contrast, the Department of Defense supports choices that promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific. We will not accept policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order - an order that benefits all nations. We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values.China's economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century. Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests. Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than China, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and security. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 1. Introduction * 1.1. America's Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific * 1.2. Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific * 2. Indo-Pacific Strategic Landscape: Trends and Challenges * 2.1. The People's Republic of China as a Revisionist Power * 2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor * 2.3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a Rogue State * 2.4. Prevalence of Transnational Challenges * 3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy * 3.1. U.S. National Interests * 3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy * 4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives * 4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness * 4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships * 4.3. Line of Effort 3: Promoting a Networked Region * Conclusion
Intensifying geopolitical rivalries, rising defence spending and the proliferation of the latest military technology across Asia suggest that the region is set for a prolonged period of strategic contestation. None of the three competing visions for the future of Asian order – a US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, a Chinese-centred order, or the ASEAN-inspired ‘Indo-Pacific Outlook’ – is likely to prevail in the short to medium term. In the absence of a new framework, the risk of open conflict is heightened, and along with it the need for effective mechanisms to maintain peace and stability. As Asia’s leaders seek to rebuild their economies and societies in the wake of COVID-19, they would do well to reflect upon the lessons offered by the pandemic and their applicability in the strategic realm. The societies that have navigated the crisis most effectively have been able to do so by putting in place stringent protective measures. Crisis-management and -avoidance mechanisms – and even, in the longer term, wider arms control – can be seen as the strategic equivalent of such measures, and as such they should be pursued with urgency in Asia to reduce the risks of an even greater calamity.
Michael Leifer, who died in 2001, was one of the leading scholars of Southeast Asian international relations. This is an academic and personal volume devoted to Leifer's vast contributions to the discipline of international relations.
This book examines the emerging maritime security scene in Southeast Asia. It considers highly topical implications for the region of possible strategic competition between China and India - the rising naval powers of Asia - with a possible naval "arms race" emerging between these countries both with naval force development and operations. As part of its "Look East" policy, India has deployed naval units to the Pacific Ocean for port visits and exercises both with East Asian navies and the US Navy, but India is also concerned about the possibility of the Chinese Navy operating in the Indian Ocean. Even as the US-India defence relationship continues to deepen, the US and China are struggling to build a closer links. China’s and India’s strategic interests overlap in this region both in maritime strategic competition or conflict – which might be played out in the Bay of Bengal, the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the South China Sea. The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through Southeast Asian waters constitute vital "choke points" between the Indian and Pacific Oceans carrying essential energy supplies for China and other Northeast Asian countries. Any strategic competition between China and India has implications for other major maritime players in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, especially Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as the US. This book identifies possible cooperative and confidence-building measures that may contribute to enhanced relations between these two major powers and dampen down the risks associated with their strategic competition.
In the prevailing climate of uncertainty and apprehension about Southeast Asia's security outlook in the post-Cold War era, this study looks at the question of whether there is an impending arms race in the region. It examines the factors behind the recent trends towards increased defence spending and force modernisation in countries in the region and what efforts should and can be undertaken to ensure that this build-up does not become a threat to regional security and stability.
Ever since Myanmar regained her independence in January 1948, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) has been crucial in restoring and maintaining law and order. It is one of the most important institutions in Myanmar politics. Various aspects of the Tatmadaw have been studied. The most notable area of study has been the political role of the military. This study looks at the organizational development of the Myanmar armed forces. It analyses four different aspects of the Tatmadaw: military doctrine and strategy, organization and force structure, armament and force modernization, and military training and officer education. It sets out security perceptions and policies, charting developments in each phase against the situation at the time, and also notes the contributions of the leading actors in the process. Since early 1990s, the Tatmadaw has implemented a force modernization programme. This work studies rationales and strategy behind the force modernization programme and examines the military capabilities of the Tatmadaw. Drawing extensively from archival sources and existing literature, this empirically grounded research argues that, while the internal armed security threat to the state continues to play an important role, it is the external security threat that gives more weight to the expansion and modernization of the Tatmadaw since 1988. It also argues that, despite its imperfections, the Tatmadaw has transformed from a force essentially for counter-insurgency operations into a force capable of fighting in limited conventional warfare.
