During the Cold War the small state of Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the West. Britain, the United States, and Nato all had valuable installations there; and any armed conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could easily suck two nearby Nato members - Greece and Turkey - into war. When therefore, intercommunal fighting broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, the West was deeply embarrassed. This book examines the consequential efforts of, first Britain, and then the UN, to keep the peace.
"The book describes how the Greek fixation with Enosis--union with Greece--led to a one-sided war against the Turks and the brutal massacres of their men, women and children."--Provided by publisher.
The Cyprus conflict was for long an inactive volcano, but it erupted violently in 1955, 1963 and 1974. Now more of a smouldering fire, its persistence is a serious obstacle on Turkey's route to EU accession. Uniquely utilizing Turkish sources, this book looks at how the conflict has developed since 1978.
Focusing on the period from September 1964, when Senor Galo Lasso Plaza assumed the UN mediatory role, to the coup d'etat and the Turkish invasion ten years later, Cyprus Before 1974 seeks to unpick the internal conflicts which led to the failure of the peace process in Cyprus. Marilena Varnava studies three phases: Plaza's mediation of 1964-1965; the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967; and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Varnava argues persuasively that each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably tied to political and social developments within the two main communities on the island itself. In particular, Cyprus before 1974 focuses on the events of 1968 - when the Greek-Cypriot political leadership, and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III, failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island's post-independence arena. Recurrent attempts within both communities during the talks of that year to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This study enlarges our understanding of the underlying issues which the Turkish invasion of 1974 were to throw into stark relief and is essential reading for all those who study the Cyprus problem and conflict resolution.
This book mainly focuses on the Cyprus question as a pivotal issue of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American relations. The Cyprus question was a constant factor in US-Turkish relations in the past and it still conditions the Turkish-American alliance, which is an important element of the present international relations. The period covered in this book is from 1960-1975. After experiencing a perfect honeymoon period in the 1950s, the durability, strength and cohesion of the US-Turkish alliance were tested by severe problems between 1960 and 1975. At the core of all the problems was there the Cyprus question, affecting the general tendency of the relationship between the two countries and the attitude of policy-makers of both states. Finally, the period covering from 1974 onward up to the present is generally studied with particular emphasis on Turkish-American relations and a supplementary chapter at the end of the book gives the latest developments from the Turkish point of view.
Conventional wisdom and ideologies hold that responsibility for the partition of the Republic of Cyprus in the wake of Turkey’s multiple advances on the island in summer 1974 rests on domestic ethnic and religious tensions between the Turks and the Greeks. This book, drawing on a wealth of archival material, shows that this is not the case at all. As the detailed report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, had shown in 1965, the Turks and the Greeks living on the island could easily have co-existed if left alone to determine their future. This did not happen. The partition of the island had been inscribed in NATO’s policy since the 1950s, rewarding the strongest component of NATO’s southern flank, Turkey, at the expense of Greece, the weaker component. The volume details the role of CIA agents in Greece and the machinations of the Greek junta of Dimitrios Ioannides to overthrow the charismatic leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, who had been fighting for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus. It also explains how the partition of Cyprus in 1974 has opened up prospects for the partition of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, with Greece’s eastern Aegean islands becoming ‘NATOlands’ in the service of the war against Russia. The volume is an essential reading for researchers and students of the history and politics of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and south-eastern Europe.