Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Author: Eilon Solan
Publisher:
Published: 2000
Total Pages: 32
ISBN-13:
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Author: Eilon Solan
Publisher:
Published: 2000
Total Pages: 32
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Chris Murray
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 19
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAbstract: "Often problems arise where multiple self-interested agents with individual goals can coordinate their actions to improve their outcomes. We model these problems as general sum stochastic games. We develop a tractable approximation algorithm for computing subgame-perfect correlated equilibria in these games. Our algorithm is an extension of standard dynamic programming methods like value iteration and Q-learning. And, it is conservative: while it is not guaranteed to find all value vectors achievable in correlated equilibrium, any policy which it does find is guaranteed to be an exact equilibrium of the stochastic game (to within limits of accuracy which depend on the number of backups and not on the approximation scheme). Our new algorithm is based on the planning algorithm of [1]. That algorithm computes subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, but assumes that it is given a set of 'punishment policies' as input. Our new algorithm requires only the description of the game, an important improvement since suitable punishment policies may be difficult to come by."
Author: Abraham Neyman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 466
ISBN-13: 9401001898
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without which this project would never have been completed. In particular, we are grateful to our editorial assistant Mike Borns, whose work has been indispensable. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the Ecole Poly tech nique, Paris, and the Israel Science Foundation. March 2003 Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin ix STOCHASTIC GAMES L.S. SHAPLEY University of California at Los Angeles Los Angeles, USA 1. Introduction In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players.
Author: Eilon Solan
Publisher:
Published: 1998
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Eilon Solan
Publisher:
Published: 1999
Total Pages: 60
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Pierre Cardaliaguet
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-09-10
Total Pages: 425
ISBN-13: 0817683542
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book focuses on various aspects of dynamic game theory, presenting state-of-the-art research and serving as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. Its contributions, written by experts in their respective disciplines, are outgrowths of presentations originally given at the 14th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications held in Banff. Advances in Dynamic Games covers a variety of topics, ranging from evolutionary games, theoretical developments in game theory and algorithmic methods to applications, examples, and analysis in fields as varied as mathematical biology, environmental management, finance and economics, engineering, guidance and control, and social interaction. Featured throughout are valuable tools and resources for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in dynamic games and their applications to mathematics, engineering, economics, and management science.
Author: Martino Bardi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 388
ISBN-13: 1461215927
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L.S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P.P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R.J. Elliott and N.J. Kalton, N.N. Krasovskii, and A.I. Subbotin (see their book Po sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L.D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M.G. Crandall and P.-L.
Author: Frank Thuijsman
Publisher:
Published: 1992
Total Pages: 107
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Haurie Alain
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: 2012-03-23
Total Pages: 488
ISBN-13: 981440134X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDynamic games arise between players (individuals, firms, countries, animals, etc.) when the strategic interactions among them recur over time and decisions made during one period affect both current and future payoffs. Dynamic games provide conceptually rich paradigms and tools to deal with these situations.This volume provides a uniform approach to game theory and illustrates it with present-day applications to economics and management, including environmental, with the emphasis on dynamic games.At the end of each chapter a case study called game engineering (GE) is provided, to help readers understand how problems of high social priority, such as environmental negotiations, exploitation of common resources, can be modeled as games and how solutions can be engineered.
Author: T. Parthasarathy
Publisher: Springer Nature
Published: 2020-12-08
Total Pages: 127
ISBN-13: 9811565775
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book discusses stochastic game theory and related concepts. Topics focused upon in the book include matrix games, finite, infinite, and undiscounted stochastic games, n-player cooperative games, minimax theorem, and more. In addition to important definitions and theorems, the book provides readers with a range of problem-solving techniques and exercises. This book is of value to graduate students and readers of probability and statistics alike.