Corps Commanders explains how five very different Second World War British and Canadian generals fought their battles, and why they fought them in similar fashion.
If the Battle of the Bulge was Germany's last gasp, it was also America's proving ground-the largest single action fought by the U.S. Army in World War II. Taking a new approach to an old story, Harold Winton widens our field of vision by showing how victory in this legendary campaign was built upon the remarkable resurrection of our truncated interwar army, an overhaul that produced the effective commanders crucial to GI success in beating back the Ardennes counteroffensive launched by Hitler's forces. Winton's is the first study of the Bulge to examine leadership at the largely neglected level of corps command. Focusing on the decisions and actions of six Army corps commanders—Leonard Gerow, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgway, John Millikin, Manton Eddy, and J. Lawton Collins—he recreates their role in this epic struggle through a mosaic of narratives that take the commanders from the pre-war training grounds of America to the crucible of war in the icy-cold killing fields of Belgium and Luxembourg. Winton introduces the story of each phase of the Bulge with a theater-level overview of the major decisions and events that shaped the corps battles and, for the first time, fully integrates the crucial role of airpower into our understanding of how events unfolded on the ground. Unlike most accounts of the Ardennes that chronicle only the periods of German and American initiative, Winton's study describes an intervening middle phase in which the initiative was fiercely contested by both sides and the outcome uncertain. His inclusion of the principal American and German commanders adds yet another valuable layer to this rich tapestry of narrative and analysis. Ultimately, Winton argues that the flexibility of the corps structure and the competence of the men who commanded the six American corps that fought in the Bulge contributed significantly to the ultimate victory. Chronicling the human drama of commanding large numbers of soldiers in battle, he has produced an artful blend of combat narrative, collective biography, and institutional history that contributes significantly to the broader understanding of World War II as a whole. With the recent modularization of the U.S. Army division, which makes this command echelon a re-creation of the corps of World War II, Corps Commanders of the Bulge also has distinct relevance to current issues of Army transformation.
The outcomes of campaigns in the Civil War often depended on top generals having the right corps commanders in the right place at the right time. Mutual trust and respect between generals and their corps commanders, though vital to military success, was all too rare: Corps commanders were often forced to exercise considerable discretion in the execution of orders from their generals, and bitter public arguments over commanders' performances in battle followed hard on the heels of many major engagements. Controversies that arose during the war around the decisions of corps and army commanders-such as Daniel Sickles's disregard of George Meade's orders at the Battle of Gettysburg-continue to provoke vigorous debate among students of the Civil War. Corps Commanders in Blue offers eight case studies that illuminate the critical roles the Union corps commanders played in shaping the war's course and outcome. The contributors examine, and in many cases challenge, widespread assumptions about these men while considering the array of internal and external forces that shaped their efforts on and off the battlefield. Providing insight into the military conduct of the Civil War, Corps Commanders in Blue fills a significant gap in the historiography of the war by offering compelling examinations of the challenges of corps command in particular campaigns, the men who exercised that command, and the array of factors that shaped their efforts, for good or for ill.
The units of the Waffen-SS were some of the most successful and influential combat formations produced by any country in this century. Their abilities and accomplishments, in both defense and offense, remain legendary. Finally, the commanders of these elite units are examined here in detail. In this book, the second of a two volume set, sixty-one biographies reveal the lives of the most senior Waffen-SS commanders. Details are provided for education, as well as pre-Third Reich era service in military and civil posts, and includes promotions, assignments and decorations. The 1933-1945 era, the most detailed, reveals all their commands and related data similar to their earlier service. Officially documented recollections of the combat actions that resulted in bestowal of their highest awards (Knight's Cross and German Cross in Gold) are finally discussed. Heavily documented, their individual stories continue until their eventual fates are revealed. Beginning with the only two brothers to command a Waffen-SS corps, the study ends with a pair of officers whose units fought in the final defense of Berlin during 1945. The text detail emulates the initial volume, exhaustively examining the lives of all individuals with full biographical information to include higher award recommendations for the Knight's Cross and German Cross. With a foreword by Knight's Cross with Oakleaves and Swords holder Otto Baum, significant material was provided by numerous Waffen-SS veterans. Profusely illustrated with more than 470 previously unpublished or rare photos and war-time documents, eight Order of Battle charts are also included. A full Feldpost listing Order of Battle for the armed formations at the end of 1940 is also included. Also included is an addendum to Volume 1 that adds both text and photographic material uncovered during the concluding research. Supplementary tactical symbols are also illustrated and explained, expanding the coverage of those detailed in the initial work.
An on-the-ground commander describes his brigade's first year in Iraq after the U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003, and explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency, in a firsthand analysis of success and failure in Iraq.
The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now. In Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory. Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals. Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.
Corps Commanders examines how five strikingly dissimilar British and Canadian generals fought battles and fit into the British Empire armies of the Second World War. The three Canadians controlled British formations and served under British army commanders, and the two Britons worked for and led Canadians as well. Such inter-army adjustments were fairly simple because all Anglo-Canadian commanders and staffs spoke the military language of the Camberley and Quetta staff colleges. Gunners from Montreal understood guardsmen from London – no small advantage when coordinating coalition battles involving thousands of troops. Delaney’s book offers invaluable insight into interoperability and how men animate armies in war.
A New York Times bestseller! An epic history of the decline of American military leadership—from the bestselling author of Fiasco and Churchill and Orwell. While history has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—it has been less kind to the generals of the wars that followed, such as Koster, Franks, Sanchez, and Petraeus. In The Generals, Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In chronicling the widening gulf between performance and accountability among the top brass of the U.S. military, Ricks tells the stories of great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and generals who failed themselves and their soldiers. In Ricks’s hands, this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails.
The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer BACKBONE of the Armed Forces. Introduction The Backbone of the Armed Forces To be a member of the United States Armed Forces--to wear the uniform of the Nation and the stripes, chevrons, or anchors of the military Services--is to continue a legacy of service, honor, and patriotism that transcends generations. Answering the call to serve is to join the long line of selfless patriots who make up the Profession of Arms. This profession does not belong solely to the United States. It stretches across borders and time to encompass a culture of service, expertise, and, in most cases, patriotism. Today, the Nation's young men and women voluntarily take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and fall into formation with other proud and determined individuals who have answered the call to defend freedom. This splendid legacy, forged in crisis and enriched during times of peace, is deeply rooted in a time-tested warrior ethos. It is inspired by the notion of contributing to something larger, deeper, and more profound than one's own self. Notice: This is a printed Paperback version of the "The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer BACKBONE of the Armed Forces". Full version, All Chapters included. This publication is available (Electronic version) in the official website of the National Defense University (NDU). This document is properly formatted and printed as a perfect sized copy 6x9".
This fascinating study of military leadership follows British general Bernard Law Montgomery's military career from his cadet days and service in World War I to his great victories of World War II, including his defeat of the great German panzer commander, Erwin Rommel, at Alamein. Nigel Hamilton presents a brilliant, arrogant Montgomery, who refused to bow to authority and skated on the edge of dismissal like his American counterpart, George S. Patton. Though very different in their command styles, Montgomery and Patton became the two most successful Allied field generals in World War II. From North Africa through the invasion of Sicily, they routed the Germans in battle, with Patton as a thrusting cavalryman and Montgomery as an infantry commander devoted to applying massive force at a vital point. The author contends that Montgomery's planning and leadership transformed Operation Overlord from a Second Front project doomed to fail into a successful Allied invasion plan. Allied operations after Normandy foundered in bitter arguments and failure, for Montgomery at Arnhem and Patton at Metz. Had Montgomery and Patton been ordered to fight in the same direction after Normandy, argues Professor Hamilton, the Allies might have ended the war in Europe in 1944. As it was, Montgomery and Patton had to save the Allies from sensational defeat in the Battle of the Bulge in what was to be their last battle together. The war ended for Monty on May 4, 1945, when he accepted the surrender of all German forces in the north.