Game Theory and Economic Analysis

Game Theory and Economic Analysis

Author: Christian Schmidt

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2002-06-20

Total Pages: 202

ISBN-13: 1134511183

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This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The reader is taken through a concise history of game theory and exposed to original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.


A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Author: Debraj Ray

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2007-11

Total Pages: 336

ISBN-13: 019920795X

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Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.


Effectivity Functions in Social Choice

Effectivity Functions in Social Choice

Author: J. Abdou

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 206

ISBN-13: 9401134480

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The present book treats a highly specialized topic, namely effec tivity functions, which are a tool for describing the power structure implicit in social choice situations of various kind. One of the ad vantages of effectivity functions is that they seem to contain exactly the information which is needed in several problems of implementa tion, that is in designing the rules for individual behaviour given that this behaviour at equilibrium should result in a prescribed functional connection between preferences and outcome. We shall be interested in both formal properties of effectiv ity functions and applications of them in social choice theory, and among such applications in particular the implementation problem. This choice of emphasis necessarily means that some other topics are treated only superficially or not at all. We do not attempt to cover all contributions to the field, rather we try to put some of the results together in order to get a reasonably coherent theory about the role of the power structure in cooperative implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Peter Fristrup and Bodil Hansen for critical reading of the manuscript, and Lene Petersen for typesetting in '.lEX.


Social Organization and Mechanism Design

Social Organization and Mechanism Design

Author: Claude d' Aspremont

Publisher: De Boeck Supérieur

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 348

ISBN-13: 9782804129941

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By presenting a collection of contributions by leading experts, this book illustrates the variety of issues that the discipline of "mechanism design", as a branch of game theory, is capable of dealing with : voting rules, trial procedures, public good production, cost-sharing, monopolistic regulation, bequest function, etc. However, the book illustrates also the fundamental unity of the basic questions : information gathering, communication, individual as well as coalitional strategic and dynamic behavior.


The Theory of Social Situations

The Theory of Social Situations

Author: Joseph Greenberg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 1990-10-26

Total Pages: 204

ISBN-13: 9780521376891

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This book, first published in 1991, offers an integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioural sciences. The theory presented here unifies both the representation of the social environment and the equilibrium concept. The theory requires that all alternatives that are available to the players be specified in an explicit and detailed manner, and this specification is defined as a social 'situation'. A situation, therefore, not only consists of the alternatives currently available to the players, but also includes the set of opportunities that might be induced by the players from their current environment. The theory requires that all recommended alternatives be both internally and externally stable; the recommendation cannot be self-defeating and, at the same time, should account for alternatives that were not recommended. In addition to unifying the representation and the solution concept, the theory also extends the social environments accommodated by current game theory.


The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics

The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics

Author: L. Corchon

Publisher: Springer

Published: 1996-10-11

Total Pages: 177

ISBN-13: 023037283X

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Since the early seventies, following the pioneering work by Leo Hurwicz, economists have been studying the relationship between socially optimal goals and private self-interest. The task was to reconcile the Utopian and Hobbesian traditions, using game theory to find ways to organise the society that are both socially optimal and incentive compatible. This book provides a succinct and up-to-date account of this vast literature and will be welcomed by students, lecturers and anyone wishing to update their knowledge of the field.


Chapters in Game Theory

Chapters in Game Theory

Author: Peter Borm

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2006-04-11

Total Pages: 327

ISBN-13: 030647526X

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Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen.